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Abstract 
 
After 100 years at an historically low level, inequality began to rise in the late 20th 
century, a trend which was especially marked in the English-speaking countries 
including New Zealand. Various explanations have been advanced, but internationally 
the most favoured theory is skill-biased technological change, driven by the new 
information and communication technologies. This thesis used income and wage data 
from the New Zealand Population Census and the New Zealand Income Survey to 
examine wage trends between 1991 and 2004. As in other developed countries wage 
dispersion was increasing in the 1990s, though it appears to have slowed since 2001, 
and the increased inequality is strongly correlated with workers’ skills and 
qualifications. There is also a correlation between new technology and earnings 
inequality, but this appears to be attributable to the demand for skills in the industries 
which are changing fastest, rather than anything intrinsic to the new technology.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.A  Inequality and Productivity 
 
1.A.1  The inequality problem 
 
Inequality is important. During the mid 20th century inequality was low and 
stable, and was largely ignored by the economics profession, except in relation 
to third world countries. However, since the 1970s many of the more developed 
countries have experienced rising inequality, and in recent years it has received 
greatly increased attention (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000). The English 
speaking countries, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, have 
recently experienced a very marked rise in inequality (Galbraith, 2000; Machin, 
2001; Borland, Gregory and Sheehan, 2001), and New Zealand has had a 
similar experience (Chatterjee, Podder and Mukhopadhaya, 2003). 
 
It has long been known that inequality is socially undesirable. All goods show 
diminishing returns, and unequal distributions of wealth or income do less good 
for the rich than the harm they do to the poor (Sen and Foster, 1997). But recent 
research has brought an additional urgency to our understanding of inequality. 
For many years it was assumed that inequality would boost savings and growth, 
and inequality was therefore a trade-off between equity in the present and 
efficiency for the future (Okun, 1975). However the increasing availability of 
data over the last 30 years has called this assumption seriously into question 
(Osberg, 1995), and it is now widely recognized that inequality has negative 
effects on growth which generally outweigh any benefits that might accrue 
(Easterly, 2002). Inequality is therefore a major public policy issue, and it is 
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important that we try to understand the reasons behind the recent increases and 
to consider what policy responses might be cost-effective. 
 
 
1.A.2  Possible explanations for rising inequality 
 
The late 20th century was a period of various and far-reaching changes. Prior to 
the 1970s nation states were very strong and many aspects of international 
commerce were relatively tightly controlled. But the last three decades have 
seen trade barriers reduced and capital flows increasing (Weinstein, 2005), 
increasing migration of workers to better locations and the migration of 
enterprises to cheaper locations (Feenstra, 1998; Streeten, 2001; Taylor and 
Driffield, 2005). The demographics of the labour force have also changed 
dramatically, with married women taking a greatly increased role in paid work, 
both in numbers and in levels of responsibility (Cancian, Danziger and 
Gottschalk, 1993). And especially in the English-speaking countries there has 
been reduced government involvement in the economy generally, in accordance 
with the policies of the “Washington Consensus” (Aghion and Howitt, 2005), 
policies which were followed with exceptional single-mindedness in New 
Zealand (Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece, 1996). 
 
Over much the same period there has also been a computer revolution. The cost 
of computing has plummeted, to the point where computer power which used to 
be seen as the preserve of large institutions is now affordable to the average 
household (Gittleman and Handel, 2003). Moreover connectivity has improved 
vastly, and cheap computers anywhere can now exchange information with 
other computers around the globe. These developments in information and 
communications technologies have opened up previously unimagined ways of 
structuring production, and the workplace of the future is rapidly evolving far 
beyond the simple replacement of some workers with machines (Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002). 
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Explaining the recent rise in inequality is therefore seriously overdetermined. 
Any of several explanations is plausible: The demographic changes, the 
adoption of neoliberal policies, globalization of production and the new 
technologies (Katz, 2000; Machin, 2003). In all probability more than one of 
these changes may have contributed to some extent, and there may well be some 
interaction effects between combinations of these changes. The challenge is 
therefore to tease out which of these possible causes is most likely to be a 
principal driver. And further, to the extent that any one of these explanations 
appears to be the prime suspect, it is important to consider what policy 
responses would be most likely to have worthwhile benefits.  
 
1.A.3  Productive systems and technological change 
 
Productive systems are constantly evolving, and every development in the way 
production is organised is likely to change the patterns of labour force demand.  
When we think of technology we initially think of machines, but within 
economics technology is used to mean more than just equipment. The 
technological system in use at any one moment is the combination of all factors 
of production (Krugman, 1994), including both the fixed items such as land and 
facilities, and the workers who are employed in their use.  
 
Many technological changes proceed incrementally, and we are very familiar 
with constant improvements in the goods and services available to us. But from 
time to time radical new inventions emerge, like steam power or electricity, 
which have applications in countless situations (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 
1995). Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar (2005) list just 24 of these radical general 
purpose technologies (GPTs) since the dawn of human society. It is always 
dangerous to assume that a current development is special, but nonetheless there 
are good reasons for believing that the new Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) does indeed represent one of these radical inventions (David, 
2000). 
  
When a new technology becomes available different skill sets are likely to be 
required. Most technological changes are incremental, and the changing 
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demands they impose on the workforce can usually be accommodated through 
retraining and other progressive adjustments. However the emergence of a new 
General Purpose Technology may well initiate far reaching changes with the 
potential for serious disruption of the workforce (Aghion, Howitt and Violante, 
2002). If a major change renders some skills obsolete, the effects across the 
workforce will not be uniform. Some workers will be well placed to benefit 
while others may be seriously disadvantaged. The only certainty is that the 
pattern of workers’ earnings will inevitably be altered (Murphy, Riddell and 
Romer, 1998).  
 
 
1.B  The hypothesis of this study 
 
It is the hypothesis of this study that the new information and communications 
technology (ICT) is a general purpose technology, that recent technological 
change has been skill-biased, and that the widespread adoption of new 
technology has therefore been a major contributor to the recent rise in inequality 
in the developed countries. That it is to say it is a radical technology which 
affects production techniques in a wide range of industries; and further, it is a 
development which rewards the more-skilled workers out of proportion to the 
less-skilled.   
 
There is no theoretical reason for assuming that new technology will necessarily 
either raise or lower the demand for skills. Some new technologies have 
displaced skilled workers, whereas some have complemented the skilled 
workers while taking over routine tasks. The outcome of any particular 
development can therefore only be determined empirically, but earnings 
inequality is likely to rise or fall depending on the nature of the most recent 
changes. As Alan B Krueger explains:  
 
"The new computer technology may be a complement or a 
substitute for skilled workers. In the former case the computer 
revolution is likely to lead to an expansion in earnings differentials 
based on skill, and in the latter case it is likely to lead to 
compression in skill-based differentials." (Krueger, 1993: 35). 
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 In order to test this hypothesis I examine the trends in incomes and wages in 
New Zealand since 1991. Different industries vary widely in the extent to which 
they have adopted new technology, and data exist which indicate earnings 
patterns by industry. It is therefore possible to study wage dispersion by rate of 
ICT-adoption, and to see whether new technology is connected in any way to 
earnings inequality. There is also data on occupations and the qualifications and 
other skills of workers in different industries and at different earnings levels. 
Thus wage dispersion can also be analysed according to the characteristics of 
the workers. 
 
The data also allow an analysis of trends in employment patterns. If new 
technology changes worker demand patterns, this should be reflected in the 
numbers of workers of different types who are employed in the various 
industries. If for example the total numbers of workers in one industry have 
changed little, but the numbers of workers with few qualifications have dropped 
substantially, it can be seen as a skills bias in that industry’s employment 
pattern. 
 
The key question is which categories of workers are doing better and which are 
doing worse as a result of the recent developments, and whether changing 
inequality is industry-specific or more a function of worker characteristics. To 
the extent that inequality is rising within groups of workers with similar 
characteristics, it lends support to deindustrialization in a more open trading 
climate as the prime mover. If, however, the greatest rises have been 
experienced between groups of workers, and especially if a rising skills 
premium is found across a wide variety of industries, then the technological 
hypothesis of this study looks the most plausible. 
 
If the skills-bias hypothesis is supported by the findings on inequality patterns, 
it would be interesting to know exactly what skills are in increased demand. For 
example, is there a wage premium for computer-specific knowledge, or is 
general education commanding a greater return. Ever since Nelson and Phelps 
(1966) it has been appreciated that general education raises the adaptability of 
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workers, and therefore has an added value during times of change. Thus, even if 
a skills premium is found, it could be that better skilled workers are more in 
demand because they can cope better with the changes, rather than any direct 
complementarity between their skills and the new technology. 
 
Finally, it is to be hoped that the findings of this study might inform public 
policy. In particular, it has been noted that inequality within groups of workers 
with similar characteristics tends to be transitory, whereas higher inequality 
between groups of workers is more likely to be permanent. If most of the rise in 
inequality is within-group it follows that the best public policies will probably 
be those which ease workers through the adjustment process. By contrast, rising 
between-group inequality would suggest the need for a greater commitment to a 
general upskilling, especially for young people early in their working lives. 
 
1.C  Arrangement of the thesis 
 
Chapters 2 to 4 review the New Zealand and international literature on 
technology and inequality. Chapter 2 addresses the importance of technological 
change as the engine of growth, and the need for an appropriately skilled 
workforce if new technology is to be adopted at the optimal rate and at the 
lowest social cost. Chapter 3 examines the inequality problem, and the reasons 
why inequality is to some extent unavoidable but at the same time both socially 
undesirable and an impediment to growth. 
 
Chapter 4 reviews the international literature on the theories which have been 
advanced as possible explanations for the return to rising inequality which was a 
feature of the more developed economies in the late 20th century. In particular, 
the interactions of technology and inequality are discussed, and the possible 
pathways by which recent technological changes may be exacerbating the 
inequality problem, and the extent to which new technology is a more plausible 
explanation than others which have been put forward. But this chapter also 
considers the effects of inequality on the speed at which a society can adapt to a 
new technology. 
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 Chapter 5 outlines the data sources and methods used in this thesis; the 
following four chapters present the empirical findings. Chapter 6 examines the 
trends in income inequality, using data from the Population Censuses of 1991, 
1996 and 2001. Wage equations are estimated for each industry in each Census 
year, and the ratio of the wage premium for a bachelor’s degree to the wage 
premium for only holding School Certificate is taken as indicating the return to 
skills in each industry. Trends in this ratio are followed over each Census period 
to investigate any tendency for different industries to show different patterns of 
income inequality, with those trends compared to the uptake of new technology 
in each industry. 
 
Chapter 7 considers the changing patterns of employment, again using Census 
data from the years 1991 to 2001. The proportions of workers at each 
qualification level in each industry are compared, as an indication of the extent 
to which employment opportunities are improving or declining for workers of 
different skills in industries with greater or lesser technology uptake. 
 
Chapters 8 and 9 use the more wage-specific data from the New Zealand 
Income Surveys of 2002 and 2004. This more recent source of data allows a 
check on trends since the 2001 Populations Census. In Chapter 8, quantile 
regression on wage data is used to estimate trends at the 10th percentile and the 
90th percentile simultaneously, indicating the extent to which wage inequality is 
related to new technology. Controlling for qualifications and other skills it is 
possible to estimate how much the wage dispersion reflects differences which 
are intrinsic to the industries, and how much it reflects higher rewards for the 
workers’ skills and characteristics which are valued in those industries which 
are making more use of new technology. 
 
Chapter 9 uses the technique pioneered by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) 
for reweighting one set of observations to the characteristics of another, as a 
method of isolating which variables explain the differences between two sets of 
workers. The workers in the New Zealand Income Surveys for 2002 and 2004 
are divided into two approximately equal groups, according to whether they 
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work in industries with high or low uptake of new technologies. As a 
confirmation of the quantile regressions in Chapter 8, the DiNardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux technique is then used to test how much the difference between the 
two sets is explained by the characteristics of the workers, and how much it is 
driven by the industries themselves.  
 
Chapter 10 summarizes the findings and considers their policy implications. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Literature on Technology, Technical Change and 
Growth 
 
 
 
2.A  Technology in the economy 
 
It is part of the hypothesis of this study that the new Information and 
Communications Technology is a General Purpose Technology, which is 
bringing about far-reaching changes in the way work is organised in a wide 
range of industries. The nature of technological change is therefore an important 
part of the background to this study. 
 
The present chapter reviews the international literature on technology as an 
economic phenomenon, with special attention to the processes of technological 
change and the role of work force skills as an integral part of the technological 
system. It begins with an overview of the recent literature on the role of 
technology, and the different elements which make up the whole technological 
system, including economic institutions.  
 
Neoclassical economics held a dominant position for much of the late 20th 
century. However neoclassical analysis is primarily concerned with efficient 
allocation, and was almost silent on technological change which it took as 
exogenous. The endogenous growth theory of the 1980s and 1990s moved 
technological change to the centre of the growth process, and because of the 
interactions of workforce skills with technological systems it also brought a 
change of emphasis from physical capital to human capital formation.  
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This chapter reviews the literature on endogenous growth and the importance of 
recent developments in human capital theory. In particular it looks at the 
literature on so-called General Purpose Technologies (GPTs), those 
technological developments which have far-reaching effects on a wide variety 
of industries, and the importance of human capital in an age of adjustment to a 
new GPT. 
 
 
2.B  Technology and technological change 
 
2.B.1 The significance of technology 
 
Living standards today vary immensely between the world’s richest and the 
world’s poorest countries. However this is a relatively recent phenomenon, and 
before the industrial revolution the gaps were very much narrower (Galor and 
Weil, 1999; Olson, 1996). David S. Landes notes that Switzerland today is some 
400 times richer than Mozambique, whereas 250 years ago “this gap was 
perhaps 5 to 1” (Landes, 1998: xx), and Dosi and Fabiani (1994) suggest the 
ratio may have been 2 to 1 or less. The difference lies in the different ways in 
which production is organized and performed. In a poor country, long and 
exhausting hours of human effort produce very few of the goods and services 
which the workers desire. The more prosperous economy is the one with the 
more efficient productive systems, the one which achieves greater output per 
worker (Lutzker, 2003).  
 
The gaps have appeared in the last few centuries because the productive 
systems improved faster in some places than others (Lucas, 1988). When 
compounded over many decades, even small differences in the growth rate add 
up to a very large difference in productivity (Landau, Taylor and Wright, 1996), 
and: 
"Output per hour worked in the United States today is 10 times as 
valuable as output per hour worked 100 years ago" (Maddison, 
1982, quoted in Romer, 1990: S71). 
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The productivity of an economy depends on the level of technology in use. The 
word “technology” conjures up images of machines and equipment, of greater 
or lesser sophistication, from simple tools such as axes and wheelbarrows 
through to the most advanced satellites and fibre optics. These things are indeed 
technologies, but within economics the words technology and technological 
change are used in a rather broader sense than this. The current technology of a 
society incorporates every part of the way production is organised (Stoneman, 
2002), including purely organisational or administrative features such as the 
legal system and social organisation. As Paul Krugman puts it: 
 
"When economists speak of technological change... they mean any 
kind of change in the relationship between inputs and outputs” 
(Krugman, 1994: 58). 
 
The way production itself is distributed over a greater or lesser number of firms, 
and the organisation of tasks within a firm are all aspects of a society’s 
technology. Any development in the way natural resources, labour and capital 
goods are combined represents a technological change, even if there is no 
introduction of any new equipment. Thus a technological change can be any 
change in the way inputs are combined, any “improvement in the instructions 
for mixing together raw materials” (Romer, 1990: S72). It is the recombination 
of these inputs in more efficient ways that is fundamental to improved 
productivity (Bresnahan and Gordon, 1997; Freeman, 1991; Pasinetti, 1981), 
and without which standards of living cannot rise: 
 
 "For real economic miracles one must look to productivity growth."  
             (Baumol et alia, 1989: 9) 
 
 
2.B.2  Institutions as part of the productive system 
 
Any improvement in general welfare therefore depends crucially on changing 
methods (Aghion and Howitt, 1998), but changing methods depend as much on 
institutions which foster change as they do on the ideas for specific change 
(Freeman, 1996; Nelson, 1991). If a country has a strongly traditional 
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organization, and all activity is governed by traditional institutions and 
relationships, there will be neither incentive nor opportunity for any sort of 
innovation. "China was much richer in the sixteenth century than England" 
(Drucker, 1971: 131), but China’s productive systems stagnated in a very 
traditional society, while Britain succeeded in shaking off its medieval past and 
establishing institutions which fostered mercantile and industrial expansion 
(Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986).  
 
Domestic institutions such as habits, social ties and legal systems all affect the 
extent to which a society promotes or inhibits change (Freeman, 1992; Simon, 
1994). The feudal economy based on a manorial system gave its members 
considerable security and mutual support, as well as allowing sufficient 
specialization for a range of skills to be developed and passed on between 
generations. But it was essentially static. People knew their place and had no 
incentive to think about making changes to the way production was organized. 
The rise of individualism and escape from rigid social structures appears to 
have been a prerequisite for the entrepreneurship which brought technological 
changes and rising productivity (Cameron, 1993; Landes, 1998): 
 
"The history of technology suggests that changes in technology and 
changes in organization and institutions are intimately related…”  
(Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998a: 73). 
 
 
There are many examples of governments and other community institutions 
impeding change, but a social infrastructure which facilitates change will not 
arise by itself; it has to be created (Hall and Jones, 1999).  The recently 
successful Asian economies have been notable for relatively high levels of 
strategic government intervention (Rowen, 1998). By contrast, the stagnation of 
the more laissez faire Latin American countries is a reminder that positive 
change is most unlikely to occur without positive government and effective 
democracy (Freeman, 1996; Olson, 1996; Stiglitz, 1998).  
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The institutions that foster new methods and new ways of thinking cannot 
spring up automatically. Especially in areas like education and infrastructure, 
where there are large complementarities and powerful network effects (Hall and 
Khan, 2003), change promoting institutions can only be put in place by a 
community which separates government from vested interests (Putterman and 
Rueschemeyer, 1992): 
 
"Domestic institutions have been the most important differentiators 
between those countries that have ultimately succeeded in attaining 
widely spread and widely shared economic development and those 
that have not" (Adelman and Morris, 1997: 834). 
 
 
2.B.3  The evolution of industrial patterns 
 
It is inconceivable that every sector of an economy will progress at the same 
rate as every other, so every area of change will lead to changes in the relative 
prices of different goods and services. If, for example, the introduction of new 
techniques raises the efficiency of the textile industry, the cost of clothing 
relative to other costs can be expected to fall. As relative prices change relative 
demand patterns will also change, resulting in a different pattern of revealed 
preferences.  
 
Thus any innovation in any aspect of the productive system will have flow on 
effects, both in terms of demand for goods and services and also in terms of the 
demand for workers in the industries which produce them. Traditionally the 
majority of workers were employed in rural areas, either directly in agriculture 
or in closely associated cottage industries. But every innovation in industrial 
practice led to different patterns of worker demand, and also to different 
patterns of industrial location and land use. 
 
"Technological change impacts on all areas of economic activity”  
(Stoneman, 2002: 249) 
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Moreover, unless there are major barriers to trade, changes in different parts of 
the world alter the production frontier for everyone. When any one local 
economy changes it will bring about new possibilities for other economies 
which trade with it, worsening their comparative advantage in fields where the 
one has shown gains in efficiency, and improving their comparative advantage 
in all other areas: 
 
"The relative importance of different activities, as measured by 
their economic weight, is subject to continual change both within 
nations and between nations” (Metcalfe and Gibbons, 1991: 485). 
 
 
 
2.C  History of technology and the increase in complexity    
 
 
2.C.1  Urbanization, specialization and  market expansion 
 
The history of technology traces the evolution of complexity. In the middle 
ages, the ways in which people produced the world’s goods and services were 
very stable for centuries. But since the Renaissance, and especially since the 
Industrial Revolution, they have been in constant change. Moreover the pace of 
that change is increasing exponentially, with new ideas, tools and organizational 
systems, both within firms and in society at large, replacing older ones at ever 
increasing speed (Streeten, 2001: 74). 
 
There was never a time without some specialization of tasks, and even the 
ancient Greeks were aware that production could be raised by having people 
specialize in particular roles, with some arrangement for exchange so that 
everyone enjoyed a full range of goods (Xenophon, quoted by Maitland, 1819, 
1962: 282). But the ability to develop specialized skills is constrained by the 
size of the market available. There were always some goods travelling 
substantial distances, and trade fairs for long-distance trade were emerging as 
early as the 7th century (Derry and Williams, 1960). But prior to the fifteenth 
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century "by far the greatest part of commercial exchange, both by volume and 
by value, was local" (Cameron, 1993: 119), and as late as 1530: 
 
“the majority of English men and women lived in rural households 
which were almost economically self-sufficient” (Hill, 1969: 20). 
 
The evolution from a world of feudal estates to a modern individualistic 
economy required sweeping changes in settlement patterns as well as social 
institutions. It is common to think of the great changes in productive methods 
resulting from the industrial revolution (Crafts, 1977; Spiezia and Vivarelli, 
2000). But the 200 years from 1530 to 1730 saw far-reaching developments in 
social and mercantile structures which were a necessary precursor (Landes, 
1989). Even before the start of the Industrial Revolution, Daniel Defoe was 
recording a high level of specialization: 
 
"Almost everything that is sold, whether it be the product of nature or 
art, passes through a great variety of hands, and some variety of 
operations also, before it becomes (what we call) fit for sale" (Defoe, 
1730, 1979: 212). 
 
 
The process of modernization involved three interrelated developments: 
urbanization, specialization and trade, each of which is both necessary for and a 
product of the others. From the early sixteenth century people moved to the 
towns and cities in unprecedented numbers. Work became more specialized, and 
activities which had taken place within a broader context (if at all) emerged as 
individual industries in their own right. 
 
In addition to creating more efficient urban industries, the drift of population 
away from the rural estates gave an impetus to increased efficiency on the land. 
Where traditionally the large estates had fed their owners and all the workers on 
the estate, agriculture was increasingly required to supply food for urban 
consumption with an ever declining proportion of the workers on the land.  
 
"The massive shift of population from agriculture [would not] have 
been possible without the mechanization of farming, and without the 
creation of urban jobs through reduced prices as a result of industrial 
mechanization" (Oshima, 1994: 253) 
 
 15
The possible rate of urbanization was thus constrained by the rate at which 
agricultural productivity could rise, and efficiency gains were as much a part of 
the rural sector as of the urban (Rosenberg & Birdzell): 
 
"It was not surprising that the Netherlands, with the largest 
proportion of town dwellers and a constant shortage of grain, was the 
leader in innovation" (Pennington, 1989: 71) 
 
 
2.C.2  The evolution of institutions 
 
It was noted at the start of this chapter that institutions are as important a part of 
the current technology as the equipment and methods used by firms. Markets 
are themselves institutions, and the urbanization of the population was only 
possible through the evolution of markets and ownership structures which 
facilitated the formation of independent trading and manufacturing enterprises: 
 
 
"In the blooming of certain economies, such as medieval Flanders 
and Renaissance Italy, institutional change such as the development 
of markets and the growth of trade and specialization loomed large." 
(Mokyr, 2002: 286) 
 
 
Progress since the Industrial Revolution has been marked by ever increasing 
complexity of commercial relationships, and every such increase has required 
appropriate commercial institutions (Abramowitz and David, 1996). The 
inadequacy of social institutions is therefore widely held to be one of the major 
impediments to growth, responsible for some countries falling so far behind 
others (Day, 1994; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997):  
 
"Many historical accounts... point to the importance of institutional 
innovation in both Germany and the United States which facilitated 
their 'catching up' with and forging ahead of Britain" (Freeman, 
1996: 166) 
 
Thus, with every increase in economic complexity it appears that structural and 
policy issues gain increased importance in facilitating development (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991).  
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 2.D  Growth, technology and human capital   
 
2.D.1  Early growth theory 
 
Since the 1950s growth theory has been dominated by the neoclassical model, in 
which growth is seen as a function of capital and labour, while technology is 
taken as exogenous and equally available to all countries (Conceição and 
Galbraith, 2001). However, in the last 25 years  the belief that neoclassical 
growth theory would help our understanding of economic development has 
increasingly come to be doubted (Adelman, 2000; Nelson, 1994). 
 
Firstly, the idea of capital formation as a driver of growth has been seriously 
questioned. Early growth theory was rooted in the idea of a dichotomy between 
a traditional agricultural sector with a low capital to labour ratio, and a more 
modern urban industrial sector with a higher ratio of capital to labour 
(Abramowitz, 1994). In this framework growth was seen as the process of 
building up the latter and progressively transferring labour from the one to the 
other (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Modern industry was therefore seen as 
requiring major capital investments. Rich people were believed to have more 
capacity to save and therefore to invest, so the rich were seen as growth 
promoting (Epstein and Gintis, 1995a; Lindert and Williamson, 1985).  
 
“If savings are the key to economic growth, through their 
deployment  in increasingly productive technology, and if the 
marginal propensity to save rises as income rises, then a more 
unequal society will save more and grow faster. This at least is the 
conventional wisdom..." (Kaelble and Thomas, 1991, pp. 1-2). 
 
 
In recent years this line of argument has been seriously called into question. For 
one thing no evidence has been found for savings rising with inequality 
(Birdsall, Graham and Sabot, 1998; Galbraith, 2001). The rich do not appear to 
save more. But more fundamentally, savings do not appear to drive investment 
(Epstein and Gintis, 1995a); rather it is the investment level which leads savings 
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(Gordon, 1995; Carvalho, 1997); Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001). As Keynes pointed 
out, savings are an effect, not a cause: 
 
“Increased investment will always be accompanied by increased 
saving, but it can never be preceded by it. Dishoarding and credit 
expansion provides not an alternative to increased saving, but a 
necessary preparation for it. It is the parent, not the twin of increased 
saving" (Keynes, 1939:  572) 
 
 
Various attempts have been made to use capital to boost productivity. It has 
been tried extensively in third world countries, where borrowing abroad was 
hoped to kick start growth (Van der Ploeg and Tang, 1992), as well as in the 
socialist countries like the former Soviet Union where domestic savings were 
generated by official planning. The dismal results of all these schemes suggest 
that Keynes had an important point.  
 
A second serious shortcoming of the neoclassical model lies in its prediction 
that the less advanced economies will tend to catch up with the more advanced 
(Amable, 1994; Dornbusch, Fischer and Startz, 2004). The rationale behind this 
belief is that technology is a public good and available to all, and that capital 
will flow to the places where it will earn the highest returns. Following this 
logic capital will flow away from the most advanced economies toward the less 
advanced where labour is cheaper, and these latter will show higher growth 
rates (Boltho and Holtham, 1992; Pack, 1994). 
 
If this prediction were close to the truth the world would look very different. As 
soon as one country got somewhat ahead of the others, capital would start 
flowing toward the laggers and the gaps would close up again (Lutzker, 2003). 
The world would be expected to display a high level of uniformity. Some 
evidence has been found for convergence within clubs of similar countries 
(Baumol, 1986; Howitt, 2000), but world wide over the last 500 years the gaps 
between rich and poor countries appear to have been widening inexorably 
(Lucas, 1988; Pritchett, 1997), and: 
 
“different countries have remained on seemingly disparate growth 
paths for relatively long periods of time." (Grossman and Helpman, 
1994: 23). 
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2.D.2  Technology and endogenous growth 
 
In addition, and probably more fundamentally, neoclassical ideas on growth 
have come under fire because of their inability to address technological change 
(Mokyr, 1990; Crafts, 1998). Neoclassical thinking emphasizes the importance 
of the efficient allocation of resources, and while distorted allocations are 
certainly wasteful this approach provides little help in understanding the 
processes of changing productive systems and improving output: 
 
"General neoclassical theory... is basically about inputs, outputs, 
prices, equilibrium configurations and associated phenomena. It is 
not well oriented toward considering things like technologies, firms 
as productive organizations, or institutions..." (Nelson, 1994: 303) 
 
 
It is now widely accepted that technological change is the ultimate source of 
economic growth (Helpman, 1998; Lau, 1996). Moreover, technology is not an 
exogenous given but is constantly evolving within economies, an intuition 
which gave birth to the endogenous growth theories which have gained 
increasing acceptance over the last 20 years (Amable, 1994; Arrow, 1991). Paul 
Romer, the founding father of endogenous growth theory, has written that it: 
 
“distinguishes itself from neoclassical growth by emphasizing that 
economic growth is an endogenous outcome of an economic system, 
not the result of forces that impinge from the outside" (Romer, 1994: 
3). 
 
Thus endogenous growth theory discards the idea that technology is a public 
good which is universally available, and treats it as the most important variable 
influencing growth rates in different countries (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). 
It is therefore a more helpful approach in terms of accommodating different 
technologies, and coping with the wide variation in growth rates and rather 
general global divergence of growth paths noted in the previous section (Aghion 
and Howitt, 1998). 
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2.D.3  Human capital as a factor of production 
  
Human capital is the general term applied to all “acquired characteristics of 
workers that make them more productive" (Filer, Hamermesh and Rees, 1996: 
84), including general education and vocational training, as well as skills and 
understanding picked up on the job.  
 
Workers are far from homogeneous. They vary widely in terms of innate ability, 
but almost all are capable of acquiring skills at least to some extent, and it is 
clear from the labour market that employers are willing to pay very large premia 
for workers who have acquired greater skills. Evidently human capital improves 
their usefulness (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2005; Green and Riddell, 2003).  
 
An extensive literature documents the relationship between human capital and 
productivity (Arrow, 1994). Workers are a fundamental part of the total 
productive system, and different levels of technology require workers with 
different sets of skills. Thus human capital is itself a vital part of the current 
technology. The rise of specialization noted earlier was accompanied by rising 
levels of both general education and occupation-specific skills, and workers in 
the more industrialized countries are spending more time in education and 
training than ever before, a reflection of the symbiosis between human capital 
and other aspects of the productive system. (Green, Felstead and Gallie, 2003; 
Murphy and Welch, 1993). 
 
If technological change is seen as central to growth (Bresnahan and Gordon, 
1997; Freeman, 1991), and human capital is a vital part of technology, then in 
terms of promoting growth, human capital gains increased significance over 
fixed capital (Dunne and Schmitz, 1995). This is an idea which goes back at 
least as far as Edward F Denison:  
 
"Past studies have identified increasing education of employed 
persons as a major source of growth since at least 1910, and 
especially since about 1930” (Denison, 1985: 15) 
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2.D.4  The special characteristics of human capital 
 
One problem with the neoclassical approach to growth is that capital markets 
are imperfect and capital does not automatically flow to the place of best use. 
But with human capital the problems are much more extreme, since: 
 
“intangibles such as human capital and knowledge capital have 
peculiar economic properties that may well not be well represented 
by the standard formulations." (Grossman and Helpman, 1991: 22).   
 
 
For several reasons information is ill-suited to allocation by conventional 
markets. Some skills are highly task- or industry-specific, but many skills are 
generic, and represent an advantage in a variety of employment settings. Human 
capital is an attribute of individual workers which they take with them when 
they change employers, so it is only partially excludable (Fischer, 2003). It is 
generally non-rival (Dowrick, 2002a; Jones, 2005) and far from homogeneous 
(Hodgson, 1999). And a feature which distinguishes it markedly from physical 
capital is that it has such high complementarities that skilled workers flock 
together (Romer, 1994). 
 
The benefits of R&D are also very hard to keep entirely private, and indeed it 
has been established that spillovers have public benefits that outweigh their 
private costs (Baumol, 2000; Engelbrecht , 2003; Stiglitz, 1999; Verspagen, 
1994). For all these reasons knowledge and knowledge expansion are likely to 
be seriously underprovided if left to an unmodified market. 
 
 
2.E  Technology and skills 
 
2.E.1  Technology-skill complementarity 
 
There are two distinct linkages between technological change and human capital 
(Engelbrecht, 2001). Firstly, new technological ideas need to be conceived, but 
secondly, these new techniques need to be adopted and adapted to meet the 
different needs of different firms and circumstances. 
 21
 Obviously it is human capital which creates new technology. There will be no 
new technology unless there are people thinking about different ways of doing 
things, and human capital applied to R&D is therefore seen by many 
commentators to be the driver of new technology (Abramowitz and David, 
1996; Bartel and Sicherman, 1999; Jones and Williams, 1998; Verspagen, 
1994). 
 
"The new growth theory has explicitly drawn the connection between 
technological change and investment in knowledge production"  
(Mokyr, 2002: 291). 
 
 
But new technologies are seldom created in a form that is instantly applicable, 
since the combinations of other inputs will vary from one economy to another 
(Basu and Weil, 1998). Different communities will want to use new 
technologies in the way that is most appropriate to their circumstances 
(Maddison, 1994), and the existence or lack of complementary infrastructure 
and equipment in a society, as well as skills among the workers in charge of 
implementing the new technology, will affect the efficiency with which new 
equipment and methods are adopted: 
 
"Even the initial process of technology transfer is fraught with 
problems because technology is never completely codified, and to 
operate it optimally in different environments requires adaptation" 
(Amsden, 1992: 55). 
 
 
R&D has often been used as a proxy for new technology (Allen, 2001; Berman, 
Bound and Griliches, 1994; Katz and Autor, 1999), but it has also been widely 
criticized for its failure to proxy the diffusion of technology (Hollanders and ter 
Weel, 2002). Production and diffusion are both necessary, but R&D only 
measures the first (Stoneman, 2002). 
 
Many of the most innovative firms are SMEs which conduct little R&D 
(Baldwin, 1996), and there appears to be scant connection between those firms 
which produce new technology and those which are innovative in its application 
(Lundgren, 2000; Metcalfe and Diliso, 1996): 
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"A range of new OECD data show that the United States, Canada, 
New Zealand, Australia, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands 
have the highest rate of diffusion of ICT" (Pilat, 2002: 4) 
 
 
The United States is a world leader in the development of computing hardware 
and software and the Scandinavians have been major contributors to 
telecommunications. But diffusion has clearly occurred in several of the above 
countries without any significant contribution to ICT production. Dean Parham 
has noted that “Australia is an advanced ICT user, not producer" (Parham, 2002: 
197), and the same comment doubtless applies to New Zealand.  
 
Thus human capital is important in terms of keeping up to date with new trends, 
and the imagination to see how they may be adapted to local needs (Helpman 
and Rangel, 1999). Rates of technological diffusion vary widely from country to 
country, a fact which has often been seen as one of the reasons behind the wide 
variation in growth rates (Baumol, Batey Blackman and Wolff, 1989). It 
therefore seems highly likely that technological diffusion is an important factor 
in the widely reported correlation between human capital and growth (Barro, 
1991; Haveman, 2000).  
 
"The absorptive capacity of an economy, which is to a large extent 
determined by its stock of human capital, will influence the ability of 
a country to take on board either embodied or disembodied 
knowledge" Engelbrecht and Darroch, 1999: 284 
 
 
 
2.E.2  Changing skills demand over time 
 
At least since the beginnings of industrial society, firms have paid a premium 
for workers who are perceived to have skills which are of value to the firm 
(Blundell, Dearden, Meghir and Sianesi, 1999; Bowles and Gintis, 2000). The 
size of this skills premium is an indicator of the comparative values of different 
forms of human capital, since the acquired skills represent the difference which 
the firm is willing to pay more for (Ashenfelter and Rouse, 2000). 
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This skills premium has not been constant over time, but has risen or fallen in 
different periods. This has given rise to the theory that some phases of 
technological change have been biased toward skilled workers while some 
phases have been biased in favour of the unskilled. There is no reason to expect 
technological change to be generally either skill-biased or unskill-biased, and it 
is easy to think of specific examples of each. Especially in factory work new 
machinery may well replace skilled workers and need only unskilled workers, 
whereas other technologies may complement the talents of the highly skilled 
and displace the less skilled.  
 
 
However the skills premium will also reflect the availability of skills in the 
labour force. In the western democracies the supply of educated workers has 
been constantly on the rise since the early nineteenth century (Easterlin, 1981), 
and a number of countries, especially in the Far East, have joined this trend 
more recently (Stevenson, 1998). The late nineteenth century was a period of 
rapidly rising basic literacy (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000), secondary 
education was extended to many more pupils in the early twentieth century, and 
higher education has expanded greatly since the 1960s (Goldin and Katz, 1996).  
 
In New Zealand, the Education Act of 1877 which established free, secular and 
compulsory education up to age 12 saw literacy rise from 83% in 1874 to 93% 
at the start of the twentieth century, and: 
 
“By 1939, two-thirds of all children between the ages of 12 and 18 
attended some form of secondary education, compared with around 8 
percent in 1900” (Statistics New Zealand, 2000:112). 
 
 
 
The rise of the factory system has been widely seen as deskilling: 
 
“Historically, changes in technology have been associated with 
deskilling the labour force in the longer run. The substitution of 
machines for skilled labour in the industrial revolution in the 19th 
century and the move towards Fordist manufacturing techniques in 
the 1950s are the most widely cited examples." (O’Mahony, 
Robinson and Vecchi, 2004: 3).  
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However there is considerable reason to think that it was not so much deskilling 
as a movement from one set of skills to another. Many of the traditional 
artisanal skills were indeed replaced by machines (Krugman, 1994), skills which 
in earlier times had been passed down within families from generation to 
generation. But with rising mechanisation the pattern of labour demand 
inevitably changed. Fewer workers were needed on the shop floor for a given 
quantity of production, but more workers were needed in marketing and 
transport, as well as technical skills in maintaining the new factory equipment, if 
the new possibilities which had been opened up by new production methods 
were to be realized. Williamson has estimated that human capital was important 
for growth in Britain as early as 1850 (Williamson, 1991b: 67). 
 
The rising general level of skills was associated with a strong pattern of rising 
demand (Acemoglu, 2002; Katz, 2000). During a phase when supply is 
outstripping demand it is quite possible that the skills premium would decline 
even as the aggregate demand for skills was rising (Heckman, 2003), and this 
appears to have occurred in some decades: 
 
“The growth in relative skill supply was smaller and the increase in 
relative skill demand was larger in the 1980s than in the 1940s and 
1970s - the decades in which the education premium fell." (Juhn, 
1999: 439) 
 
 
But since 1980 the skills premium has been rising in many countries (Galor and 
Moav, 2000; Nickell and Bell, 1996) despite a steady rise in numbers of 
students continuing to higher education. This suggests that the recent rise in the 
demand for skills has been particularly strong (Topel, 1997). 
 
 
2.E.3  Returns to adaptability 
 
Every current technology requires a particular skill set, and changes in the 
available technology mean that the optimal skill set is also constantly changing 
as old skills obsolesce (Bartel and Sicherman, 1998; Howitt, 1996).  
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But change itself places particular demands on workers. Ever since the 
pioneering work of Huffmann (1974) and Schultz (1975), it has been known 
that workers with better education are better equipped to manage change. This is 
not so much a function of the skills required to use the new technology, as the 
ability to assess the new possibilities and manage the change process itself: 
 
“Decision makers with more education can more quickly grasp 
changes and adjust more quickly and accurately to them..." 
(Huffmann, 1974: 95-96). 
 
 
A strong correlation has been found between skill growth and the pace of 
change (Wolff, 2000), and in recent years an extensive literature has appeared 
on the economics of volatility. In particular, increased volatility is widely seen 
as tending to dampen growth, probably because of the costs of uncertainty 
(Ramey and Ramey, 1995). Dynamic communities are always in transition 
(Landau, Taylor and Wright, 1996), and the greater the rate of change, the 
greater the need for a workforce that can adapt to the new opportunities (Galor 
and Moav, 2000; Phelps, 1997): 
 
 “Education is more productive the more volatile the state of 
technology" (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004, p. 111). 
 
 
Thus two distinct kinds of human capital are required during a phase of change, 
and there is a premium paid for the possession of skills appropriate to the 
current technology, but also a premium paid for adaptability during periods of 
change. All change incurs risk (Helpman and Rangel, 1999). The workers of 
greatest value during a period of change are therefore those who are best 
equipped to assess and minimize risk, rather than those with the specific skills 
associated with the technology itself (Nelson and Phelps, 1966).  And the 
greater the step being taken, the more critical the need for good risk assessment 
becomes: 
 
“Entrepreneurs face a trade-off between productivity and difficulty. 
A great innovation, giving a large productivity gain over the 
technology previously used, implies a higher degree of ignorance 
about its optimal use and a larger scope for mistakes" (Hassler and 
Rodriguez-Mora, 2000: 889). 
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2.F  The nature of technological change   
2.F.1  Radical versus incremental change 
 
Technological change takes two distinct forms (Freeman, 1992; Metcalfe, 
1994). A large proportion of change is incremental improvement, which builds 
slowly over long periods. Persistent refinement brings about ever improving 
reliability, economy or value for money of some sort. One example might be the 
remarkable improvements in the efficiency of commercial aircraft, which have 
seen a mode of travel which was very expensive 50 years ago evolve into mass 
transport. 
However from time to time radically new technologies emerge which, rather 
than merely improving on existing techniques, offer a fundamental change in 
the productive system (Soete and Verspagen, 1991). Lipsey, Carlaw and Bekar 
(2005) estimate that there have been some 24 radical inventions since the start 
of recorded history, such as steam power in the nineteenth century or 
electrification at the start of the 20th. 
The ultimate effects of radical change are often so far-reaching that only a tiny 
part of the full potential is initially evident, either to the inventor or to the 
industrialists who might benefit by adopting the idea. For example "The 
telegraph facilitated the formation of geographically dispersed enterprises..." 
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000: 24), a downstream effect of far greater 
significance than could have been imagined by those who simply thought they 
were developing a faster form of communication. Thus a wave of change can be 
initiated which ultimately redefines a wide range of productive activities.  
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 2.F.2  General purpose technologies  (GPTs) 
Radical new technologies of this sort are often referred to as General Purpose 
Technologies (GPTs). These GPTs are: 
 
“characterized by the potential for pervasive use in a wide range of 
sectors and by their technological dynamism." (Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg, 1995: 84). 
 
Technological change does not proceed at a smooth rate over time. Commonly, 
change comes in waves which start with a new technology and follow a sigmoid 
curve on a very long time frame (Aghion and Howitt, 2002; David, 2000). At 
first change is very slow (Freeman, 1992), partly through uncertainty or lack of 
knowledge on the part of those who might benefit, but largely because of the 
lack of supporting technologies which only begin to evolve as the need for them 
is felt (Crafts, 2003): 
 
“The fruits of the Industrial Revolution were slow in coming. Per 
capita living standards increased little initially, but production 
technologies changed dramatically in many industries and sectors, 
preparing the way for sustained Schumpeterian growth in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, when technological progress spread to 
previously unaffected industries.” (Mokyr, 1990:83) 
 
As the technology becomes more widely adopted the pace of change quickens. 
Complementary products begin to appear, which make the new technology 
easier to implement profitably, and awareness of the new technology diffuses 
through the community (Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998a). Change proceeds 
very rapidly in the middle phase, around the time when the minority of firms 
which pioneered the new practices swells into a majority. When most firms 
have made the move the pace slackens again, as the outstanding firms resist 
making the change either through innate conservatism or because of particular 
reasons why the old technology suits their purposes better. 
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Many commentators have noted that the early phase of adoption of a new GPT 
is accompanied by lowered profitability and poor productivity figures (Howell 
and Wolff, 1992; Jorgensen and Stiroh, 1999). Initially there were surprised 
comments that technology changed but productivity did not rise simultaneously 
(Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Rosenberg, 1996), a pattern which gave rise to 
Solow’s oft-quoted paradox:  
"You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity 
statistics" (Solow, 1987). 
 
But closer study of GPTs has established that poor productivity is inevitable at 
the beginning of a wave. New technologies arrive in two distinct phases 
(Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998a). During the first phase firms are investing in 
the new technology but the lack of complementary skills and facilities holds 
back productivity and profitability, since “most GPTs play the role of 'enabling 
technologies', opening up new opportunities rather than offering complete, final 
solutions” (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995: 84). During the second phase the 
complementary inputs in terms of institutions, skills and other goods begin to 
catch up, and positive returns begin to be realized (Helpman and Rangel, 1999). 
Moreover, the faster the change, the more it may impede the growth of 
productivity in the short term (Howitt, 1998): 
"It is only as new technologies are used and spread widely in an 
economy that any real welfare gains arise from those technologies"               
(Stoneman, 2002: 3) 
 
 
2.F.3  ICT as a general purpose technology 
 
Many authors have suggested that information and communication technologies 
(ICT) represent the latest of these GPTs (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000). Lipsey, 
Bekar and Carlaw (1998) set down three criteria for a GPT -  pervasiveness, 
technological dynamism and innovational complementarities -  and ICT meets 
all of these. 
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"The pervasiveness of ICT is not just a question of a few new 
products or industries but of a technology which affects every 
industry and every service, their interrelationships and indeed the 
whole way of life of industrial societies." (Freeman and Soete, 1994: 
42) 
 
In terms of technological dynamism, the ratio of computing power to cost has 
increased at a startling rate, making simple but useful ICT affordable for even 
very small business applications (Jorgensen and Stiroh, 1999). This increased 
affordability led to an explosion in complementary goods and software 
packages, with 
“cheaper and better ICT facilitating co-invention of more and more 
complex uses” (Bresnahan, 1999: F402).  
 
ICT has far-reaching complementarities (Bertschek, 2003; Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt, 2000). The nature and quality of services supplied have been changing and 
improving ever since the beginning of telegraphic communication in the late 
nineteenth century. But the most dramatic changes came with the development 
of networks which allow computers to communicate over large distances. The 
combination of computing with telecommunications has facilitated such 
developments as the world wide web for information and marketing 
(Brynjolfsson and Kahin, 2000), and the ability of large companies to centralize 
customer services on call centres.  
Tasks which in the past would have been performed within companies are today 
much more easily outsourced. This often leads to redistribution of tasks between 
firms (Lindbeck and Snower, 2000; Rubery and Grimshaw, 2001), not 
infrequently in different countries at distant locations (Feenstra and Hansen, 
1996): 
"The most striking findings are that the main thrust has come not 
from final demand but from its pervasive role through inter-industry 
relationships, supplying other producers (Greenhalgh and Gregory, 
2001: 644). 
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2.G  Impact of new technology in the workplace 
 
2.G.1  GPTs and workplace organization 
 
An important reason for treating ICT as a General Purpose Technology is that 
its effects run far beyond mere automation. Early computerization used 
machines to save on labour costs by carrying out specific tasks. But the 
development of shared information systems meant a breakdown of traditional 
roles in many workplaces, as it became possible to share virtually all firm 
information with all staff, at sites almost anywhere in the world (David, 2000; 
Lindbeck and Snower, 2000).  
 
Many commentators have noted a strong correlation between ICT adoption and 
workplace reorganization (Black and Lynch, 2003; Fernald and Ramnath, 
2004). The adoption of ICT in the workplace has led to changes in management 
systems (Ducatel and Miles, 1994), as workflows have been freed from the 
constraints of specific units with traditional hierarchies (Simpson, 1999). But 
with better informed staff it has also encouraged flatter structures (Caroli and 
van Reenen, 2001): 
 
“in which nonmanagerial workers are involved in problem solving 
and identifying opportunities for innovation and growth” (Black and 
Lynch, 2003: 545) 
 
 
But workplace reorganization is not merely encouraged by new technology, it 
appears to be almost necessary. There is strong evidence that merely automating 
traditional systems results in little benefit, and the effective use of new 
technologies actually depends on reorganization (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1998; 
Pilat, 2002): 
 
"In order to reap the benefits from computerization, firms have to 
redesign the organization of work… decentralize decision making, 
and make flexibility a prime goal in planning production and product 
design" (Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998a: 73). 
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It has also been found that more flexible organizations are more receptive to 
new technology (Roos, 1991). Thus new technology and reorganized 
workplaces are systematically connected in a positive feedback loop (Hitt and 
Snir, 1999), in which ICT adoption facilitates workplace reorganization, but 
reorganization necessarily accompanies ICT adoption (Wolff, 2002). This view 
is supported by the finding that change tends to be a feature of specific firms 
and workplaces rather than countries (Brown and Campbell, 2002).  
 
"IT and organisational change have complementary effects on 
technology" (Askenazy, 2000: 100). 
 
 
2.G.2  Skills and adaptability 
 
It is now widely accepted that there is a link between increasing use of 
technology and greater returns to education, since returns to schooling have 
been found to be higher in industries making greater use of advanced 
technology (Bell, 1996; Chennells and van Reenen, 1997), and the rate of skill 
upgrading tends to be greatest in industries with greater computer investment 
(Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998; Johnson, 1997). 
 
Evidently there is a complementarity between worker skills and new 
technology, with more skilled labour rendering new technology more productive 
(Acemoglu, 1998; Booth and Snower, 1996; Lloyd-Eills and Roberts, 2002). 
However, the evidence suggests that rather than a simple complementarity 
between computer use and individual workers’ skills, there is a complementarity 
between skilled workers and the automated workplace mentioned above 
(Bresnahan, 1999; DiNardo and Pischke, 1997). A more educated workforce is 
more adaptable to new ways of working (Bowles, Gintis and Osborne, 2001; 
Griliches, 1997; Hassler and Rodriguez Mora, 2000; Phelps, 1997), so the 
returns to adaptability described in section 2.E.3 are especially significant in the 
context of ICT: 
 “The effects of IT on labor demand are greater when IT is combined 
with the particular organizational investments we identify, 
highlighting the importance of IT-enabled organizational change”  
(Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002: 339). 
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 Change in the workplace not only requires higher levels of skills, it also requires 
different skills. There is little evidence that computer skills as such are enjoying 
increased demand (Borghans and ter Weel, 2004), and it appears that the returns 
to general education have been rising faster than returns to vocational training 
(Aghion and Howitt, 2002; Dearden, McIntosh, Myck and Vignoles, 2002). At a 
higher pace of change, experience and task specific training lose value faster 
than general education (Rosenzweig, 1994), since: 
 
"Technological change influences the rate at which various types of 
human capital obsolesce” (Bartel and Sicherman, 1998: 747)  
 
It is general education and cognitive skills that are being rewarded, as firms find 
learning strategies (Lundgren, 2000) and adaptability more important than 
vocational training in an environment of change (Sheehan and Esposto, 2001). 
 
 
 
2.G.3  Skills and inequality 
 
If the ideas underlying endogenous growth theory are accepted, including the 
belief that firms particularly value workforce skills during a period of change, 
then it is to be expected that a period when new technology is being introduced 
will be one of generally rising wage inequality. As explained in 2.E.3 above, the 
better educated workers are known to be generally more adaptable workers. 
Thus a period of changing technology is likely to give higher rewards to those 
who are better educated, exacerbating the skills premium which exists at any 
time and increasing overall wage inequality. 
 
The appropriate response to such a skills premium will depend on whether 
inequality is seen as economically good or bad. Chapter 3 will review the 
literature on inequality, and the reasons why a technologically-driven rise in 
inequality may have important policy implications. 
 
 33
  
 
Chapter 3 
 
The Literature on Inequality 
 
 
 
3.A  The inequality problem  
 
3.A.1  Introduction 
 
No society is totally egalitarian, nor can such an ideal ever be realized. However 
the extent of inequality has varied greatly between different cultures and 
different eras. The early industrial society of the nineteenth century had 
immense inequality by comparison with the late twentieth century social 
democracies, and in our own time most of the nations of East and Southeast 
Asia are much more egalitarian than those of Latin America.  
 
Inequality received little attention in the high-growth, low-inequality period 
following World War II. But since the mid-1970s growth rates have fallen and 
inequality has risen (Gottschalk, 1997; Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997), and 
economists have come to appreciate (a) that it has important economic and 
social consequences, and (b) that it is not immutable. Different policies have 
different outcomes in terms of inequality, and inequality is now recognized as 
an important aspect of public policy. 
 
In this chapter I review the international literature on the inequality problem, 
and the recent trends in inequality both in New Zealand and in other developed 
countries. There are a number of different ways of measuring inequality, so the 
first section is a review of these various methods and the reasons why some of 
them show more exaggerated dispersion than others. This chapter then considers 
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the significance of inequality as an economic phenomenon, the relationship 
between inequality and growth and the reasons why inequality has damaging 
effects.  
 
Finally, I review the literature on unemployment, since access to work is itself 
unequally distributed. Those who are most likely to be unemployed are also 
those who command the lowest wages, so unemployment represents an added 
dimension to inequality, with a tendency to exacerbate the differences in 
financial rewards.  
 
3.B  Measuring inequality  
 
3.B.1 Different dimensions of inequality 
 
Inequality can be measured in various ways, and is characteristically wider in 
some dimensions than others.  Inequality of wealth is typically wider than 
inequality of income (Davies and Shorrocks, 2000; Scholz and Levine, 2004), 
which itself is wider than inequality of earnings. Of these various measures, the 
most commonly used are wealth and income, wealth because it is widely seen as 
the most revealing indicator of economic differences (Castello and Domenech, 
2002; Shapiro, 2001), and income because it is often the most readily available 
figure. 
 
Inequality of wealth and inequality of income are very different, with some 
individuals enjoying high incomes while accumulating few assets, while others 
are asset-rich but income-poor. In particular, since the pioneering work of 
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), there has been a vigorous debate about the 
nature of saving for retirement, with the life-cycle hypothesis suggesting a 
“hump-saving” pattern as workers build up assets prior to retirement, and run 
them down again when they are no longer working. The relationship between 
income and wealth is therefore partly a function of age, as workers progress 
from being highly dependent on income early in their working lives to 
increasing dependence on assets as they approach retirement.  
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Related to this life-cycle theory is the “permanent income hypothesis, which  
implies that, for any cohort of people born at the same time, inequality in both 
consumption and income should grow with age" (Deaton and Paxson, 1994: 
437). If this hypothesis is correct there will be a rise in overall inequality in any 
country where the population is generally aging (Deaton, 1997). Deaton and 
Paxson (1994) found that this was indeed the pattern in the United States, in the 
United Kingdom and in Taiwan, but as yet there has been no study of this effect 
in New Zealand. 
 
However income inequality is an important factor in wealth inequality 
(Deininger and Squire, 1998), and each is to some extent a proxy for the other 
since the two interact and tend to reinforce each other. Assets often generate 
investment income, and conversely, those who have greater incomes have more 
discretionary income and are therefore more likely to supplement their earnings 
through investment (Burtless, 1998): 
 
“Typically a skewed income distribution reflects concentration of 
ownership of assets” (Amsden, 1992: 75). 
 
Incomes are more dispersed than earnings, because low-wage workers seldom 
have any income other than their earnings, whereas the better-off are more 
likely to enjoy unearned incomes such as dividends and rents. However 
earnings and total incomes are highly correlated, since “earnings make up the 
lion’s share of individual incomes” (Snower, 1998: 69). Earnings inequality in 
turn is greater than wage inequality because workers on low wages are more 
vulnerable to casualization, part-time work and spells of unemployment (Booth, 
1999), a point I will return to in more detail in section 3.G. 
 
Finally, the social significance of inequality is complicated by household 
dynamics, and the tendency of household inequality to be more exaggerated 
than personal inequality. Assortative mating exacerbates inequality. High 
income earners group together and stay together, while the low income earners 
are more likely to be living in single income households. In the past the 
members of poor households depended on two incomes and in richer families 
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women were less likely to take paid employment. This pattern has reversed in 
recent decades, highly skilled people marry people of similar skill levels, and 
both are much more likely to pursue careers (Cancian, Danziger and Gottschalk, 
1993; Oshima, 1994; Burtless, 1998). 
 
That households today are more polarized than individuals has been found in 
the United States (Hyslop, 2001), in Australia (Burbidge and Sheehan, 2001), 
and also in New Zealand (Callister and Singley, 2004). Women are more likely 
than men to vary their hours of work according to family financial 
circumstances (Devereux, 2004), and the potential impact of assortative mating 
on household inequality is therefore somewhat dampened. But for New Zealand 
couples Paul Callister (2004) has established that average weekly hours worked 
where both partners are well qualified are higher than where both partners have 
few skills, leading to household inequality being more exaggerated than 
personal inequality. 
 
 
3.B.2  Uses of different inequality measures 
 
Inequality of wealth is widely regarded as the most meaningful dimension for 
the purpose of comparing welfare between individuals and communities. Many 
studies have found wealth to be the most robust proxy for the explanation of 
economic and social phenomena (Lovell, Richardson, Peter and Wood, 1994; 
Perotti, 1996; Fishman and Simhon, 2002). In particular it is inequality of 
wealth which most strongly predicts the educational achievements of the next 
generation, making this measure especially significant in terms of the mobility 
issue which I will return to in section 3.D. 
 
However, the present study is concerned with the effects of technology on the 
workforce, and therefore uses trends in wages as far as possible, since it is 
“wages which are more closely related to market prices for human capital 
components" (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993: 411). In Chapters 6 and 7, when 
using Population Census data, there is no alternative to using income figures. 
These are not ideal, but all inequality measures are interconnected, and many  
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studies have used incomes as a proxy for earnings. As Peter Gottschalk notes in 
the US context: 
 
“the increase in inequality of wages was mirrored by an increase in 
the dispersion of family income” (Gottschalk, 1997: 21). 
 
 
 
3.C  Inequality, wellbeing and growth 
 
3.C.1  Inequality and the  standard of living 
 
From an economic perspective, inequality matters both in the present and in 
terms of its effects on future growth. In static terms, it has long been appreciated 
that inequality is socially undesirable, and an abhorrence of poverty in the midst 
of plenty dates back at least as far as Adam Smith: 
 
“No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far 
greater part of the members are poor and miserable"  
(Smith, 1789, 1961, Vol 1: 88) 
 
Almost 200 years ago Jeremy Bentham pointed out that the utility function 
would be concave, and show diminishing returns (Bentham, 1811). For people 
at the poor end of the income spectrum, money is closely related to wellbeing 
(Lane, 2000; Layard, 2006); a small increase in income can bring real relief, and 
even a small decline can be disastrous (Freeman, 1999). In contrast, at the rich 
end of the spectrum small increases or decreases have negligible effects: 
 
"except among the very poor, income is surprisingly weakly related 
to one's reported sense of well-being"  
(Bowles and Gintis, 1998: 365).  
 
 
More than 80 years ago Hugh Dalton explained in a more formal fashion the 
significance of the relationship between inequality, diminishing returns and 
aggregate wellbeing: 
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 "Let us assume... that the economic welfare of different persons is 
additive, that the relation of income to economic welfare is the 
same for all members of the community, and that, for each 
individual, marginal economic welfare diminishes as income 
increases. Then, if a given income is to be distributed among a 
given number of persons, it is evident that economic welfare will be 
a maximum when all incomes are equal." (Dalton, 1920: 349). 
 
Thus for a given level of production the utility function of the whole community 
is maximized when inequality is minimized. In static terms inequality is clearly 
a bad. 
 
 
3.C.2  Inequality and rising productivity 
 
The dynamic effects of inequality are much more contentious, and the 
interactions of inequality with growth have been the subject of an extensive 
literature over the last 50 years. The idea that inequality and growth might be 
connected was first raised by Simon Kuznets (1955) who saw a causality 
running from the growth path to the pattern of inequality. But since the 1970s 
there has been increasing interest in the reverse causality, the extent to which 
inequality enhances or impedes growth. 
 
As explained in Chapter 2, rising productivity is necessary for a rising standard 
of living. But it follows from the concave welfare function that a productivity 
indicator such as rising per capita GDP is not on its own a sufficient descriptor 
of an economy (Alkire, 2002; Osberg and Sharpe, 2002).  Production and 
distribution must both be considered: 
 
"The limitations of gross national product (GNP) and its rate of 
growth as indicators of economic well-being are now well 
appreciated. GNP does not tell us how the benefits of economic 
activity are distributed"  (Fields, 1980: 8). 
 
For a given level of production a higher level of inequality means a lower 
overall standard of living. Thus, if growth occurs but inequality rises with it, the 
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rising inequality tends to offset the benefits of the growth. This degradation of 
the growth effect may be only partial, but in extreme cases, with slow growth 
and a serious rise in inequality, the median standard of living can fall 
(Slaughter, 1999), leaving the majority of the population actually worse off than 
before: 
“The U.S. experience of recent decades shows that increases in 
inequality of labor market income can fully offset the effects of 
increase in the mean…” (Gottschalk, 1997: 24) 
 
Indeed, in New Zealand during the years from 1988 to 2000, there is some 
evidence that the median household income rose more slowly than the 
Consumers Price Index, leaving the majority of households worse off (Hector, 
2004). Thus, a general rise in welfare requires not only growth, but that growth 
be shared (Harberger, 1998; Katz, 1994; Meier and Rauch, 2000). 
 
 
3.C.3  The equity-efficiency trade-off concept 
 
Prior to the 1970s the received wisdom that inequality was necessary for growth 
went virtually unquestioned, and the “common wisdom among economists was 
that inequality should, if at all, have a stimulating effect on accumulation and 
growth" (Aghion and Howitt, 1998: 280).  The Classical economists took for 
granted that inequality promoted growth (Lindert and Williamson, 1985; 
Roemer, 2000). Progress was seen as rooted in capital investment, the rich were 
disproportionately able to invest, and greater egalitarianism was therefore 
assumed to be growth inhibiting (Galor, 2000; Thorbecke and Charumilind, 
2002). Inequality was known to be bad in itself, but the social obligation to 
place limits on inequality was seen as standing in a tension with the imperative 
of inequality as a driver of growth, a tension which Arthur Okun described as 
the “equity-efficiency tradeoff” (Okun, 1975). 
 
Productivity improvements are promoted by secure property rights and by well 
structured incentives, and these necessities for economic efficiency lead 
inexorably to some inequality between the members of a society. While 
inequality might have costs, for a long time it was widely believed that 
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inequality provided the incentives necessary for growth (Aghion, Garcia-
Penelosa and Caroli, 1998). In particular, any government intervention which 
might address inequality was assumed to be distortionary (Boadway and Keen, 
2000; Burtless, 2003) and almost certain to impede growth (Welch, 1999). 
 
 If we accept that inequality is growth promoting, then it is a necessary evil. 
There can be no improvement in the general standard of living without an 
increase in productivity, so if inequality is a necessary component of growth the 
benefits it conveys will outweigh the damage, at least up to a point. And as 
Jeffrey Williamson notes: 
 
"For at least a century and a half, mainstream economists and 
government officials were guided by the belief that the national 
product could not be raised if the poor were given a larger share" 
(Williamson, 1991a: 7). 
 
 
3.C.4  The effect of inequality on growth 
 
However, the last 30 years have seen the assumption that inequality is growth 
promoting come under ever increasing scrutiny. As long ago as the 1970s 
development economists had noticed that countries with very high inequality 
tended to be particularly stagnant. In practice the more egalitarian developing 
countries were more likely to have growing economies (Adelman, Morris and 
Robinson, 1976; Adelman, 1979). In particular, Latin American stagnation with 
high inequality was frequently compared to East Asian growth with lower 
inequality (Bridsall, Graham and Sabot, 1998; Hikino and Amsden, 1994). 
 
Cross-national studies, looking at countries which were otherwise similar but 
not equally egalitarian, found that better growth generally followed lower initial 
inequality (Freeman, 1996; Birdsall, Ross and Sabot, 1995), especially initial 
inequality of assets such as land (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Deininger and 
Squire, 1998; Fields, 2001).  
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For example, Roland Bénabou compared the growth paths of Korea and the 
Philippines, two countries which in the 1950s were very comparable in terms of 
standard of living and the extent of industrialization, but which had markedly 
different levels of inequality. Korea, with the lower inequality, enjoyed rapid 
growth, while the Philippines stagnated (Bénabou, 1996). 
 
At first it was assumed an equity-efficiency trade-off would be the norm, and 
efficiency would only be compromised when inequality became excessive 
(Epstein and Spiegel, 2001). Damaging levels of inequality could be expected in 
third world countries where inequality was very high, so there would be some 
circumstances under which the promotion of equity could simultaneously 
promote efficiency (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000; Blank, 2002; Lindbeck, 
1998).  
 
But in recent years the debate has widened to include much more than merely 
the extreme inequality situation. Studies which looked at intertemporal trends 
for individual countries also found that stronger growth was correlated with 
phases of lower inequality, even among developed countries where levels of 
inequality were moderate (Gottschalk, 1997):  
 
“Both historical panel data and postwar cross sections indicate a 
significant and large negative relation between inequality and 
growth” (Persson and Tabellini, 1994: 600).  
 
There continues to be some debate around the phases of growth, and the idea 
that inequality may be helpful at certain periods. Robert Barro (2000) claims 
that higher inequality impedes growth in developing countries, but may be 
helpful in the more developed countries, and Stephen Knowles (2005) agrees 
that it is consistently harmful in the less developed. However Oded Galor 
(2000) takes quite the opposite position, believing that inequality was useful in 
the early industrial era, when growth was rooted in the ability of a country to 
build up physical assets, but that it is undesirable in more advanced economies 
which are more human capital dependent.  
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But as increasingly comprehensive datasets became available the facts 
consistently refuted the idea of any equity efficiency trade-off (Deininger and 
Squire, 1996, 1998; Thorbecke and Charumilind, 2002; Lloyd-Ellis, 2003), and 
the notion of inequality promoting growth is now being questioned very 
generally (Birdsall, 1997; Epstein and Gintis, 1995b; Galor and Zeira, 1993; 
Furman and Stiglitz, 1998): 
 
"The traditional argument that inequality has a positive impact on 
growth is strongly challenged."  (Aghion, Garcia-Penelosa and 
Caroli, 1998: 32). 
 
and 
"Many articles, both theoretical and empirical, lead to the 
conclusion that countries characterized by greater equality grow 
faster, other things equal" (Osberg, 1995: 5). 
 
 
 
 
3.D  Outcomes, Opportunities and Mobility 
   
3.D.1  Mobility   
 
The reality that inequality impedes growth more than it promotes it is now very 
widely accepted, but the path by which this happens is far from fully 
understood. There are probably several mechanisms at work, but social mobility 
is often seen as one of the most important.  
 
Social mobility matters because greater mobility leads directly to greater 
efficiency in the economy (Owen and Weil, 1998; Iyigun, 1999; Amiel and 
Bishop, 2003). Theory suggests that economic efficiency will be maximized 
when the talents available in the workforce are able to find their best possible 
uses, and empirical studies bear out this expectation: Communities with higher 
mobility do better (Bjorklund and Jantti, 1997; Topel, 1999). 
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Up to the mid 1980s there was a general belief that modern democracies had 
largely eliminated the immobility problem. In one of the most frequently cited 
studies Gary Becker and Nigel Tomes claimed that: 
 
“Aside from families victimized by discrimination, regression to the 
mean in earnings in the US and other rich countries appears to be 
rapid”  (Becker and Tomes, 1986: S32) 
 
However, there was relatively little longitudinal data available twenty years ago. 
Also, Becker and Tomes were writing shortly after the end of the exceptional 
period of high growth and low inequality which followed World War II. 
Substantially higher levels of inequalilty have now re-established themselves in 
many of the most developed countries, and this trend, coupled with much more 
comprehensive data, have led to a serious re-evaluation: 
 
“In the seventies and early eighties, researchers argued… that there 
was considerable economic mobility across generations and little 
evidence of a vicious cycle of poverty. This consensus changed in 
the late eighties and nineties when researchers used longitudinal 
data to examine the persistence of economic status across 
generations”   (Boggess and Corcoran, 1999: 77-78) 
 
It is now generally agreed that higher levels of inequality in society lead to 
lower mobility (Erickson and Goldthorpe, 1991; Dearden, Machin and Read, 
1997; Freeman, 1999; Maoz and Moav, 1999). In particular, greater inequality 
in a country makes upward movement more difficult (Sloane and Theodossiou, 
2000), and what mobility there is, is mostly short range (Gardiner and Hills, 
1999). 
 
3.D.2  Inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunities 
 
Arthur M Okun (1980) drew a crucial distinction between inequality of 
outcomes and inequality of opportunity.  As noted at the start of this chapter, 
some inequality of outcomes is inevitable. For any productive system to 
function it is important that effort and contributions be rewarded, and that 
savings and assets be secure, which in turn leads to some variation in outcomes 
for different members of a society. 
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 By contrast, inequality of opportunity is generally accepted as being a bad. It is 
a feature of an efficient economy that the members of the workforce can move 
easily to work which is best suited to them. Mobility within society is a key 
indicator of labour market efficiency, since any tendency for workers to be 
locked into certain categories of work because of their background or 
circumstances inhibits the efficient matching of skills to jobs. As Christopher 
Jencks notes, members of the general public are “full of contradictions” (Jencks, 
1972: 3), because they fundamentally do believe in equality of opportunity 
while not believing there should be equality of outcomes (Bénabou, 2000). 
 
The difference between inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity is 
simple in principle, but much less clear in practice. The outcomes for one 
generation profoundly affect the opportunities of the next, and the likelihood 
that children will fall into the same socioeconomic position as their parents has 
been estimated at 40% (Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992). The children who are 
born into fortunate circumstances have a head start, both in material and in 
attitudinal terms, and also because they tend to be much better connected in 
society (Atkinson, Maynard and Trinder, 1983). 
 
In particular, there is a strong correlation between wealth and education, with 
“educational attainment… responsible for almost half of observed immobility” 
(Checchi, 1997: 331). This in turn appears to affect subsequent success in 
careers, earnings and ultimate wealth (Micklewright, 1989; Solon, 1992; 
Dearden, Machin and Reed, 1997; Jianakoplos and Menchik, 1997):  
 
“Many societies are concerned about the association between 
parental income and child schooling because it is perceived that the 
stronger this association is, the less is intergenerational social 
mobility and the less equal is opportunity”  
(Behrman and Knowles, 1999: 237). 
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There is an extensive literature on this effect, which probably reflects a 
combination of the advantages of parental wealth and the advantages of parental 
education. Firstly, the child is likely to do better simply as a result of the better 
housing, health and nutrition which a richer family offers (Gould, 1982; 
Bianchi, Cohen, Raley and Nomaguchi, 2004; Grossman and Kaestner, 1997): 
 
"Studies have shown that children who are economically and 
socially deprived in their first three years of life suffer permanent 
negative consequences in terms of their personal development" 
(Sharpe, 2003: S10) 
 
Secondly, better educated parents are likely to encourage the education of their 
children in a number of ways. They often create a better learning environment at 
home (Butcher and Case, 1994; Iyigun, 1999), and it has also been found that 
schools “are more effective for children from strong backgrounds than for 
children from weak ones” (Coleman, 1987: 35). 
 
Thirdly, good schools develop in good communities. Prosperous families flock 
together in prosperous neighbourhoods, while poor families have no choice but 
to live in cheap housing, which usually means in poor neighbourhoods. The 
schools in the good neighbourhoods have all the advantages of serving families 
which are more likely to take an interest in education and be supportive of the 
school, and where the children are surrounded by the children of other well-to-
do and well-educated families (Carbonaro, 1998). In America there is a strong 
tendency toward the selection of school district by house purchase (Durlauf, 
1996; Wanner, 2005), and the same trend appears to be emerging in New 
Zealand (Gibson, Sabel, Boe-Gibson and Kim, 2006). 
 
Finally, the idea of “social capital” has attracted much attention in recent years 
(Schiff, 1992; Streeten, 2002). The term remains ill-defined and very difficult to 
quantify, but the intuition underlying it is the evident fact that some citizens are 
much better connected than others (Isham, Kelly and Ramaswamy, 2002). 
These social connections can substantially improve people’s access to jobs or 
influence, and conversely social exclusion can limit their opportunities 
(Narayan, 2002; Woolcock, 2002). Well-connected parents greatly improve the  
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 opportunities of the next generation, and while individuals naturally do their 
best for their children, this leaves a legacy of immobility which is counter-
productive for society as a whole. 
 
 
3.E Incentives, investment and the role of government 
 
3.E.1  Investment behaviour 
 
A second area in which inequality may impede growth lies in the effect of 
inequality on public and private investment activity, including the inability of 
governments to promote forward looking investment in polarized societies. 
(Sharpe, 2003). 
 
The classical and neoclassical economists assumed that savings drove 
investment, and investment drove growth. The rich were seen as able to save 
more, and were therefore the investing class on which growth depended 
(Lindert and Williamson, 1985; Carvalho, 1997). This sequence was first 
questioned by Keynes (1939), who radically suggested that investment preceded 
savings. The bulk of evidence now supports Keynes’ contention (Gordon, 1995; 
Palley, 1996; Chaudhri and Wilson, 2000) and encouragement of private saving 
appears to do little to boost investment (Foster, 1990; Epstein and Gintis, 
1995a). The assumption that a group of wealthy investors would be needed as a 
catalyst for growth has therefore lost its underpinning, and recent studies 
strongly suggest that it is more important to have a large middle class of 
investors, (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997), rather than a small 
elite. 
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3.E.2  Access to investment capital 
 
The more egalitarian is the distribution of wealth, including both assets and the 
wealth value of income streams, the more equal will be the access to investment 
capital. What an individual or household already owns determines both the ease 
and the extent to which they can borrow for further investment. For people who 
are poorer the price of borrowing is therefore effectively higher (Amsden, 1992; 
Chiu, 1998; Fender and Wang, 2003), and:  
 
“In the face of capital market imperfections the distribution of 
wealth significantly affects the aggregate economic activity"  
(Galor and Zeira, 1993: 50). 
 
The credit constraint argument has often been used in support of publicly 
funded education, since it is harder for poor families to invest in the human 
capital of their children (Behrman, Pollak and Taubman, 1989; Chiu, 1998; 
Birdsall, 1999). But the same argument is equally valid for any form of 
investment (Bénabou, 2000), such as purchases of land or equipment, or even to 
finance migration (Rapoport, 2002). The returns to capital would be greater if 
the poor could invest in their own self-advancement (Bowles and Gintis, 1995), 
but, to use Amartya Sen’s terminology, they are unable to gain command over 
capital (Birdsall and Londoño, 1997).   
 
Moreover "the degree of risk aversion is inversely related to wealth" (Bowles 
and Gintis, 1995: 575), leaving the poor as unwilling as they are unable to take 
on debt in order to invest. A laissez faire approach to capital markets therefore 
tends to be suboptimal (Katz, 1994; Fender and Wang, 2003), especially in the 
human capital market since education has far-reaching positive externalities and 
is therefore socially desirable (Durlauf, 1998; Finegold, 1996).  
 
However a number of authors have called into question the extent to which 
access to credit is really the binding constraint (Shea, 2000). While the credit 
constraint is real, and doubtless affects some poorer households, it has been 
estimated that the numbers for whom this is critical are probably less than 8 per 
cent of the population (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002).  
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 3.E.3  Capital :  Physical and  human 
 
It was suggested in chapter 2 that endogenous growth theory comes closer to the 
reality of the growth process than does the neoclassical approach, and one 
outcome of placing greater emphasis on technological change is to increase the 
significance of  human capital. It has been known for twenty years that 
countries with higher human capital grow faster (Denison, 1985; Barro, 1991; 
Rosenzweig, 1994). If technological change is the engine of growth, and human 
capital facilitates technological change (Galor and Moav, 1994; Booth and 
Snower, 1996), the rate of investment in human capital is likely to be the 
binding constraint on growth (Jorgensen and Fraumeni, 1995). 
 
It is now widely asserted that, at least in relatively developed economies, human 
capital is more important than physical capital (Abramowitz and David, 1996; 
Stiglitz, 1998). Many authors have noted that development is marked by a rising 
ratio of human capital to other forms of capital (Birdsall, 1999; Judson, 2002), 
and a recent study has found this ratio to be a clear pattern in New Zealand (Le, 
Gibson and Oxley, 2006). But rather than a simple reversal of roles this may 
reflect the ways that different kinds of capital interact (Aghion and Howitt, 
1998). As noted in the previous chapter, there appears to be an important 
complementarity issue (Jorgensen and Fraumeni, 1995), since a better skilled 
workforce is better able to use new technologies (Lloyd-Ellis, 2002). Investment 
in human capital therefore also encourages investment in physical capital, since 
it raises the returns to that investment (Helpman and Rangel, 1999). 
 
The investment problem is therefore closely linked to the mobility issue raised 
in section 3.D above, since “mobility promotes economic growth via its effect 
on the accumulation and allocation of human capital” (Maoz and Moav, 1999). 
Any increase in inequality and its associated tendency to dampen human capital 
investment is therefore likely to promote a suboptimal pattern, in which 
excessive investment is devoted to fixed capital, and human capital investment 
falls short of the ideal (Zhang, 2005). 
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 3.E.4  Polarization and the role of government 
 
In addition to the purely economic effects of inequality, there are also political 
complications which arise when divisions in communities force governments to 
follow policies with anti-growth implications. Many investments, including 
both the human capital investments mentioned above as well as much 
infrastructural investment, have large externalities (Acemoglu, 1996; 
Verspagen, 1994). Infrastructural investments are also prone to very large 
economies of scale, which renders a free market approach inefficient and 
expensive. It is therefore unsurprising that growth has been found to accompany 
higher levels of government investment (Temple, 1999). 
 
Median voter theory suggests that in countries where large numbers of citizens 
are trapped in low incomes, governments have no option but to follow 
expensive and growth inhibiting redistribution programmes (Alesina and 
Rodrik, 1994). Since governments are always constrained by the willingness of 
the public to pay taxes, greater pressure to fund current consumption has a 
tendency to inhibit the ability of government to fund growth promoting 
investments: 
 
“Countries with high shares of government consumption in GDP 
have grown on average more slowly than others... whereas those 
with high rates of government investment have tended to grow 
more rapidly" (Grossman and Helpman, 1991: 2), 
 
 
An extensive body of literature has established the importance of a large middle 
class (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Rowen, 1998). 
Whenever a society experiences a disappearing middle, political activity 
becomes increasingly factionalized. The rich have a vested interest in 
maintaining the status quo, the poor lobby for a better share, and governments 
focus on short term appeasement (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Perotti, 1996). 
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"An economy in which workers are sharply divided by income 
must operate differently from one dominated by a large, confident 
middle class"  (Freeman, 1999: 48). 
 
Inequality diverts taxation revenue, with rising inequality leading inexorably to 
larger numbers of people in need of public assistance. Safety nets for the poor 
are expensive in terms of the administration they entail as well as the funds 
redistributed (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Borland, 1999), and the social 
imperative of reducing poverty interferes with the government’s ability to 
address longer term goals. 
 
With rising polarization it becomes increasingly difficult for action supportive 
of long term growth to gain political support (Bénabou, 2000). The rich control 
ever more of the capital, but become increasingly distanced from the interests of 
their own communities (Galbraith, 2000; Streeten, 2001), a process which has 
been dubbed “the secession of the successful” (Reich, 1992: 282). 
 
“Any factor that breeds polarization will worsen policy, and thus 
cause lower growth." (Easterly, 2001a: 259).  
 
 
 
3.F  The Effect of Growth on Inequality 
 
3.F.1  The Kuznets curve 
 
Recent literature has concentrated on the effect of inequality on growth, as 
outlined in the previous two sections. But the first studies to investigate growth-
inequality relationships focussed on the likelihood of an effect running in the 
opposite direction (Epstein and Spiegel, 2001; Topel, 1999).  
 
Simon Kuznets (1955) used data from the early industrialisation phase in the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Germany, and discovered a pattern of 
inequality rising during the first period of industrialization, but falling off again 
as industrialization became more advanced. Growth was seen as requiring 
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workers to move from unproductive agriculture to the modern industrial sector. 
Initially this would produce a rise in inequality, while there was a premium for 
working in the modern sector. But as the distribution of the workforce between 
the traditional and the industrial sectors settled, inequality was expected to drop 
back again (Lundberg and Squire, 1999). 
 
However the data available to Kuznets were limited to the three early 
industrializers. Many more countries have joined the industrialized club in the 
twentieth century, and the wealth of data provided by these newcomers have 
provided the Kuznets hypothesis with little support (Kanbur, 2000). The right 
hand side of the Kuznets curve appears to be a widespread phenomenon, with 
inequality declining as development proceeds (Lindert and Williamson, 1985). 
However the initial rise of inequality during early industrialisation is a much 
less regular pattern (Deininger and Squire, 1997). In particular, there has been 
no Kuznets curve in East and Southeast Asia through a period of exceptionally 
rapid industrialization, and it seems that it is possible to manage growth without 
any phase of rising inequality: 
 
“The Kuznets curve... does not explain the bulk of variations in 
inequalilty across countries or over time” (Barro, 2000: 5) 
 
 
3.F.2  Does growth reduce inequality? 
 
Several studies have concluded that income tends to be more equally distributed 
within wealthier countries (Blank and Card, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993). But 
growth can be accompanied by either an improvement or a deterioration in the 
level of inequality (Ravallion and Chen, 1997; Lundberg and Squire, 1999), and 
certain phases of industrialization show inequality rising with growth 
(Williamson, 1991b; Violante, 2002). Recent trends in the United States are a 
case in point, where growth has picked up in the 1990s while inequality remains 
at a relatively high level (Burtless, 2003). 
 
However a lack of growth is strongly associated with high and entrenched 
inequality. While growth does not appear to guarantee a reduction in inequality 
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it does appear to be a prerequisite (Freeman and Gottschalk, 1998), and growth 
has been identified as essential if the standard of living of the poor is to be 
raised (Dollar and Kraay, 2002).  
 
“Generally sustainable economic growth benefits all layers of society” (Bruno, 
Ravallion and Squire, 1998: 117). But a lack of growth impedes mobility (Maoz 
and Moav, 1999; Hassler and Rodriguez Mora, 2000) and is generally 
accompanied by widening inequality as the rich are able to improve their 
position relative to the poor (Galbraith, 2000). So the reverse causality of 
growth on inequality is an asymmetric one, with growth unable to guarantee 
inequality reduction, but nevertheless essential if inequality is not to worsen 
(Fields, 2001). 
 
 
3.F.3 Feedback loops 
 
It is now widely accepted that the linkages are bi-directional (Carter and Coles, 
1998; Sharpe, 2003). If better growth helps to contain inequality, and lower 
inequality helps to promote growth, we would expect to find different 
economies on divergent paths over the long term, and this is indeed the historic 
experience. I will return to the history of inequality in detail in chapter 4, but the 
general pattern is one of widespread divergence (Amable, 1994; Baumol, 
Nelson and Wolff, 1994; Landau, Taylor and Wright, 1996; Pritchett, 1997; 
Lutzker, 2003).  
 
There may be other explanations for the long run divergence of nations, but the 
facts are strongly supportive of the idea that reinforcement mechanisms of some 
sort create the possibility of multiple equilibria (Owen and Weil, 1998) and 
work to cement long term path dependency. A feedback mechanism between 
growth and inequality, while not proven, is therefore at least fully compatible 
with the observed facts. 
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3.G  Unemployment as a form of inequality 
 
3.G.1  Access to work 
 
Differences in wage rates are not the only form of labour market inequality. No 
less important is access to a wage in the first place.  
 
Firstly it is a matter of efficiency that talents which are available should be put 
to good use. If a society has an underutilised workforce it follows that it is 
performing inside its production frontier (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991). 
Secondly, work is important, not only for income. It is demoralizing if those 
who would like to work are unable to find anything suitable. Work is an end in 
itself (Saunders, 2002). It gives people a sense of belonging (Morley, 1994; 
Phelps, 1997), a sense of identity (Barrett and Spoonley, 2001) and a sense of 
self-worth in addition to the financial rewards (Lane, 1991; Freeman and Soete, 
1994). People need to be needed (Layard, 2006). 
 
Moreover, unemployment is peculiarly persistent. The intergenerational 
transmission effect discussed in section 3.D is reflected in the likelihood of 
unemployment as much as in dimensions of human capital and earnings 
(McKnight, 2000), and further: 
 
“the experience of joblessness itself is likely to disadvantage low-
paid workers even more in their quest for better paid work" 
(Dunlop, 2001: 96). 
 
Unemployment can therefore be seen as raising particularly strong mobility 
issues, and is therefore a form of inequality which should be of special concern 
to policy makers. 
 
3.G.2  Inequality of employment opportunities 
 
Lifelong earnings are a function of wages and of hours in employment. If 
workers on different wages were all equally likely to spend a given proportion 
of their working life unemployed, then their lifetime earnings would reflect their 
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wage rates. But this is not the case, and those who command low wages are 
much more likely to be afflicted with periods of unemployment (Phelps, 1997; 
Pryor and Schaffer, 1999). Total earnings inequality over the lifetime is 
therefore more exaggerated than wage inequality.  
 
Between the Second World War and the 1970s unemployment was low in the 
more developed countries, and exceptionally low in New Zealand (Hawke, 
1985). But the last 25 years have seen a substantial rise in unemployment levels 
in most OECD countries (Nickell and Bell, 1995), which have been 
accompanied by profound changes in labour market institutions, as well as 
changing expectations of both employers and workers (Spoonley and Davidson, 
2004). Casualisation of work has become increasingly common (de Bruin and 
Dupuis, 2004), as has the use of part-time employment (Burbidge and Sheehan, 
2001). 
 
A more casual approach to work is not bad for everyone. For those who are 
relatively well off it can bring the social benefits mentioned in the previous 
section and augment incomes, while avoiding some of the obligations of a 
permanent full-time position (Blank, 1998). But casualisation and part time 
work, like unemployment itself, are concentrated on workers in the bottom 
quartile of the wage distribution (Shirley, 1996; Dunlop, 2001), precisely those 
who least want it and can least afford it (Booth, 1999). This further reduces 
lifetime working hours and compounds the income inequality problem (Sloane 
and Theodossiou, 2000). 
 
 
3.G.3  Interaction of unemployment and wage flexibility 
 
Many authors have suggested that high wage inequality lowers unemployment. 
The underlying intuition is that higher wages at the low end would reduce 
employment opportunities, and minimum wage regulations and trade unions can 
therefore blamed for penalising the unemployed (Hutton, 1995). As proof, it is 
sometimes pointed out that Britain and the USA have wide wage dispersion, 
whereas the Continental West European nations have higher levels of 
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unemployment (Bettio and Rosenberg, 1999; Card, Kramarz and Lemieux, 
1999; Slaughter, 1999). However this argument is questionable, as 
unemployment patterns on the Continent are spread more widely over different 
groups of workers, and appear to be driven more by macroeconomic policies 
than by wage tradeoffs (Nickell and Bell, 1996). 
 
In the United Kingdom and the United States unemployment particularly 
afflicted the low-skill workers who would have been paid the lowest wages 
(Freeman, 1995a; Galbraith, 2000). Since the seminal work of Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1990, 1994) it is now widely appreciated that there is no tradeoff 
between low wages and unemployment (Borjas, 2005), the general case being 
that depressed wages at the low end of the distribution occur at the same time as 
high unemployment. This so-called ‘wage curve’ has been found to hold true in 
many country studies (Glyn and Salverda, 2000a), including New Zealand 
(Morrison and Poot, 1998; Papps, 2001): 
 
“The standard model of supply and demand suggests that if wages 
are raised... employers' demand for labor should drop...  The 
opposite is true.. workers in regions of a country with high 
unemployment have lower wages than comparable workers in 
regions with lower unemployment" (Ackerman, 1998b: 18). 
 
 
 
 
3.H  Conclusion 
 
It now seems reasonably unequivocal that inequality is an economic bad in 
every dimension. It has long been known to lower current welfare, but it is now 
largely accepted that it is also damaging in terms of its effect on growth into the 
future. It lowers mobility and reduces the ability of the all-important middle 
class to invest in their own self-advancement. Moreover it promotes socially 
and politically undesirable polarization, which diverts government activity into 
short-term palliatives at the expense of investment in education and the 
infrastructure, where large externalities make public intervention desirable. 
 
 56
 But however damaging may be the side effects of inequality, any attempt to 
reduce it will also have costs. It is therefore important to understand the driving 
forces underlying an increase in inequality, so that the most appropriate and 
cost-effective corrective measures can be taken. Chapter 4 reviews the wide 
variety of explanations for rising inequality that have been advanced over the 
last two decades, with special attention to the possibility that the technological 
developments described in Chapter 2 are the principal driver of the most recent 
phase. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Explanations for Changing Inequality 
 
 
4.A  Introduction 
 
Inequality has risen and fallen over long periods. From the Industrial Revolution 
to the late nineteenth century inequality was rising, but from about the 1870s to 
the 1960s it was stable or trending downwards, and by 1970 the developed 
countries had reached a position of exceptional egalitarianism. Then, in the mid-
1970s, the trend abruptly reversed (Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997), and 
inequality once more began to rise. 
 
Simon Kuznets (1955) published a seminal paper suggesting that 
industrialization would see inequality initially rise and then fall again as a new 
distribution of workers across industries stabilized. During the “golden age” 
following World War II dispersion was so low and so stable that inequality was 
seen as largely a problem for the third world, and with respect to industrialized 
countries it attracted little interest (Myles, 2003). 
 
But the latest reversal, coupled with a growing awareness of the social and 
economic problems attached to inequality, brought the topic back onto the 
agenda of inquiry (Atkinson, 1997), and in particular prompted economists to 
revisit the economic forces which drove inequality. 
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When inequality began to rise in the 1970s it was initially popular to focus on 
the labour market institutions. This was the Reagan/Thatcher era, when it was 
widely believed that failure of labour markets to clear was the result of union 
activity or misguided government intervention (Schettkat, 2003; Simonazzi and 
Villa, 1999). More recently the balance of opinion has swung toward 
mismatches of supply and demand, with attention increasingly focused on the 
skills premium (Pryor and Schaffer, 1999) and explanations based on changing 
industrial patterns and workforce requirements (Katz, 2000; Pianta, 2001). 
 
The present chapter will review the international and New Zealand literature on 
the historical trends in inequality, and the arguments which have been advanced 
in the literature regarding the plausibility of each of these explanations. It will 
also introduce the empirical work of this thesis and explain how the econometric 
methods used can help to identify which of the explanations fits the New 
Zealand data best. 
 
 
4.B  Historic patterns of inequality 
 
4.B.1  Historic trends in  inequality 
 
Prior to the eighteenth century production systems and the way of life changed 
very slowly (Simon, 1994), and inequality, like other indicators of social life, 
persisted at relatively constant levels (Holderness, 1976: 198). From the mid-
eighteenth century, however, inequality has risen and fallen and recently risen 
again on a very long cycle, and William J Baumol notes:  
 
"The historic course of reduction in income dispersion... has swung 
violently several times, meaning that the change that occurred in the 
1970s was hardly unique." (Baumol, 2000: 9) 
 
However some countries had lower inequality than others, and given the 
importance that is now attached to a large middle class, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century started in 
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Britain. At that time Britain had lower inequality than any other European 
country and had acquired a relatively large, affluent, entrepreneurial middle 
class (Landes, 1998; Maland, 1968): 
 
"As the trading, middling sort of People in England are rich; so the 
labouring, manufacturing People under them are infinitely richer than 
the same Class of People in any other Nation in the World" (Defoe, 
1728: 74). 
 
The Industrial Revolution sparked a massive social upheaval (Mokyr, 1990). 
Mechanization and the development of an increasing range of manufactured 
goods saw factories operating at a much larger scale than previously, and large 
numbers of workers relocating from agricultural areas to cities and factory 
towns. Urban factory workers would have been more cash dependent than rural 
dwellers, but the new opportunities provided previously unheard of income 
levels: 
"Wages in Britain's cities in the 1830s were some 73 percent higher 
than on farms" (Williamson, 1991b: 68). 
 
However, from the mid eighteenth century onwards the new specialization and 
urbanization were accompanied by very diverse outcomes for different people. 
Large returns on capital meant rapidly rising wealth for the fortunate few, while 
the poor made only small gains (Cameron, 1993), and from the later 1700s until 
about 1870 inequality was steadily rising (Kuznets, 1955; Karoly, 1993).   
 
In the late middle of the nineteenth century the long term rising trend in 
inequality reversed. The peak of the Kuznets curve in Britain has been placed 
around 1860 (Williamson, 1991b: 74) and for the USA around 1870 (Aghion, 
Garcia-Penalosa and Caroli, 1998: 9). In many of the more developed countries 
inequality began to decline as the poor made greater gains than the rich 
(Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986: 26-27). 
 
In particular, the mid twentieth century, from the 1930s to mid-1970s, was a 
period of exceptionally low dispersion in all the OECD countries (Juhn, 1999; 
Karoly, 1993). The depression was a great leveller in terms of wealth (Danziger 
and Gottschalk, 1995), and once growth began to pick up in the mid 1930s 
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earnings dispersion also declined (McLean, 1991). World War II created an 
unprecedented demand for unskilled labour, and wage inequality fell so 
remarkably that the 1940s have been labelled “the great compression” (Goldin 
and Margo (1992).  
 
Following World War II the low inequality was coupled to unusual growth, and 
the benefits of that increased production were spread through communities to an 
unprecedented extent. The median standard of living rose even faster than total 
production, delivering a great improvement to the general population (Baumol, 
2000; Blank and Card, 1993). But this long period of stable or declining 
inequality reversed again in the mid-1970s (Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997; 
Kosters, 1994). The last quarter of the twentieth century once again saw 
inequality generally rising (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1993; Wolff, 2004), 
though this latest movement has not been felt equally in all countries and there 
is considerable international variation. 
 
4.B.2  International comparisons of recent trends 
 
The English speaking countries have been at the forefront of the rise in 
inequality (Gottschalk, 1997), with the USA (Acemoglu, 2002; Galbraith, 2000) 
and the United Kingdom (Haskel and Slaughter, 2001; Schmitt, 1995) leading. 
The trend was so marked that US inequality continued to rise even through 
periods of recovery (Levy and Murnane, 1992), though trade cycles usually 
show inequality declining during expansionary phases (Blank and Card, 1993). 
 
By contrast, the rising inequality experienced by the Continental Europeans was 
generally rather less (Slaughter, 1999). Germany had a smaller rise than the 
United Kingdom or the USA (Nickell, 1998; Osberg, 2003), with the Nordic 
countries showing least of all (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997): 
 
"In the United States the poor are getting poorer. In Germany, by 
contrast, the poor are getting richer. Britain is in between. The rich, 
on the other hand, are getting richer in all three countries” (Nickell, 
1998). 
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 Some Continental European economies have been troubled by high levels of 
unemployment, which, as noted in Chapter 3, is a form of inequality in itself. 
This has given rise to a theory that the United Kingdom and the United States 
have kept unemployment down by tolerating low minimum wages, while the 
Continentals have protected their low paid workers at the cost of high 
unemployment (Atkinson, 2001, 2002), a theory which has come to be known 
as the “Transatlantic Consensus”. 
 
But the Transatlantic Consensus suffers from two major shortcomings. Firstly, 
the simple view of the facts themselves may be misleading. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the risk of unemployment for the least skilled is just as high in 
the United States as it is in continental Europe (Glyn and Salverda, 2000a) 
suggesting that the greater wage flexibility is doing little to help. The ability of 
wage flexibility to cure unemployment appears to be quite limited Bettio and 
Rosenberg, 1999; Freeman, 1995a; Nymoen and Rodseth, 2003).  
 
Secondly it portrays Continental Europe as more homogeneous than it is, and 
the various countries show a wide variety of unemployment outcomes 
(Abraham, 1999). There are several possible explanations for high levels of 
unemployment in Europe. Simonazzi and Villa (1999) put it down to poor 
growth. Pianta (2000, 2001) takes a slightly different view and considers the 
nature of European growth to be critical, with its emphasis on improving 
processes, in contrast to US and Japanese emphasis on new products. The tight 
monetary policies required in the run-up to monetary union have almost 
certainly contributed (Peters, 1995; Vivarelli and Pianta, 2000), and in 
Germany’s case there have been the added problems of funding reunification. 
 
Within the English speaking countries, Canada has lower inequality than 
Australia, which in turn has lower inequality than the United Kingdom 
(Gottschalk and Smeeding, 2000). New Zealand joined the trend a few years 
later than the other Anglo-Saxon countries. Jeff Borland (2000) commented that 
rising inequality in the 1980s appeared to be greater in Australia than in New 
Zealand, and Peter Saunders also agreed that up to about 1990 the pattern in 
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New Zealand was less clear (Saunders, 1994), though by 1996 the OECD was 
putting New Zealand alongside the USA as having a greater rise in inequality 
than Australia (OECD, 1996).  
 
When it did arrive the rise in inequality in New Zealand was particularly 
marked (Hyslop and Maré, 2001, 2005; O’Dea, 2000). Podder and Chatterjee 
(2002) found New Zealand to be extreme compared to other OECD countries, 
as did Richard B. Freeman who wrote that “excluding tiny New Zealand the US 
led the pack in increased inequality” (Freeman, 1999: 37). 
 
One particularly disturbing feature of the latest rise in inequality is that in some 
countries the poor are actually going backwards. The rising inequality during 
the Industrial Revolution saw the rich pulling ahead of the poor, but everyone 
becoming better off to some extent (Cameron, 1993). For most countries this 
has also been the pattern in the last thirty years, but in the United States there is 
strong evidence that the poor are absolutely worse off than they were before 
(Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993; Slaughter, 1998). Despite significant growth, 
many people have not gained as much as they lost through rising inequality 
(Gottschalk, 1997; Haveman, 2000; Slaughter, 1999). In the USA: 
 
“Since 1973 CPI-deflated real wages have fallen about 0.4% per year...  
For many less-skilled workers the declines have been staggering" 
(Slaughter, 1998: 145). 
 
 
The pattern of a declining median also appears to be true for New Zealand 
(Barker, 1996). Between 1986 and 1991 median incomes fell significantly for 
men of all races. The median fell slightly for Maori women and was almost 
constant for non-Maori women. Between 1991 and 1996 the median for men 
recovered part of its fall, while the median for women of all races continued at a 
constant level (Statistics New Zealand, 2000: 137). Since men make up the 
majority of the workforce it appears that the median worker was worse off in 
1996 than in 1986. The big losers in New Zealand have been male workers, 
exactly the pattern Freeman (1999) found in the United States. 
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 4.B.3 Changing demand for skills 
 
Throughout history, workers with higher skill levels have naturally commanded 
higher wages than those without the same skills. However the magnitude of the 
skills premium has varied over time, and at least over the last 100 years the 
general trend in inequality has moved closely in step with trends in the skills 
premium. The twentieth century up to the 1970s was an era of generally 
declining inequality, and it was also a time in which the margin for skills was in 
decline (Juhn, 1999). The wages of unskilled workers were generally rising 
faster than those of skilled workers (Freeman, 1999). Since the 1970s the skills 
premium has been opening out once more, with a surge in the 1980s (Sill, 
2002).  
 
This trend has been found in the USA (Borjas, 1995; Bound and Johnson, 1992; 
Goldin and Katz, 1998), and in the United Kingdom (Machin, 1996), where the 
gap between skilled and unskilled wages fell more or less continuously from the 
end of World War II to the late 1970s. “Since then they have risen very sharply" 
(Haskel and Slaughter, 2001: 163). The rising skills premium has also been 
noted in Australia (Pappas, (2001), New Zealand (Engelbrecht, 2000a), and in 
most states of the European Union (Gregory and Machin, 2000).  
 
Moreover the extent of the general rise in inequality is closely correlated with 
the size of the skills premium. The USA has greater inequality than Canada, and 
the skills premium is also much more substantial in the USA than in Canada 
(Murphy, Riddell and Romer (1998). Similarly, Continental countries like 
Germany and the Netherlands have strong public policies of providing good 
schooling for all their young people (Nickell and Bell, 1996), and the general 
level of inequality is lower than it is in the English speaking countries where 
schooling is less egalitarian (Checchi, 1997; Haskel and Martin, 1996).  
 
Throughout the more developed countries both employment opportunities and 
wage rates have held up well for well-qualified workers, and even risen. 
However wage rates have plummeted for the unskilled workers, and in addition 
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their employment opportunities have been seriously eroded (Nickell, 1998; 
Phelps, 1997), with rising unemployment and increasing casualisation 
exacerbating their difficulties. 
 
4.B.4   The technology-education race 
 
Following the pioneering work of Jan Tinbergen (1975) there has been a strong 
theme in labour economics that technology and education are locked in a never-
ending race (Heckman, 2003; Sattinger, 2003). According to this theory, the 
global production system is constantly becoming more sophisticated, and the 
associated capital deepening changes the pattern of demand in the labour force 
(Goldin and Katz, 1996). The demand for skills in the workforce is therefore 
constantly growing as the proportion of jobs requiring greater skills rises 
(Abramowitz and David, 1996). On the supply side, education and training are 
also reaching an ever growing proportion of the workforce, so inequality will 
rise or fall depending on whether it is the demand or the supply which is 
currently winning.  
 
The patterns of returns to schooling since World War II suggest that the supply 
of skills was winning the race during the 1950s and 1960s. At that time 
secondary education was already universal in the developed world, and the 
proportion of school leavers continuing to higher education was rapidly rising in 
OECD countries (Machin, 2001), including New Zealand (Maani, 2000). 
During the 1960s and 1970s the supply of more qualified workers outstripped 
demand (Juhn, 1999) and the returns to skills declined. 
 
The reversal in the returns to skills since the 1970s would therefore suggest that 
for some reason changes in the production system came along faster than the 
rate of increase in the skills required, and the skills premium opened out (Juhn, 
Murphy and Pierce, 1993; Mayer and Peterson, 1999; Pryor and Schaffer, 
1999). Not only has the earnings dispersion increased, the demand for the less 
skilled has plummeted (Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998; Levy and Murnane, 
1996; Nickell and Bell, 1995): 
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“returns to schooling rose over the last thirty years despite the 
unusually rapid increase in the supply of educated workers" 
(Acemoglu, 2002:11). 
 
 
Rising general levels of inequality are thus strongly correlated with rising levels 
of wage inequality, which in turn are strongly correlated with the rising skills 
premium. For any explanation of rising inequality to be plausible, it is important 
that it also makes sense of this crucial aspect of labour market demand. 
 
4.B.5  Sheepskin effects 
 
It has been suggested that rising demand may be more apparent than real. 
Workers with more ability are likely to self-select themselves into higher levels 
of education. Thus it could be that the premium paid by employers is a premium 
for native ability rather than for anything gained during education (Taber, 
2001). Higher qualifications would then represent a signalling device rather than 
a good investment; the so-called sheepskin effect. 
 
However this argument has been largely demolished by the empirical evidence. 
Denny and Harman (2001) carried out cross-national studies testing earnings 
against schooling and found: “that there are well determined positive returns to 
the completion of educational levels" (Denny and Harmon, 2001: 635). 
Ashenfelter and Rouse (2000) and Bowles and Gintis (2000) likewise found that 
the return to schooling is not caused by an omitted correlation between ability 
and schooling, but that : "Those with more schooling earn more at least in 
substantial measure because they are educated” (Bowles and Gintis, 2000: 120). 
 
Nor is education merely a positioning device: 
 
"Recent research has shown… that it's a person's absolute amount of 
education, not her position in the distribution, that affects earnings. As 
average levels of education have increased over time, years of 
schooling have had a consistent, positive effect on earnings, while 
relative position  in the distribution of schooling has had little, if any, 
effect" (Filer, Hamermesh and Rees, 1996: 109) 
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4.C     Possible explanations for the latest rise in inequality 
 
4.C.1  Introduction 
 
The abrupt turning point of the mid 1970s has provoked an extensive debate as 
to its underlying causes. Why, after a century of stable or declining inequality, 
did income start to polarize again? After such a long period in which any growth 
which occurred had been distributed very generally, why did the trend suddenly 
turn back toward the nineteenth century pattern, with growth predominantly 
captured by the wealthy few? 
 
Firstly, the possible explanations fall into two broad classes: Arguments based 
on labour market institutions, and arguments around mismatches of supply and 
demand. Secondly, the supply and demand issues are split further into two 
camps: The supply side view, which sees labour markets changing as increasing 
numbers of women and migrants entered the workforce, and the demand side 
position based on changes in production systems and the evolving pattern of 
demand for workers of different types. 
 
Thirdly, the demand side arguments are yet further divided over the source of 
changing demand (Gregory and Machin, 2000). In the 1990s globalization was 
widely seen as a major driver of higher inequality, especially through the effect 
of increased openness to imports from low-cost third world countries. However 
the last ten years have seen trade-based arguments seriously called into 
question, and increasing interest in the idea that skill-biased technological 
change has driven up the skills premium. 
 
I will address the labour market institutions theory and the supply side issues in 
the next two subsections. But it is the demand side arguments which are 
currently the most widely accepted and studied, and the questions they raise 
concerning the global production system are also the arguments which this 
thesis attempts to address. I will therefore return to them in detail in sections 
4.D and 4.E. 
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 4.C.2  Labour market institutions 
 
At the end of the 1970s there was a worldwide shift in the received wisdom on 
economic management. The post World War II belief in maintaining low 
unemployment was sidelined and inflation control rose to the top of the agenda.  
New Zealand in particular was subjected to a swift change in macroeconomic 
policy (Silverstone, Bollard and Lattimore, 1996) and exceptionally strict 
policies were put in place in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Evans, Grimes, 
Wilkinson and Teece, 1996; Kelsey, 1995). 
 
This change in macroeconomic direction was accompanied by a more 
conservative approach to labour market institutions. Strong unions and 
government intervention with minimum wages and worker protection were 
widely held to be responsible for high wages at the bottom end, implying that 
wages had been artificially compressed for the benefit of those in work but to 
the disadvantage of the unemployed and labour market efficiency in general. 
 
The appeal of the labour market institutions theory is largely based on its ability 
to explain the difference between the Anglo American countries and the 
Continental Europeans (Nickell, 1997; Schettkat, 2003). The English speaking 
world was much more enthusiastic about rolling back workplace legislation, and 
union density is lower in the United Kingdom, and substantially lower in the 
USA, than it is in continental Europe (Blanchflower and Slaughter, 1999).  
 
Card and DiNardo (2002) believe the sudden relaxation of the labour market 
institutions led to a reallocation of workers which prompted the spike in wage 
inequality, and Claudio Lucifora (2000) also rejects the alternative explanations 
as unsubstantiated and falls back on the theory that labour market institutions 
made a significant difference. But for two reasons the facts do not seem to fit 
the theory. Firstly, in most countries, and especially in the USA where the rise 
in inequality began in the early 1970s, the timing does not fit. The reversal in 
the trend in income dispersion had begun some years before the changes in 
economic policies (Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997).  
 68
 Secondly, if this theory had been correct it would be expected that lowering 
wages at the bottom of the distribution would reduce unemployment. But no 
such effect has been detected (Glyn and Salverda, 2000a). There is a strong 
correlation between high unemployment and low bottom end wages (Galbraith, 
2000), and no evidence that any relaxation of minimum wage regulations would 
have helped the unemployment problem (Simonazzi and Villa, 1999). 
 
While different labour markets may explain some of the different 
unemployment patterns between the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental 
countries, most commentators conclude that the effects are small compared to 
those of changing labour demand (Acemoglu, 2003a; Heylen, Goubert and 
Omey, 1996; Webster and Tseng, 2002):  
 
"The… mismatches suggest that technological change, the 
composition of the economy and demand factors can offer a 
powerful explanation for current unemployment, a more convincing 
one than that provided by traditional views looking at labour markets 
alone, emphasizing the lack of flexibility of labour regulations, wage 
levels or the skill composition of the work force." (Pianta, 2001: 
144). 
 
 
4.C.3  Demographic effects 
 
The supply of workers in many countries has been changing, partly because of 
married women becoming much more active in the paid workforce and partly 
because of rapidly rising migration in recent decades (Haveman, 1997).  
 
To the extent that women take low-paid jobs this could help to explain rising 
inequality through increased supply at the low end of the labour market. 
However in most developed countries, and certainly in New Zealand, gender 
inequality has been declining for at least 40 years. In the 1930s and 1940s 
women in paid employment were very largely confined to low-paid low-skill 
work (Ferguson and Galbraith, 2001; Karoly and Burgess, 1995). But attitudes 
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began to change with the women’s movement of the late 1960s, and equal 
opportunities were formally legislated in the 1970s.  
 
Female education rapidly overtook male in the period 1965 to 1990, and by the 
early 1990s more young women than young men were completing high school 
and tertiary qualifications (Statistics New Zealand, 2000). Particularly in New 
Zealand, the primary industries remain a bastion of male dominance, whereas 
female paid work is generally urban and frequently white collar. As will be 
detailed in chapter 6, it is precisely the white collar industries, where women 
tend to be clustered, that have shown wages and inequality to be rising fastest. It 
is therefore not surprising that “returns to higher education have been higher for 
females since 1981” (Maani, 1997: 78), and that women have been gaining on 
men in terms of acquiring education, and in applying that education to gain 
more skilled work (Engelbrecht, 2001). 
 
“About half the total reduction in the gender log hourly earnings 
differential between 1984 and 1995 can be attributed to the increased 
similarity of male and female characteristics” (Dixon, 1996: 39) 
 
Since women are overtaking men in terms of skills and opportunities, arguments 
that women have suddenly swamped the low-skill end of the labour market do 
not seem very plausible. 
 
Immigration is another supply side argument that has been advanced. This has 
been studied extensively in the United States, where large numbers of migrants 
have entered, especially from the Latin American countries. These are typically 
low-skill workers (Rosenthal, 2004) who might have had the effect of reducing 
job opportunities and forcing down wages at the low end of the market, though 
Borjas et alia note that "area studies have generally found that immigration has 
had only a slight effect on native outcomes." (Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1996: 
246).  
 
Harford (2006) compares the serious rise in wage inequality in the United States 
where many migrants were unskilled, with the less extreme rise in the United 
Kingdom, where immigrants were screened according to skills and low-skill 
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migrants were largely excluded. However this explanation fails to fit the New 
Zealand case. Immigration into New Zealand is subject to strict rules, and being 
an island nation with access only by air, it is readily monitored. Apart from 
small quotas of Pacific Islanders and refugees, most migrants are required to 
meet strict conditions for education and other skills, and the skill levels of 
migrants are generally higher than those of the native population. Of full-time 
workers in the 2004 Income Supplement data, 27 percent of migrants have 
university degrees compared to 13.3 percent of non-migrants, and 14.5 percent 
of migrants have no qualifications compared to 20.7 percent of non-migrants.  
With immigration policy biased towards the high-skilled workers it seems 
highly unlikely that recent immigration has promoted increasing wage 
inequality. 
 
 
4.D     Globalization 
 
4.D.1  Introduction 
 
The period from the 1929 crash until the early 1970s was one of fixed exchange 
regimes and substantially regulated international trade. The abandonment of 
fixed currencies started with the United States in 1973, and was quickly 
followed by many countries including New Zealand in 1984. GATT and the 
WTO encouraged the elimination of barriers to trade, and north-south trade 
increased substantially in the more liberal climate (Feenstra, 1998; Obstfeld, 
1998). 
 
Many commentators have suggested that greater global integration may be 
responsible for the renewed rise in inequality (Moran, 1999), through two 
possibly related trends: Displacement of low skill workers in developed 
countries as a result of increased imports from low wage countries; and changes 
in the patterns of industries in the more developed countries as low-skill 
intensive work is abandoned or outsourced, and domestic industry concentrates 
increasingly on the more capital intensive areas. 
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4.D.2  Import penetration 
 
Import penetration from third world countries has often been suggested as a 
major driver of rising inequality (Bhagwati, 1998; Burtless, 1995). This 
argument usually takes the following form: Third world countries have a 
shortage of skilled labour, but an abundance of cheap unskilled labour. 
Increasing trade between developed countries and third world countries results 
in the developed countries importing increased quantities of manufactured 
goods with a large low-sill labour content. The effect of these imports is to force 
down the wages of unskilled workers in the richer countries, or eliminate their 
jobs altogether, while leaving the more skilled workers relatively unaffected 
(Wood, 1995). 
 
In its simplest form this argument has been largely rejected. The greatest rises in 
trade volumes have been between the developed countries, and trade with third 
world countries does not appear large enough to have the observed effects 
(Machin and van Reenen, 1998). Robert Z Lawrence points out that US trade 
with third world countries nearly doubled in the decade of the 1980s, but this 
still only amounted to 2.1% of US GDP in 1990. The “arithmetic does not add 
up” (Lawrence, 1995: 19). 
 
"Trade with industrialized countries contributed as much to the 
growing wage gap as did trade with developing countries, contrary to 
the assumptions of the most commonly expressed trade argument" 
(Brauer and Hickok, 1995: 72) 
 
But the most common basis for rejecting this theory lies in the apparent results 
for different industries. Burtless (1998) and Machin (2003) both note that 
industry inequality rose equally for those industries which do trade and for those 
which do not, whereas the trade effect would be expected to show up as rising 
inequality between industries. 
 
The New Zealand experience also tends to confirm this international experience. 
As noted in section 4.B.2 above, New Zealand has suffered one of the greatest 
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rises in inequality of any country, but its export trade is not in the industries 
with high worker skill-levels. New Zealand exports are predominantly in the 
primary industries which are the industries least affected by lack of worker 
skills (Ballingall and Lattimore, 2002). By contrast, as the empirical sections of 
this thesis will show, the industries where the skills premium has risen most, 
like banking, insurance and public administration, are among the least traded. 
 
 
4.D.3  Outsourcing 
 
One variant of the trade argument has greater plausibility. The great reduction in 
freight costs has made it practical to outsource the more labour intensive stages 
of much manufacturing, and trade today is increasingly intra-industry rather 
than inter-industry (Feenstra and Hansen, 1996; Rodrik, 1997). Outsourcing 
would be obscured in the between industry comparisons of Burtless (1998) and 
Machin (2003), since it is only the labour that is being purchased instead of the 
goods themselves. 
 
However, the outsourcing argument has also been questioned on the grounds of 
its being too small to have the observed effects. Rodrik (1998) notes that despite 
very large gross capital flows, the net flows are quite small, and: 
 
"There is little evidence... that U.S. multinationals are reducing the 
demand for [production workers] ... by shifting large numbers of 
production worker jobs out of the country" (Moran, 1999: 105). 
 
While the globalization arguments continue to circulate, most commentators are 
agreed that neither trade nor outsourcing explains more than a minor part of the 
recent inequality trend. Brauer and Hickock (1995) concluded that trade 
explained 10 percent of the rise, and Gary Burtless believes it is “no more than 
one fifth” (Burtless, 1998: 62). Feenstra and Hansen (1999) estimate that 
outsourcing caused 15 percent of the rise, and: 
 
"My scorecard reads; trade matters, but it is neither all that matters nor 
the primary cause of observed changes" (Freeman, 1995b: 30). 
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4.E     Skill biased technological change (SBTC) 
 
4.E.1  Introduction 
 
The cause of rising inequality remains unproven, but the majority of 
commentators favour explanations based on technological changes which are 
biased against low-skill workers and in favour of higher-skilled workers 
(Chennells and van Reenen, 1997; Piva, Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2003). 
 
Technology is never skill neutral. As noted in Chapter 2, productivity in 
different industries is constantly changing, and the proportions of the workforce 
in each industry or performing different tasks within each industry are therefore 
also undergoing constant readjustments as an economy evolves. It follows that 
every change in the production function is likely to be reflected in a changing 
level of inequality, raising inequality if the technological change is skill biased, 
and lowering inequality if it favours the unskilled. 
 
In the early phase of industrialization it was common for new technologies to 
deskill the workforce, as machines replaced artisans and relatively low-skill 
workers were capable of controlling the machines (O’Mahony, Robinson and 
Vecchi, 2004). The abrupt change in the 1970s and the rising skill premium 
suggest that technological change is now generally skill-biased (Acemoglu, 
2002). 
 
There are two possible paths whereby industrial change might favour more 
highly skilled workers. Firstly, SBTC might occur within industries, with 
automation displacing process workers more than it affected skilled tasks. This 
would lead to a changing pattern of labour demand of the sort that has been 
identified in the last few decades. Or secondly, there might be changes between 
industries, as a result of some industries changing or expanding faster than 
others. 
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 4.E.2  Information and communication technologies (ICT) 
 
The period when the advantage enjoyed by skilled with respect to less skilled 
workers began to widen was also a period of rapidly changing technology in the 
workplace. Computers were applied to a wide range of tasks from controlling 
manufacturing processes to a mass of information handling in offices. 
Technological change has not been proven as the principal driver of rising 
inequality, but the last decade has seen it emerge as the prime candidate (Bound 
and Johnson, 1995; Goldin and Katz, 1998).  
 
The importance of technological change as a source of economic growth was 
noted in Chapter 2, and this has given rise to extensive research into different 
kinds of technology and the nature of technological change. Some technologies, 
especially those relating to specific industries, evolve progressively and display 
steady incremental improvements rather than more radical innovations 
(Freeman, 1992). In contrast, “General Purpose Technologies” or GPTs 
(Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995; David, 2000) spark a revolutionary change 
in modes of production, affecting countless industries. Examples of GPTs 
include steam power in the nineteenth century and electrification at the turn of 
the century (Helpman, 1998), and many authors have suggested that information 
and communication technologies represent the latest of these general purpose 
technologies (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000), with the general purpose nature of 
cheaper and better ICT permitting co-invention of more and more complex uses 
(Bresnahan, 1999; Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw, 2005).  
 
Whether a new general purpose technology, such as ICT, raises or lowers the 
demand for skills can only be determined empirically. Either outcome is 
possible depending on which segment of the labour market is most affected and 
the nature of the impact (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Krueger, 1993). But 
a causal link between increasing use of technology and the decline in demand 
for less skilled workers is widely accepted as very plausible, since returns to 
schooling have been found to be higher in industries making greater use of 
advanced technology (Allen, 2001).  Moreover, the rate of skill upgrading has 
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tended to be greatest in industries with greater computer investment (Autor, 
Katz and Krueger, 1998; Johnson, 1997).   
 
 
4.E.3  The sources of the skill bias 
 
Early studies (eg. Krueger, 1993) established that there is a wage premium 
associated with computer use, the implication being that computer use directly 
raised the contribution of the worker. Since the late 1990s, however, the idea 
that computers directly drive wages has been increasingly questioned. Rather 
than a simple complementarity between computer use and the skills of workers, 
most commentators now consider that there is a complementarity between 
skilled workers and an automated workplace (Bresnahan, 1999; DiNardo and 
Pischke, 1997).  
 
Freeman (2002) studied employment figures by industry for the USA, and 
established that demand is strong for those who are working with computers as 
well as for those in the IT industry proper. If well educated workers are 
continuing to enjoy an enhanced premium at a time when demand for ICT 
specialists has stabilized, this provides evidence that the skills premium is 
driven by the new workplace rather than the technology itself.   
 
Since the pioneering work of Richard Nelson and Edmund Phelps it has been 
appreciated that better educated workers are better equipped for decision 
making in all areas, and not merely their own field of specialization (Nelson and 
Phelps, 1966; Huffman, 1974). This return to adaptability may explain why 
computerization appears to be strongly associated with occupational 
restructuring (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Wolff, 2002), with better educated 
workers enjoying a comparative advantage in implementing new technology 
(Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987). 
 
There is significant evidence to suggest that the workplace reorganisation 
facilitated by ICT has boosted demand, not so much for ICT specialists, as for 
the generally well educated workers who are best able to adapt to and operate in 
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a rapidly changing environment (Howell and Wolff, 1992; Schultz, 1993). New 
Zealand evidence provides support for this theory, with a recent study showing 
that employment of IT specialists as a proportion of the total workforce has 
peaked at only some 4%, and while still growing in absolute numbers its share 
of the workforce actually declined during the 1990s (Blumenfeld and Thickett, 
2003: 2). 
 
The existence of a correlation does not establish either the nature or the 
direction of causality. At least in part, the computers could be following the 
higher incomes rather than driving them, since “firms may allocate computers to 
their most able workers, so what is measured is the combined effect of computer 
use and ability” (Daldy and Gibson, 2003: 14). However the results of a study 
using panel data from the British National Child Development Study to control 
for worker heterogeneity suggest that the wage premium exists independently of 
the unobserved characteristics of either firms or individuals (Bell, 1996). 
 
 
4.F   Purpose of the present thesis 
 
4.F.1  Summary of the existing literature 
 
In most developed countries inequality has risen considerably since the 1970s, 
and unemployment has also risen especially among the less-skilled members of 
the workforce. In terms of wage inequality the New Zealand case is one of the 
more extreme, and unemployment, while less serious in this country than in 
many, is likewise a problem which particularly afflicts those at the low end of 
the skills spectrum. 
 
If we can identify where the rise in inequality is occurring, we may have some 
indication of what is driving it. If inequality is rising within industries rather 
than between industries the implication is domestic SBTC. It would seem the 
supply of skills is not matching the demand generated by new work practices, 
and those who have skills are enjoying a premium over those who lack them. By 
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contrast, to the extent that inequality is rising between industries it would be 
more likely to reflect deindustrialization and globalization. Rises in between 
industry inequality suggest a Kuznets-type intersectoral evolution, with 
stickiness in the reallocation process as industrial patterns change while it takes 
time to achieve the best matching of workers.  
 
The bulk of overseas literature tends to suggest a strong skill premium and 
rising inequality within industries but between firms and establishments. This 
pattern is strongly suggestive of returns to adaptability. It implies that some 
firms have adopted a rapid modernization path, making deeper use of capital 
and paying premia for staff who can move with the changes and make the new 
approach worthwhile, while other firms are able to retain a niche in their 
industry using more traditional equipment and methods.  
 
This pattern would also suggest that globalization effects are relatively 
secondary, being somewhat correlated through the downstream effect that it is 
mostly export oriented companies which usually pursue company growth most 
vigorously. 
 
 
4.F.2  The present study 
 
The purpose of the present thesis is to investigate the patterns of rising 
inequality in New Zealand, and to consider these in the light of new technology 
and the demand for skills within and between different industries. In particular, 
because the pattern of New Zealand trade is rather different from that in other 
developed countries, similarities or differences between the New Zealand 
experience and those found overseas can help to elucidate which forces have 
been driving the rising inequality of the last twenty years. 
 
This thesis uses data from the Population Census and from unit record files to 
investigate the patterns of inequality in New Zealand. If rising inequality is 
inter-sectoral the problems are more likely to be temporary, and adjustment can 
be expected to take effect automatically, though it may be painful in the short-
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run. But if the inequalities are between workers of different skill levels and the 
problem is a general shortage of skills, then it is much less likely that any 
adjustment will take place automatically.  
 
The extent to which rising inequality is between industries or between groups of 
workers is therefore an important guide to appropriate public policy. If 
inequality is within groups and between industries, the best strategy is probably 
to facilitate adjustment. However the opposite pattern, with inequality between 
groups and within industries is likely to be more intractable. The only long term 
answer to this problem is to raise general levels of education and skills, if the 
country is to avoid greater polarization, and the economic and social problems 
which that would bring. 
 
I also study the extent to which the rise in inequality was temporary. Most 
authors have concluded that it was most marked in the late 1980s or early 1990s 
(Hyslop and  Maré, 2001; O’Dea, 2000), and that the rise has substantially eased 
in recent years and may even have reversed. It is still rather too early for this to 
be answered with confidence, but it is another important distinction from a 
policy point of view, as here again, if the inequality is more permanent, it would 
suggest a more determined policy response. 
 
Chapter 5 following describes the data and methods used to investigate these 
issues, and Chapters 6 to 9 report the findings. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Data and Methods 
 
 
5.A  Introduction 
 
It is the hypothesis of this study that recent changes in technology have been 
skill-biased. In order to test this hypothesis the empirical chapters which follow 
examine the patterns of inequality change in New Zealand according to 
industries and the skills and qualifications of workers. To this end we need data 
sets which reveal worker numbers, and the age, occupations and skill levels of 
workers in each industry, with the industries as finely divided as possible.  
 
There are two available data sets which provide relevant worker information: 
The Census of Population and Dwellings, which is conducted every five years, 
and the New Zealand Income Survey. Each has its strengths and its limitations. 
The Population Census is only conducted every five years. But it has been 
maintained for many decades without interruption, and with only minimal 
changes to the variables collected. The New Zealand Income Survey is annual, 
and provides more detailed and precise information. However these data have 
only been collected since 1997, and being unit record data access to them is 
strictly controlled.  Section 5.B describes these data sets in detail. 
 
An indicator of technology uptake is also needed, in order to check whether the 
new technologies are related in any systematic way to workers skills and 
changing worker demand in different industries. A number of different 
technology-uptake measures have been used in different countries, but the 
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analysis which follows uses expenditure on computing hardware and software 
as reported by Statistics New Zealand in the Input-Output tables. The reasons 
for this choice are explained in Section 5.D. 
 
 
 
5.B  Sources of income data 
 
 
5.B.1  The New Zealand Population Census 
 
For the present study New Zealand Population Census data were purchased for 
the Census years 1991, 1996 and 2001. The information requested was numbers 
of workers and average age of workers, broken down: 
By gender  
   By industry (using the 62 industry classification) 
     By personal income bracket (the 11 income brackets in the Census) 
     By highest qualification achieved 
 
Census data have the merit of being virtually comprehensive, but they are 
limited in terms of the range of questions asked, and the way these questions are 
structured. For one thing, questions on topics such as income are expressed in 
terms of income brackets, which inevitably give less precision than unit record 
data would provide. Thus instead of analyzing patterns over individuals, the 
analysis has to compare averages of workers with certain characteristics in the 
various industries, and some covariances within unit record data become 
unobservable. 
 
Secondly, this thesis being an exploration of the wage effects of new 
technology, it would have been ideal to have information about hourly wages 
received. However, the only Census question relating to income asks 
respondents for total income in the last year from all sources. The data 
purchased were therefore restricted to full-time workers, since these workers 
can be expected to receive the great bulk of their total incomes from earnings. 
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The total number of full-time workers rose from some 891 200 in 1991 to some 
997 300 in 2001, with the proportion of female workers in the full-time 
workforce rising from 39.9 percent to 42.6 percent. Table 5.1 gives a summary 
of worker numbers by gender in each Census year. Appendix 1A provides a 
more detailed table of the Census data, broken down by worker numbers in each 
education level and also subdivided by gender. The Population Census uses an 
11 step scale for qualifications, but these were grouped up to the 7 step scale 
used in much previous New Zealand research (Maani, 1997; Winkelmann, 
1998). 
 
    
Table 5.1 : New Zealand Population Census 
     Full-time workers  
    
1991 Male workers 535 539 60.1% 
 Female workers 355 674 39.9% 
 Total 891 210  
   
1996 Male workers 551 718 58.7% 
 Female workers 387 447 41.3% 
 Total 939 162  
   
2001 Male workers 572 244 57.4% 
 Female workers 425 088 42.6% 
 Total 997 332  
  
 
 
In 1991, 10.2 percent of male workers were graduates, compared to 9.1 percent 
of female workers. By 2001, not only had women increased their share of the 
workforce, but 18 percent of female workers were graduates compared to only 
14.6 percent of male workers. 
 
Just as dramatic is the change in relative numbers for workers who left school 
with few if any qualifications. In 1991, 40 percent of male workers had no 
qualifications beyond School Certificate, while for female workers the figure 
was 42 percent. By 2001, the proportion of males with no qualifications beyond 
School Certificate had risen to 45.5 percent, while the proportion of female 
workers had fallen to 40 percent.  
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 Evidently women perceive a greater advantage in pursuing education to higher 
levels. This may well reflect a greater skill premium for women than for men, if 
the job opportunities for unskilled women tend to be especially poorly paid.  
Appendix 1B gives the worker numbers in each of the 62 industries for each 
Census year. 
 
 
 
5.B.2  The New Zealand Income Survey (NZIS) 
 
Since 1997 Statistics New Zealand has conducted an annual New Zealand 
Income Survey (NZIS) as a supplement to the June quarter of the Household 
Labour Force Survey (HLFS). The Income Survey collects an extensive array of 
income information, including hourly, weekly and annual usual and total wages. 
The NZIS surveys some 30 000 individuals aged 15 or over, and includes 
information on the industries and occupations those individuals are employed 
in, their highest level of qualification achieved, and many other details such as 
marital status and ethnicity.   
For confidentiality reasons the full Income Survey data set is carefully 
controlled, and access to it by outsiders is only possible for approved projects 
conducted at the Statistics New Zealand Datalab, where all output can be 
checked before release. However, since 2002 Statistics New Zealand have been 
putting the NZIS data through a confidentialising process. This involves some 
top coding of numbers to exclude outliers, and some rounding to make 
identification of individuals more difficult. It also involves some regrouping 
into broader categories, such as grouping location of residence from the local 
government districts into 10 larger regions.  
With the risks to confidentiality much reduced, the resulting Confidentialised 
Unit Record Files (CURFs) are available for use outside Statistics New Zealand 
offices, and while the loss of some detail is regrettable they are beginning to 
prove a very useful research tool. In particular, the appearance of IS CURF data 
every year facilitates the tracking of relatively recent trends in personal 
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incomes. Full details of CURFs available and the confidentilising process are 
available on the Statistics New Zealand website (Statistics New Zealand, 2004).  
 
As of mid-2006 three years of Income Supplement CURFs had been released. 
The present chapter uses the 2002 and 2004 CURFs, the earliest and latest 
currently available, to examine wage inequality between workers in each of 
those years, and also the inequality trend over this two year period.  
The CURF data provide many different income and earnings variables, but 
because this is a study of the technology and industry effects on wages it focuses 
on the usual hourly wage from first job. This variable should be the most 
responsive indicator of the earnings effects of industries and worker 
characteristics.   
5.C  Industry information from Statistics New Zealand 
The Population Census records each worker as being employed in one of 64 
industries. However the following six categories were deleted from the data 
analyzed, either because there were very small numbers of workers and many 
empty cells, or (in the case of line 64) because the industries could not be 
identified: 
5  Hunting and Trapping 
22  Petroleum Refineries 
53  Owning Owner-Occupied Dwellings 
61  Domestic Services 
63  International And Extra-Territorial Body Operation 
64  Unidentifiable/ Not Specified 
 
There were no data supplied for industry 53, and industry 63 was not used in 
2001. Industries 5, 22, 61 and 63 had large numbers of empty cells. 
Moreover, in the case of industry 22 (petrol refining) there is only one firm in 
New Zealand, so data on wages and education levels of workers is as much 
firm-specific as it is industry-specific. Appendix 2 gives details of the 
numbers of workers in the 58 usable industries. 
 84
 5.D  Measures of ICT uptake 
 
There is no generally accepted best proxy for the uptake of new technologies, 
and two broad approaches to quantifying technology uptake have been used. 
One approach is to use indicators of level of innovation, usually either R & D 
expenditure (Allen, 2001; Gregory and Machin, 2000) or use of patents (Bartel 
and Sicherman, 1998). R & D expenditure is one of the most widely used 
proxies internationally, but has serious drawbacks. Lundgren (2000) has noted 
that there is little connection between R&D and innovation, and moreover: 
 
"The advantage of this variable [the ratio of R&D to net sales] is that it 
is a direct measure of innovative activity in the industry, but… the 
innovative activity refers only to the industry in which the innovation 
originates, not the industry where the innovation is actually used"  
(Bartel and Sicherman, 1998: 729).  
 
 
Pilat (2002) points out that Australia and New Zealand are both among the 
countries with very high levels of ICT diffusion, but Parham (2002) has 
commented that while Australia is a high user it is low in the league of countries 
which produce new ICTs, and the same is doubtless true for New Zealand. R&D 
is therefore an inappropriate measure in the New Zealand context, and number 
of patents used suffers from the same limitations 
 
The second approach is to use new investment as a proxy for innovation, either 
using specific technology measures such as computer use (Gittleman and 
Handel, 2003) or expenditure on ICT equipment and services (Katz and Autor, 
1999), or sometimes using broader measures of new investment such as age of 
capital or capital-labour ratios. A correlation has been found between rising 
capital-intensity and higher wage dispersion (Caselli, 1999), suggesting a skill-
bias related to changing capital-labour ratios. But using a general investment 
indicator as a proxy for ICT is open to question, since ICT is only one possible 
area for new investment, and capital-intensity tends to rise in any industry with 
large economies of scale. 
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 The present study therefore focuses on industry expenditure which is 
specifically on computers and computer services, using data drawn from the 
1996 inter-industry input-output tables compiled by Statistics New Zealand. 
These tables provide figures for the expenditure by each industry on goods and 
services purchased from each industry, expressed to the nearest million dollars 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2002). In addition to inputs from other industries, the 
input-output tables provide industry expenditure on wages of employees and 
operating surplus, as well as figures for  imports and exports in each industry.  
These figures facilitate controlling for wage-intensity, for profitability (using 
operating surplus as a proxy) and for trade effects. 
 
Unfortunately the 1996 input-output tables were an experimental one-off project 
which has not been repeated, and Statistics New Zealand advise that there is 
currently (2007) no update planned. It would be very desirable to track changes 
in the ICT inputs by industry over a period of years, to monitor the consistency 
of ICT investment over time and as a check whether any particular year such as 
1996 was typical. However this appears to be impractical at present.  
 
The 1996 industry expenditure information provides a reasonable ICT-use 
indicator for the analysis of the Census data between 1991 and 2001. However 
it is now becoming increasingly out of date, and this source is less satisfactory 
for the analysis of wage trends in the Income Supplement since 2002. The lack 
of any more recent source of ICT-uptake data will be an increasingly serious 
problem for any extension of the present study into later years. 
 
The input-output tables are published at two levels of detail, but the more 
detailed 126 industry by 210 product version was chosen because it provided 
separate commodity data for computer hardware, and computer software and 
services. Statistics New Zealand provide a concordance between their 126 
industry groupings and their 49 industry groupings. Neither of these exactly 
matches the 62 industry division used for the Census data, so a new 
concordance between the 62 and the 126 industries was created (Appendix 3). 
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 5.E  Analysis of Census data 
 
5.E.1 Income inequality trends by industry 
 
The Census data were used to estimate earnings functions for full time workers 
in each industry and each Census year, with estimated coefficients on each of 
the seven qualification levels. There are large numbers of workers with 
bachelors degrees, and also large numbers who only hold School Certificate. 
These two levels of qualifications were taken as being indicative of workers 
near the ends of the qualifications spectrum, and the ratio of these coefficients 
was used as an indicator of the skills premium being paid by employers in each 
industry and each Census year.  
 
The trend over time is examined by dividing the skills premium in one Census 
year by the skills premium in the previous Census year. This time trend is then 
regressed on the industry use of computing, as an estimate of the extent to 
which any change in the industry skills premium is associated with the use of 
computer technologies. The analysis is described in detail in Chapter 6, and the 
regression estimates are reported in Appendix 4. 
 
Within-group inequality trends were also estimated by calculating Gini 
coefficients for workers’ incomes within each industry and qualification level. 
Changes in the Gini coefficients between one Census year and the next were 
regressed on the proportion of industry expenditure devoted to computing 
inputs, as an indicator of the extent to which industry computing was related to 
trends in within-group inequality.  
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5.E.2 Employment change by industry 
 
The Population Census data were further used to examine the extent to which 
workers of different qualifications levels are experiencing increasing or 
declining work opportunities in different industries. Unemployment is itself a 
form of inequality, since employment opportunities tend to vary systematically 
with skill levels. Typically, demand is strongest for the well qualified workers, 
and weakest for the least-skilled workers. Thus an employment differential 
across workers of different skill levels is a form of between group inequality, 
analogous to the skills premium described in the previous section.  
 
The Census data were used to estimate a labour skills demand function for full-
time workers of each qualification level, in each industry and over each inter-
censal period. The dependant variable is the proportional change in numbers 
employed in each industry and year, and this was regressed on computer use 
and other industry variables, to check whether there is any correlation between 
computer uptake and changing labour demand patterns. The detailed findings of 
this investigation of employment trends are reported in Chapter 7. 
 
 
5.F  Analysis of New Zealand Income Survey data 
 
5.F.1  Income dispersion in the 2002 Income Survey data 
 
As noted above, the New Zealand Income Survey provides a source of earnings 
data which are both more up-to-date and more specifically wage information 
than the Census offers, though as yet they are only available for a few years. 
 
Quantile regression analysis was applied to the hourly wages of workers as 
reported in the New Zealand Income Survey for 2002. Quantile regression 
permits the simultaneous estimation of the relationship between wages and 
computer uptake at different points in the conditional wage distribution. In this 
study the 10th percentile (P10) and the 90th percentile (P90) were chosen, the 
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P90:P10 ratio being taken as an indication of the skills premium in each 
industry.  
 
 
5.F.2 Trends in the CURF data between 2002 and 2004 
 
For the final phase of the study, industries were divided into two groups, 
according to whether or not they were significant users of the new technologies.  
Industry expenditure on computer equipment and services varies from virtually 
zero in the primary industries up to nearly 4.9 percent of total industry inputs in 
banking. A cutoff line was drawn at 0.8 percent of total industry inputs. Only 14 
industries out of 58 spend a higher proportion than this on computer equipment 
and services, but these 14 industries are among the largest and provide 
employment for some 45 percent of all workers. This cutoff point therefore 
divides the workforce into two groups of approximately equal size. Appendix 
2B lists the 58 industries in order of ICT-uptake. 
 
Inequality patterns have shape as well as magnitude, with the consequence that 
no simple measure of inequality is able to capture nuances in the distribution. 
For this reason, three inequality measures were used in the analysis: the Theil 
measure, which is most sensitive to income differences towards the top of the 
distribution, the Gini coefficient, which is most sensitive to differences around 
the mode of the distribution, and the Atkinson (A2) measure, which is most 
sensitive to differences near the bottom of the distribution. 
 
These three inequality measures were calculated for wages in the CURF data for 
2002 and 2004, for workers in the high-technology group of industries and the 
low-technology group. This allows comparison of the inequality between 
workers in the different industrial groups, as an indicator of the technology 
effect. It also provides an indication of recent trends over time, though the 
availability of CURF data for only a two year interval is rather limiting. 
 
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) pioneered a technique for reweighting one 
set of observations to the characteristics of another, as a method of isolating 
which variables explain the differences between the two sets. This technique is 
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applied to the workers in the two groups of industries, as a test of the extent to 
which wage differentials are explained by worker characteristics as against 
differences intrinsic to the technology. 
 
 
5.G  Empirical contribution of this study 
The findings on New Zealand inequality trends outlined above are covered in 
detail in Chapters 6 to 9 following. The broad facts of rising inequality have 
already been widely documented elsewhere, but this thesis represents the first 
major attempt in New Zealand to isolate the underlying causes.  
 
In particular, international literature mostly suggests that inequality has risen 
because of a rising skills premium associated with new technology. Against this 
background the present thesis probes the relationship between earnings 
inequality and the adoption of new technology since 1991. In particular, 
Chapters 6 and 7 report on the broad trends as revealed in Population Census 
data between 1991 and 2001. Chapters 8 and 9 use unit record data to probe 
more deeply into the workers’ attributes which are most likely to explain the 
relationship between new technologies and the trends in wage dispersion, 
thereby providing an indication of what public policies would be most 
appropriate. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Skills differentials and the use of new technology  
in New Zealand 
Patterns across industries 
 
 
6.A  Introduction 
 
Inequality in earnings and in incomes increased considerably in New Zealand in 
the last quarter of the 20th century (Borland, 2000; Chatterjee, Podder and 
Mukhopadhaya, 2003), as in many other developed countries (Atkinson, 1997; 
Freeman, 1999). This rising inequality is coincident with the rapid diffusion of 
computers and other information technologies, and in other developed countries 
the rising inequality has also been found in conjunction with a rising skills 
premium. Skill-biased technical change (SBTC) is therefore one of the most 
favoured explanations for the growth of inequality (Goldin and Katz, 1998).  
 
When inequality is rising, it may either be between groups of workers with 
certain characteristics or it may be within such groups, or some combination of 
the two. If the SBTC theory is correct, we would expect a rise in inequality to be 
largely between groups of workers with different skills or qualifications, as the 
premium for acquiring certain skills increases. In this chapter I use Population 
Census data from 1991, 1996 and 2001 to explore income differentials by level 
of education and worker experience for full-time workers in 58 industries 
covering the entire New Zealand economy. In particular I try to determine the 
extent to which rising inequality is reflected in the skills premium, and therefore 
a rise in between-group inequality, and the extent to which it is a rise in within-
group inequality. 
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 The skills premium in New Zealand industries is estimated by means of the ratio 
of the marginal wage effect of having a bachelor’s degree compared to the 
marginal wage effect of only having School Certificate. Change over time in the 
skills premium is examined by comparing this ratio in one Census year with the 
same ratio in the subsequent Census year, for each of the two inter-censal 
periods.  
 
In order to estimate changes in within-group inequality, I calculate Gini 
coefficients for income inequality by industry, within groups of workers with 
the same level of educational qualifications. These Gini coefficients are 
calculated for each of the three Census years, in order to estimate the trend in 
within-group inequality over time. Data on industry use of computers from the 
1996 Input-Output tables (as discussed in section 5.C) are used to examine the 
relationship between new technology and the changes in both within-group and 
between-group inequality.  
 
6.B  Data  
 
6.B.1  The Population Census 
 
This chapter uses data from the New Zealand Population Census for the years 
1991, 1996 and 2001, as described in Chapter 5 and summarized in Appendix 1.  
The Census data were purchased in a disaggregated form which provided 
worker numbers in each of 63 industries, with the numbers in each industry 
further broken down into 12 income brackets. These brackets are typically  
$5 000 wide for incomes below $30 000, and $10 000 wide above that.  Within 
each industry the workers were further divided into seven groups according to 
their highest qualification held, and the numbers of workers in each industry and 
qualification group were also broken down by gender. Thus there are 10 584 
cells of worker numbers for each Census year: 
      7 Qualifications * 2 genders * 12 income brackets * 63 industries 
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Appendix 1A shows the worker numbers by highest qualification, in each of the 
three Census years. Appendix 1B gives the worker numbers by income bracket, 
and Appendix 1C gives the worker numbers in each of the 63 industries. Each 
of these tables is also broken down by gender. 
 
For each cell containing worker numbers there was an additional cell providing 
the average age of those workers, since age (or an experience measure based on 
age and years of education) is an important control variable in wage equations. As 
noted in Chapter 5, unit record data are preferable to tabular data because some 
information is lost when workers are grouped into cells representing numbers of 
workers with certain characteristics, and it is a particular limitation of the Census 
data that average ages of groups of workers are less informative than unit record 
data would be.  However confidentialised unit record data have only been 
released since 2002, and the Census data remain the best available source of 
information on the 1990s era, which because of the rapid changes in technology 
and inequality is of particular interest for this study. 
 
It is a further drawback that the Census data only provide a single figure for total 
income from all sources, rather than a specific figure for earnings. Some of these 
income sources are likely to be positively correlated with earnings, such as 
interest payments, while others may be negatively correlated, such as government 
benefits, so the use of incomes data may bias the estimated earnings equations in 
unknown directions. However, in the absence of unit record data until very 
recently, a number of authors have used Census data on incomes as a proxy for 
earnings (Morrison and Poot, 1998; Papps, 2001). 
 
To minimize the possible biases from using income data, the data sets were 
restricted to full-time workers only. For one thing, earnings can be expected to 
provide the bulk of annual incomes for full-time workers, with income from other 
sources playing a relatively minor role. Secondly, workers in full-time positions 
are more likely to have incomes which reflect the market value of their work, 
whereas part-time workers may be more interested in work for reasons of 
personal satisfaction or other non-market reasons. 
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Full-time workers are unlikely to receive benefit income, but highly paid workers 
are more likely to have investment income in addition to their earnings, compared 
to workers on low wages. It is therefore most unlikely that earnings will move in 
the opposite direction from incomes, but there is a risk that the income 
differentials in the Census data are somewhat greater than the earnings 
differentials. 
 
The 58 industries which were used for the analysis vary greatly in size. The 
largest of them, wholesale and retail trade, employed 129 210 full-time workers in 
1991, rising to 162 477 in 2001. In 1991 this was followed by public 
administration and defence (77 409), education (65 652) and business services  
(56 574). By 2001 this order had changed slightly with business services up to 
second largest (85 110), followed by education (83 115) and public administration 
and defence (64 899). At the other end of the scale, the smallest industries are 
coal mining, petroleum and coal products, and gas manufacture and distribution, 
each of which has fewer than 1000 full-time workers. Throughout this chapter the 
estimation methods used employ weighting by worker numbers, to take account 
of these large differences in industry sizes. 
 
6.B.2  ICT uptake by industry 
 
The 1996 input-output tables provided by Statistics New Zealand were used as an 
indicator of the extent to which different industries rely on computer hardware 
and computer software and services. As discussed in Chapter 5, the input-output 
tables were a one-off project which has not been repeated, and are therefore the 
only available official tables of this kind. The different industries in New Zealand 
vary widely in terms of their use of computer equipment and services. Banking 
and finance are the industries making heaviest use of computing, with expenditure 
on these inputs more than 4 percent of total industry outlays, including outlay on 
salaries and dividends.  
 
Of the 58 industries, six have computer expenditure in excess of 2 percent of 
outlay, and 12 industries have computer expenditure in excess of 1 percent of 
outlay. At the low end of the scale, 11 industries spend less than 0.1 percent of 
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total outlay on computing, these being mostly primary production such as 
farming, fishing and forestry. Appendix 2A provides the complete table of 
computing expenditure by industry in industry sequence, and Appendix 2B gives 
the same information sorted by computer expenditure as a proportion of total 
outlay. 
 
6.C  Method of analysis  
 
6.C.1  Earnings differentials between skill groups 
 
The Census data were used to estimate earnings functions for full-time workers 
in each industry and each Census year. The earnings functions are of the form: 
 
(6.1) ln Yi = αi + βSC School Certi + βUEUEi  βBURSBursaryi +  
                βDIPDiplomai + βBACHiBachelor’s Degreei + βPG [Post-grad       
                         Degreei] + β7 EXPi + β8 EXPi2 + ui                                                            
                [i=industry] 
 
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual income and the 
data on highest qualifications enable six dummy variables to be defined, 
distinguishing between School Certificate, University Entrance, Seventh Form/ 
Bursary, Post-School Diploma, University Bachelor's degree, and Post-graduate 
degrees. The βk (k=SC, .., PG) coefficients estimate the marginal effect of each 
level of education, as compared with the excluded group who have no school 
qualifications.  
 
Thus 58 equations were estimated, one for each usable industry, for each of the 
three Census years. The estimation results for these 174 equations are reported in 
Appendix 4A, arranged by Census year and then industry. 
 
The earnings equations also include a quadratic in years of potential labour 
market experience. A quadratic in age is frequently used in labour equations, but 
Winkelmann (1998) argues that experience is the more appropriate specification.  
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Work experience is itself valuable, but the time spent in gaining qualifications 
means that years of experience are shorter for a worker of given age but higher 
qualifications1. Thus controlling for age and age squared encompasses two 
variables, and is likely to underestimate the benefits of further education. 
 
There is a problem with the estimation of an earnings function from Census 
information, in that the data on annual earnings are not continuous but instead 
fall into unequal intervals. Moreover, the income brackets changed between the 
1991 and 1996 Censuses, though the 1996 brackets were retained for 2001. 
While it is tempting to use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation on such 
data (implemented, for example, by using the mid-points of the intervals) such a 
strategy generally gives inconsistent estimates (Stewart, 1983).  
 
For this reason a consistent maximum likelihood procedure is used here 
(StataCorp, 2001), which is a generalisation of the Tobit model (See Appendix 
11). This model requires the end points of the intervals to be specified (with the 
exception of the lower end-point for the bottom interval and the upper end-point 
for the top interval, which are treated as censored). The interval regression 
model assumes that the distribution of the error term is normal, but this should 
cause no difficulty since the logarithm of income is being used and it is well-
established that earnings distributions are approximately log-normal (Pryor and 
Schaffer, 1999). Appendix 4A reports the coefficients on the marginal effect of 
each level of education and for each industry, for each of the three Census years.  
 
The variety of qualification levels distinguished in New Zealand allows several 
different empirical measures of skills differentials to be calculated. The ratio of 
the marginal effect of a Bachelor’s degree relative to the marginal effect of 
School Certificate was chosen because these two qualifications are close to the 
ends of the qualification spectrum, and there are large numbers of workers at each 
of these qualification levels.  
 
Within each industry and year this ratio is interpreted as the premium paid for 
gaining a university level qualification. Appendix 4B gives these ratios for each 
of the 58 industries and each of the three Census years. 
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 The skills premia revealed by these ratios of marginal effects of qualifications 
vary considerably between industries. For example, the 2001 weighted mean 
skills premium was 2.25 and the industry median was 2.08. However the lowest 
ratio is just 1.43 (rubber products, industry 24) and 10 industries have a skills 
premium below 1.8. At the other end of the scale the highest ratio is 4.23 
(petroleum and coal products, industry 23), but only 18 of the 58 industries have a 
premium for skills which is greater than 2.4. Eric Wanner (2004) notes that the 
wage premium enjoyed by a graduate in the USA over a worker with only high 
school qualifications is about 85 percent, so a premium of 110 percent over 
School Certificate in New Zealand appears to be quite comparable. 
 
 
6.C.2  Time trends in the skills premium 
 
The trend over time is examined by dividing the skills premium in one Census 
year by the skills premium in the previous Census year. The skills differential that 
is calculated for each industry and Census interval, and then related to industry 
use of computers, therefore takes the form: 
 
( )( ) ).,(ˆˆ
ˆˆ
)2.6( 5 controlsindustryotherusecomputerf
tSCBACH
tSCBACH =+ββ
ββ  
Where t = 1991, 1996. 
 
Equation (6.2) implies a causal relationship, with the income differential due to 
skills modelled as depending on computer use. However this is not the only  
plausible explanation for a correlation between a skills premium and computer 
use. It could be the reverse relationship, with industries raising the premium for 
skills in order to attract or retain higher quality workers, and then equipping 
those workers with computers. Or, following Nelson and Phelps (1966) and 
Schultz (1975), it could be that industries undergoing rapid change are paying a 
premium for adaptability and simultaneously introducing new technology. The 
evidence for a correlation is examined in Section 6.D, but an attempt to tease 
out the path of causality will be left to Chapter 9. 
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 6.C.3  Earnings differentials within skill groups 
 
To examine earnings differentials within skill groups, inequality in annual 
incomes amongst full-time workers with the same level of highest qualification 
was measured, using the Gini coefficient:  
∑∑ −=
i j
ji
N
xx
G μ22)3.6(   
where xi  is the income of the ith person, μ is the mean income and N is the total 
number of persons. To deal with the problems created by interval data, the 
midpoints were used for the closed intervals (e.g., $10,001-$15,000). Unlike the 
regression case, where such a procedure can cause bias, simulations suggest that 
no bias is introduced by using midpoints to estimate the data for Lorenz curves, 
from which the Gini coefficient is derived (Chen, Datt and Ravallion, 1991)2.  
 
For each Census year Gini coefficients were computed for workers at each of 
the seven educational levels, and for all workers grouped together. In order to 
see whether the change in within-group inequality was related to computer use 
the inter-censal change in these Gini coefficients was regressed on the 
computer-uptake measure and other industry controls.  
 
 
6.D  Trends in income inequality 
  
6.D.1  Earnings differentials between groups of workers 
 
Over the ten years from the Population Census of 1991 to the Census of 2001 it 
appears that the skills premium for gaining a bachelor’s degree increased 
significantly. Of the 58 industries analyzed, 43 industries, or 74 percent, showed 
a rising skills premium over those 10 years. But because the larger industries 
were more likely to show rising returns to skills than the smaller industries, the 
number of workers involved was 897 054 in 2001, or 89.95 percent of all full-
time workers.  
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 Table 6.1 below provides a summary of the skills premium over all industries 
for the three Census years, together with the ratio over the whole decade 1991 to 
2001, as defined in equation 6.2, showing the generally upward trend. Appendix 
4B gives detailed figures for the trends in each industry, over each of the inter-
censal periods. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Changes in the skills premium 
Full-time workers 1991-1996-2001 
 ( )SCBACH ββ ˆˆ  
 1991 1996 2001 
( )( )19912001ˆˆ
ˆˆ
SCBACH
SCBACH
ββ
ββ
 
     
Median 1.910 1.840 2.078 1.088 
Unweighted mean 1.951 1.928 2.208 1.132 
1996 employment-weighted mean 1.881 1.993 2.249 1.196 
     
  
Industries with rising skills premium, 1991-1996 30 of 58                  (51.7%) 
Industries with rising skills premium, 1996-2001 52 of 58                  (89.7%) 
Industries with rising skills premium, 1991-2001 43 of 58                  (74.1%) 
  
Numbers of workers in these 43 industries, 2001 897 054 of  997 332 (89.95%) 
 
 
 
Over the decade as a whole, the skills premium rose from a factor of 1.88 to a 
factor of 2.25, an increase of almost 20 percent. But the 5 years of the early 
1990s contributed only 6 percent to the rise, whereas the second 5 year period 
contributed more than 13 percent. 
 
Moreover, in the first five years the rise in between-groups inequality was 
markedly concentrated in certain industries, while in the second five years it 
was much more general. In the five years from 1991 to 1996, between-group 
inequality rose in only 30 of the 58 industries (51.7 percent). In the 5 years after 
1996 the skills premium rose in 52 of the 58 industries (89.7 percent). 
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When unweighted industry data are used the return to skills even appears to 
have fallen slightly in the first period, though weighted industry data show a 
rise. Evidently the rising between-group inequality was concentrated in the 
larger industries in that period, with those 30 industries employing 68.6 percent 
of the workers in 1991. However this selective pattern did not continue into the 
late 1990s, when between-group inequality was rising more rapidly, and 
affected 90 percent of the industries. Because of the small size of the six 
unaffected industries, rising between-group inequality was experienced by more 
than 95 percent of the full-time workforce. 
 
 
6.D.2  Earnings inequality within  groups 
 
In addition to this rise in inequality between skill groups, there has also been a 
rise in inequality amongst workers who have the same highest qualification. 
This change in within-group inequality is reported in two ways:  
(1) the change in the weighted mean Gini coefficient, 9196 GG −  for each level of 
highest qualification (weighted by the numbers in each industry), and  
(2) the mean of the changes in the Gini coefficient, ,GΔ where in any particular 
industry, .9196 GGG −=Δ   
 
 
Appendix 5 reports the within-group Gini coefficients for each level of 
qualifications and for each of the three Census years. It also shows the findings 
on changes in the Ginis, using both the above methods. For most workers the 
rise in within-group inequality over the whole 10 years is about 8 percent in the 
Gini coefficient, though the figure is rather less for postgraduates and 
substantially greater for those with no qualifications. The percentage changes 
are summarized in Table 6.2. 
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 For holders of a postgraduate qualification the overall increase in the Gini 
coefficient is only 5.2 percent. This probably reflects the fact that this group is 
one of the smallest, making up only 5.3 percent of full-time worker numbers in 
2001, and probably relatively homogeneous. However there was a marked 
difference between the two periods. In 1991 – 1996 the university graduates 
experienced an exceptionally large increase in within-group inequality, but after 
1996 there was a significant reduction. Thus, by the end of the 10 years the 
overall rise in within-group inequality for these workers was quite modest.  At 
the other end of the scale, the workers with no formal qualifications experienced 
rising within-group inequality in both periods. Over the whole 10 years their 
within-group inequality rose 14.1 percent, a much greater increase than within 
any other group.  
 
 
 
Table 6.2 : Changes in within-group income inequality  
                   by highest education level :   Full time workers 
     
1991-1996 1996-2001 
  
Qualification Mean %-age Mean %-age 
level Change in Gini Change in Gini 
 
   
No qualifications 9.3% 4.0% 
School Cert 4.6% 2.6% 
UE/6th form 2.7% 4.3% 
Bursary 5.8% 3.5% 
Diploma 4.6% 2.4% 
Bachelor 10.9% -2.9% 
Postgraduate 11.2% -5.1% 
Total 7.4% 2.2% 
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6.E  Computer use and changes in income inequality 
 
6.E.1  Computer use and between group inequality 
 
A variety of regressions were estimated to see whether the rise in inequality 
between skill groups that is documented in the previous section is related in any 
way to the importance of computers in each of the various industries. The initial 
estimates used a bivariate version of equation (6.2), with industry computer use 
measured in three ways: the ratio of hardware purchases to total outlay (which 
includes wage payments and operating surplus); the ratio of software purchases 
to total outlay; and the ratio of all computer purchases to outlay.  
 
Industry spending on software and computer services appears to have been 
significantly related to the rise in between-group inequality that occurred in the 
1991-1996 period (Table 6.3), with an estimated coefficient on the ratio of 
software spending to industry total outlay in that period of approximately 2.2.  
In other words, in an industry where software and computer services spending 
relative to total outlay is one percentage point higher, the skills premium for a 
Bachelor’s degree relative to School Certificate would have risen by 2.2 
percentage points between 1991 and 1996. However in the period 1996 to 2001, 
while the coefficients continue to be positive they are considerably smaller and 
they have low statistical significance. 
 
The increase in the weighted mean skills premium in the period 1991-1996 was 
3.6 percent. The predicted rise in between-groups inequality associated with 
computing expenditure (at some 2.2 percent) therefore represents more than the 
half the mean increase, signalling the potential importance of industry computer 
use to this source of inequality at that time. The bivariate regression results also 
show that purchases of computer hardware have a positive effect on between-
groups inequality, but this effect is not statistically significant. This stronger 
apparent effect of software and services spending may reflect the fact that 
measured expenditure on this input is nearly four times that on hardware, 
making it easier to observe statistically significant effects. 
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 By contrast, in the period 1996 – 2001 the correlations were much weaker. The 
coefficient on total computer outlay dropped to about 1.6, and the coefficient on 
software alone to about 1.9. But in this later period the results had little 
statistical significance. 
 
 
Table 6.3: Bivariate relationships between industry computer use  
                  and the change in between-groups inequality  
                  All full time workers, 1991-1996-2001 
 Independent variables 
All workers OutlayTotal
Hardware
OutlayTotal
Software  
OutlayTotal
ComputingAll
   
(i) 1991 - 1996 3.174 2.243 2.061 
  (0.90) (2.90)** (2.67)** 
     
(ii) 1996 - 2001 0.867 1.867 1.569 
  (0.21) (1.27) (1.15) 
     
(iii) 1991 - 2001 4.581 4.722 4.142 
  (0.63) (2.13)* (1.92) 
     
Note: The values in the table are coefficients from bivariate regressions. The dependent 
variable for each regression is the ratio of the marginal effect of a Bachelor’s degree relative to 
the marginal effect of School Certificate in the later year, relative to the value of the same ratio 
in the previous year. The independent variables are, alternately, the ratio of industry spending 
on computer hardware to total industry outlay, the ratio of software spending, and the ratio of all 
computer expenditures to total industry outlay. Each regression is estimated on the sample of 58 
industries, and is weighted by industry size. In Table 6.2 all missing values are set to zero. 
Heteroscedastically-robust t-statistics in parenthesis;  * significant at 5% level; ** significant 
at 1% level. 
 
 
 
One problem with the information reported in the inter-industry tables is that 
values less than one million dollars are suppressed. Of the 58 industries, there 
were 11 with software and computer services expenditure and 25 with hardware 
purchases below this threshold in 1996 (Appendix 2B). In the base case reported 
above these missing data were set to zero, but to test the robustness of the 
findings the model was re-estimated using three alternative assumptions. The 
first alternative was to set the missing values to $0.5 million (and then divide by 
total industry outlays), under the assumption that any larger figure would have 
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been rounded up to $1M and reported. In contrast to adjustments which operate 
only on the numerator of the ratio between computer spending and total industry 
outlay, the other two approaches operate on the ratio itself. One of these is to set 
the ratio to the lowest non-missing ratio and the other is to use the mean of the 
non-missing ratios.  
 
The results for these four different approaches to the missing data are reported 
in Appendix 6. The coefficients for the bivariate relationships are very similar, 
regardless of which method is used. In the 1991 – 1996 period the coefficients 
on computer use were slightly over 2 and highly statistically significant. In the 
period 1996 – 2001 the coefficients dropped to approximately 1.5 but the 
statistical significance was low in every case except the coefficient on software 
expenditure when the mean of the non-missing values was used.  
 
To test whether these bivariate relationships between industry use of computers 
and changes in between-group inequality are robust, a variety of additional 
control variables were added to the model. These additional variables included: 
profitability (proxied by operating surplus), wages, and trade effects (exports 
and imports) each expressed as a proportion of total industry outlay.  
 
A measure of employment change over each five year period was also included. 
This final control variable was defined two different ways: 
(1)  As a general employment change measure, based on the change in 
employment levels in each industry as a whole, and 
 
(2)  As a targeted measure, based on the ratio of numbers of workers at the 
bachelor’s degree level to the number with only school certificate. This change 
in skilled relative to unskilled employment can be seen as a quantity change in 
the demand for skills, corresponding to the price change that is being measured 
by the skills premium for a Bachelor’s degree relative to School Certificate. 
 
Because the results in the previous section (Appendix 6) show that the measured 
effect of industry computer spending is robust to the assumptions about missing 
values, only one approach was used with the augmented model: Computer 
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spending was set to zero for those industries where it was less than $1million. 
The results for this augmented model are reported in Appendix 7A for the 
period 1991 – 1996, and Appendix 7B for 1996 – 2001. 
 
The relationship between industry spending on computing and the rise in the 
skills premium appears robust to the inclusion of the control variables. The 
addition of the control variables results in almost no change in either the 
magnitude or the statistical significance of the variables that proxy for industry 
use of computers, as reported in Table 6.3 above.  
 
Amongst the control variables, in the period 1991-1996 it appears that the rise in 
the returns to skill was smaller in industries which relied heavily on imports. 
However there was no significant import effect in the period following 1996.  
In the five years 1996-2001 there was a positive coefficient on operating 
surplus, with strong statistical significance, even though there had been no 
significant effect in the earlier period. Neither the general employment change 
nor the ratio of skilled to unskilled employment changes appears to have a 
significant effect on the change in the skills premium.  
 
6.E.2  ICT and changes in inequality within groups 
 
Bivariate and multivariate OLS regressions were estimated to see whether the 
rise in the Gini coefficient between 1991 and 1996 for each educational level is 
associated with the spending on computing in each industry. These regressions 
take the general form: 
 
).,(_)3.6( controlsindustryotherusecomputerfGinid edlev =  
    Where edlev = highest qualification held 
 
 
Eight regressions were estimated for each model, one for each of the seven 
educational levels, and one for all levels grouped. The coefficients on computer 
use for both the bivariate and the multivariate models are reported in Appendix 
8. The multivariate regressions use the same controls as were used in the 
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between-group estimates in the previous section, and again the results are robust 
to the inclusion of the controls.  
 
For poorly educated workers (those whose highest qualification is School 
Certificate or less) greater spending on computers by an industry is associated 
with a significant fall in income inequality between 1991 and 1996. In contrast, 
spending on computers is associated with a substantial rise in inequality 
amongst the most skilled workers, which is those who hold at least Bachelor’s 
degrees. 
 
 
6.F Summary and Implications 
 
The results reported here suggest there was a rise in both between-group and 
within-group income inequality for full-time workers, both between 1991 and 
1996, and further between 1996 and 2001. Earnings make up much the greater 
part of incomes for people who are employed full-time, so the most likely cause 
is a rise in earnings inequality.  
 
There was a marked difference between the general trends in inequality over the 
period 1991 – 1996 and the period 1996 – 2001. The skills premium, 
represented by the inequality between those with only School Certificate and 
those with a bachelor’s degree, rose by about 6 percent in the first period, but 
unevenly between industries. In the five years following 1996 the overall 
between-group inequality rose by more than 13 percent, and this rise was spread 
over 90 percent of industries and affected 95 percent of full-time workers. 
 
In the case of within-group inequality there was also an important difference 
between the two periods. Overall there was a fairly general rise of about 8 
percent in within-group inequality, with the least skilled workers experiencing 
the greatest rise and the most highly skilled workers experiencing the least. 
However the workers with university degrees experienced a very sharp rise in 
within-group inequality in the first 5 years, which dropped back again in the 
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later period. Other groups of workers experienced within-group inequality rising 
more steadily over the whole 10 years. 
 
The patterns of between-group and within-group inequality can be seen as 
complementary, and are therefore not surprising. If some industries are paying 
greater returns to skills than other industries, it would be expected that graduates 
in the industries with the higher skills premium would be widening their gap 
from other graduates who are in the industries where there is less change. 
 
The late 1980s and early 1990s were a period of considerable industrial change. 
This was partly brought about by the widespread adoption of new technologies, 
especially in some industries, and was compounded by a more open economic 
philosophy which ended the protection of many industries and led to a number 
of industries being more exposed to imports than previously. 
 
Thus it is not surprising that the period 1991 – 1996 saw considerable 
differentials between different industries. The global changes inevitably affected 
some industries more than others, and the pattern of between-group inequality 
growing only in some industries during that period is therefore quite 
understandable. During the early 1990s the premium for skills appears to have 
been associated with higher levels of computer expenditure, and in that period 
the industries with high levels of imports also showed a small negative effect on 
the returns to skills. These associations tend to support the idea that the early 
1990s were a period of major adjustment, in which particular skills were very 
well rewarded, and there were substantial if sometimes temporary advantages 
for workers of certain skills in certain industries.  
 
In contrast the period from 1996 – 2001 was a time of persistently rising 
inequality which affected all industries, and the between-industry effects of the 
early 1990s disappeared. In particular, the association with computer 
expenditure, which had been significant in the earlier period, was insignificant 
after 1996. 
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As noted in Chapter 3, earnings inequality is not only a matter of wage 
inequality for those who are working, but also involves access to work. The 
inequality measured in this chapter at the end of each time period is for 
surviving workers, and will not tell the whole story unless unemployment is felt 
equally by workers of all skill levels and in all industries. Chapter 7 continues 
the analysis of data from the Population Census by examining the changes in 
employment by groups of workers, and relating those changes to the computer-
intensity of industries. 
 
 
 
Footnotes: 
 
1 To construct the potential experience variable it was necessary to assign standardised years to 
each of the seven qualification levels. I follow the concordance used by Winkelmann (1998), 
which is: no qualification (8 years), school certificate (11 years), sixth form certificate (12 
years), Bursary (13 years), Diploma (14 years), Bachelor’s Degree (16 years), Postgraduate 
degree (18 years). 
 
2 For the open-ended interval at the top of the income distribution (either >$70,000 in 1991 or 
>$100,000 in 1996) the mean income for the interval was set at 30 percent above the lower 
bound, while for the lowest income interval it was set at 80 percent of the upper bound. Both of 
these values are recommended by Chen, Datt and Ravallion (1991) for use with interval data. 
 
 108
  
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
Employment change in New Zealand industries 
 
 
7.A  Introduction 
 
7.A.1 Employment Opportunities as a Form of Inequality 
 
The previous chapter examined patterns of wage inequality by industry, but 
hourly wage rates or annual incomes are only one dimension of inequality. 
Many studies have confirmed that being unemployed has serious non-pecuniary 
costs (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998). People 
need jobs, not only for the money but also for the sense of self-worth and the 
sense of being needed that having a job confers (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 
1991; Freeman and Soete, 1994).  
 
Job security therefore has value (Killick, 1995, Osberg, 2002). “Jobs differ in 
the amenities they offer” (Borjas, 2005: 206), and the payment of a higher wage 
in recompense for some undesirable feature of a job is referred to as a 
compensating differential. Since some jobs have greater security (and some 
employers offer greater security), workers are less willing to take employment 
where job security is seen to be a worry. Thus for many workers a somewhat 
lower wage in a secure job may be worth more than a higher wage with weaker 
long-term prospects. 
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However. many studies have shown that workers of different skill levels have 
systematically different levels of job security, with the less skilled more likely 
to be unemployed, employed casually, or forced to change jobs (Topel, 1993; 
Booth, 1999):  
 
"People without skills are much more likely to be out of work, and, if in 
work, low paid" (Layard, 2006: 175). 
 
These different patterns of job security therefore represent a form of systematic 
inequality, which exacerbates the inequality of wages. The least skilled workers 
command the lowest wages, but it is precisely those workers who also enjoy the 
lowest job security. Thus they tend to be doubly disadvantaged. 
   
In the middle years of the 20th century, there was little unemployment in the 
OECD countries, but by the mid-1990s unemployment had risen significantly in 
New Zealand (Gobbi and Rea, 2000; Statistics New Zealand, 2000) and in other 
developed countries (Martin, 1994; Nickell and Bell, 1995), and it particularly 
afflicts workers at the lower end of the skills range (Kruse, 1998). This decline 
in employment opportunities is coincident with the rapid diffusion of computers 
and other information technologies. Skill-biased technological change is 
therefore one of the leading explanations, not only for the changing wage 
distribution for those who still have jobs  (Goldin and Katz, 1998), but also for 
the changing pattern of employment opportunities (Phelps, 1997).  
 
This chapter examines the link between computer use and employment change 
across different industries. Worker numbers in the Census of Population from 
1991, 1996 and 2001 are used to estimate trends in employment change by 
educational level for full-time workers in 56 industries covering the entire New 
Zealand economy. To explore the role of technical change, I again use data on 
industry use of computers from the 1996 Input-Output tables as described in 
Chapter 5, in this chapter relating them to the changes in employment levels for 
workers at different levels of education. 
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7.A.2  The Theoretical Framework 
 
The present chapter examines the demand for workers of different educational 
levels in terms of industry computer use, the underlying theory being the 
assumption that the demand for labour at each skill level is a function of the 
price of labour and the price of other inputs. The cost of computer power fell 
dramatically in the late 20th century (Jorgensen and Stiroh, 1999), and as the 
cost of computer inputs fell it was to be expected that the pattern of demand for 
different sorts of labour would also change. In industries with high levels of ICT 
uptake, both wages and employment growth are expected to be strongest for 
workers at those skill levels which are complementary to the new technology 
(Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Katz, 2000). Conversely, for those workers 
for whom the new technology is a substitute, wages are likely to be weak and 
employment trends to be flat or negative  
 
   
7.B  Data and Methods 
 
7.B.1  The Population Census 
 
Appendix 1A gives the numbers of full-time workers by gender and highest 
qualification achieved from the New Zealand Census of Population for 1991, 
1996 and 2001, together with the proportions of workers at each qualification 
level by gender and year. The sample was again restricted to full-time workers, 
in part because the previous chapter looked at changes in annual incomes for 
full-time workers, and comparison between the wage effects and the 
unemployment effects are more meaningful if the same data specification is 
used. Secondly, part-time work is more often associated with casual work than 
is full-time work, and casual work tends to change systematically with 
unemployment. Thus, while the following results do not cover the full working 
population they do relate to the largest group in the New Zealand workforce, 
and the group which is least like the unemployed. 
 
 111
Female workers increased their share of the full-time workforce from 39.9 
percent in 1991 to 42.6 percent in 2001. But working women also overtook men 
in terms of qualifications achieved at every level except postgraduate. The 
distribution of full-time workers by highest qualification achieved for each 
Census year is displayed in Graph 7.1, and shows the general trend over this ten 
year period in which women’s educational attainment levels continued to rise 
while men’s levels tended to fall. The proportion of female workers who were 
university graduates had overtaken that of male workers by 1996, and by 2001 
was ahead by more than 3 percentage points. At the lower end of the 
qualification scale female workers also displayed significantly higher 
qualification rates than males, with only 24.3% of female workers lacking even 
School Certificate in 2001, compared to 31.7% of male workers.  
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The figures show a broad trend toward more workers with university degrees, 
both at the bachelor’s and at the post-graduate levels. Workers holding degrees 
rose from 9.8 percent of the full-time workforce in 1991 to 12.9 percent in 1996 
and 16.1 percent in 2001. However this rise was entirely achieved at the 
expense of other post-secondary qualifications, and the proportion of workers 
with no qualification beyond the University Entrance/6th form level increased 
from 48.9 percent in 1991 to 54.7 percent in 2001.  
 
One problem affecting the estimation of a skills demand function from self-
reported qualifications lies in the changing use of terminology and the expansion 
of degree-level polytechnic courses. Many qualifications  such as accountancy are 
today recognized with university degrees, where in earlier years qualifications 
were granted by professional bodies or non-degree granting institutions. In 
primary teaching for example, since 1990 the six colleges of education have all 
amalgamated with local universities, and the standard qualification has become a 
BA or BTeaching degree, where in the past the teachers colleges awarded their 
own diplomas. Thus the decline in numbers of workers with vocational diplomas 
and the rise in numbers with bachelor’s degrees is partly explained by changing 
the names of qualifications which in reality are quite similar. 
 
In theory a decline in the employment of low-skill workers could be explained by 
declining demand for these workers, or by a declining supply if increasing 
numbers of school leavers were proceeding to further qualifications. However the 
second explanation is implausible in the New Zealand context in view of the 
overall rise in the proportion of school leavers with no qualifications beyond the 
school level. Thus it seems clear that declining employment of low-skill workers 
is entirely a function of declining demand. 
 
 
7.B.2 Industrial Classification 
 
Of the 58 industries analyzed in Chapter 6, 56 were used to track employment 
change. Prior to 1997, Statistics New Zealand used the New Zealand Standard 
Industrial Classification (NZSIC) to differentiate industries, but since then they 
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have adopted the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification 
(ANZSIC). The Census data from 1991 and 1996 are therefore directly 
comparable, but the design of the ANZSIC classification results in a number of 
regroupings which complicate some industry comparisons between 1996 and 
2001.  
 
Translation between the classifications is relatively straightforward for 54 of the 
58 industries, covering some 94% of the full-time workforce. Of the remaining 
four industries, two industries (banking and other financial services) have been 
redefined in such a way that some 5000 workers classified as banking under 
NZSIC are now included in other financial services. For the purpose of 
comparison between 1996 and 2001, these two industries have therefore been 
combined into a single financial services industry of 32 073 full-time workers. 
A further two industries (manufacture of professional equipment and sanitary 
and cleaning services) have been regrouped in such a fundamentally different 
manner as to make comparison of worker numbers invalid. These two industries 
were therefore dropped from the analysis in this chapter, but together they only 
account for 28 122 workers in 2001, or 2.8% of the full-time workforce. 
 
 
7.B.3  Industry Use of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) 
 
As a measure of ICT uptake, the present chapter again uses industry expenditure 
on computers and computer services, drawn from the 1996 inter-industry tables 
compiled by Statistics New Zealand. As noted in Chapter 6, in the inter-industry 
tables values less than $1M are suppressed. Four alternative ways of handling 
the missing data were tested and found to make no significant difference to the 
results of the wage equations. The same four methods were tested for the 
following labour-skills demand equations, but again there were no significant 
differences in the results. The results reported in this chapter are those with 
missing values set to zero. 
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7.B.4  Method of analysis 
 
The Census data were used to estimate a labour-skills demand function for full-
time workers of each qualification level, in each industry and over each inter-
censal period, where the dependent variable is the proportional change in 
numbers employed (E) in each industry (i) and year (t), which is regressed on 
computer use and other industry variables: 
 
( )
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The base-line case examines the bivariate relationship between ICT expenditure 
and the demand for labour at different skill levels. In the second phase controls 
are brought into the model as proxies for other inputs which could be 
alternatives to labour. Operating surplus and wage costs as proportions of total 
industry expenditure are controlled for as proxies for the price of capital and the 
capital-to-labour ratio. Industry use of imports is introduced as a proxy for the 
extent to which industries may be able to substitute foreign sourced fabrication 
as an alternative to local labour. The proportion of female workers is also 
controlled for, as the rising proportion of women in the workforce has been 
advanced as a possible explanation for the changing labour demand patterns. 
 
The same caveats apply to equation (7.1) as for equation (6.2) in the previous 
chapter. As written, equation (7.1) posits a causal relationship, with changing 
employment patterns modelled as dependant on computer use, but it is quite 
possible that the causality runs in another direction. A greater proportion of high-
skill workers could theoretically be the exogenous variable, with the changed 
workforce needing to be equipped with computers. Or more fundamental changes 
in certain industries could be simultaneously driving both the increased use of 
computing and a different pattern of labour demand.  
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7.C  Computer use and Changes in Employment 
 
7.C.1  Bivariate Relationship : Computer use and changes in employment 
between skill groups 
 
Table 7.1 shows the proportional change in numbers of workers at each skill level 
over each of the two intercensal periods. There are overall trends in employment, 
which grew 5.4 percent from 1991 to 1996 and 6.2 percent from 1996 to 2001 (as 
well as being higher for female workers than male), so to focus on the changing 
demand by skill level the employment changes in Table 7.1 have been calculated 
relative to the change in total employment, using equation (7.2), where Es is the 
number of workers E at each skill level s: 
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Table 7.1: Employment change by educational level as a proportion of 
overall change 
 1991 – 1996 1996 – 2001 
Highest 
Qualification Male Female Total Male Female Total 
       
No 
qualification 1.88 0.11 0.72 2.28 0.21 0.98 
School Cert 3.72 1.23 2.06 8.01 2.04 4.04 
UE/6th Form 11.59 4.22 6.74 4.44 1.71 2.68 
Bursary 18.41 9.17 12.12 5.46 2.79 3.72 
Diploma -5.87 -1.16 -2.78 -5.96 -1.28 -2.95 
Bach’s 
degree 10.78 6.98 8.18 5.29 5.72 5.69 
Postgrad 
degree 7.18 4.97 5.47 4.24 4.78 4.44 
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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In Table 7.1 ratios greater than 1 indicate categories of worker with numbers rising 
faster than the overall trend, those with ratios which are positive but less than 1 are 
growing more slowly than the overall trend, and those which are negative are 
categories in absolute decline. These figures highlight the rapid increase in the 
proportions of the workforce with university degrees, and the steadily declining 
proportions of workers, both male and female, whose highest qualification is a 
vocational training diploma, though as noted in Section 7.B.1 above this is partly 
explained by the trend towards replacing vocational courses with degrees. 
 
A variety of regressions were estimated to see whether the changing proportions 
of workers at each educational level were related in any way to the importance 
of computers in each of the various industries. The initial estimates used a 
bivariate version of equation (7.2), with industry computer use measured as the 
ratio of all computer expenditure (including hardware, software and computer 
services to total industry outlay. The regressions were estimated for all workers 
together, and also for male and female workers separately. Table 7.2A shows 
the coefficients from the bivariate reressions, for all workers grouped. Appendix 
9A gives the full table of coefficients, showing male and female workers 
separately as well as grouped together. 
 
The proportion of industry expenditure devoted to computing appears to be 
significantly related to the changes in the demand for skills.  There is a strong 
and statistically significant negative correlation between industry computer 
expenditure and the proportionate change in the number of workers with no 
qualification beyond school level. This is particularly true for workers with no 
qualifications beyond 6th form or bursary, for whom the coefficients are 
between minus 15 and minus 18 over the 1991-1996 period. The implication of 
these findings is that for workers with no qualifications beyond upper secondary 
school level, between 1991 and 1996 there would have been a 15% to 18% 
decline in employment in the i-th industry, for every one percentage point 
increase in the ICT share of total industry expenditure. (Though the entire range 
in the computer expenditure measure is only 0-4.8%, so a 1 percentage point 
difference in this measure is a full one-fifth of the range.) The same trend is 
apparent over the 1996-2001 period, though the coefficients are reduced to 
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below 10 percent. In contrast, there was very little effect of computer spending 
on rates of industry-level employment change for workers who had completed 
post-school qualifications.  
 
 
Table 7.2A:  Bivariate relationships between employment 
change and industry computer use, by 
educational level 
 
 No School UE Bursary Diploma Bach's Post- All 
 Qual’s Cert 6th form   degree grad Levels 
 
 
1991-1996        
 -4.18 -6.26 -15.26 -18.05 -2.26 -0.71 1.67 -2.31 
 (2.03)* (3.42)** (6.58)** (5.93)** (1.89) (0.17) (0.32) (1.23) 
         
 1996-2001        
 -3.44 -7.83 -9.71 -4.66 1.14 -6.66 -0.94 -2.01 
 (0.89) (3.07)** (3.72)** (1.44) (0.41) (1.28) (0.26) (0.72) 
 
 
Table 7.2B:   Multivariate relationship between employment change  
and industry computer use, by educational level.  
 
 No School UE Bursary Diploma Bach's Post- All 
 Qual’s Cert 6th form   degree grad Levels 
         
 1991-1996       
         
 -5.84 -9.52 -19.47 -21.94 -3.38 -1.08 0.98 -3.79 
 (2.32)* (4.33)** (6.65)** (4.81)** (2.25)* (0.51) (0.38) (1.78)+
         
 1996-2001       
         
 -6.54 -11.46 -14.96 -10.50 -0.32 -7.98 -3.55 -4.05 
 (1.66)+ (2.71)** (2.87)** (1.78)+ (0.12) (1.25) (0.64) (1.47) 
         
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
 
Graph 7.2A (for the 1991-1996 period) and Graph 7.2B (for 1996-2001) 
illustrate the relationship between employment change and industry expenditure 
on ICT at each of the seven educational levels. In the five years 1991-1996 there 
was a strongly negative relationship between industry use of computers and 
employment opportunities for those workers with no more than school 
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qualifications, and this relationship had a high statistical significance. For those 
workers with any post-school qualifications the relationship was closer to zero, 
and the statistical significance was weak, especially for the university graduates.  
 
In the five-year period following 1996 the coefficients were generally smaller, 
and were rather more uniform across all educational levels. However, as in the 
earlier period, the negative relationship had strong statistical significance for 
workers who did not proceed beyond 6th form, and low statistical significance 
for workers with post-school qualifications. 
 
When male and female workers are considered separately, the same patterns are 
evident in the 1991-1996 period, suggesting that declining demand for less 
skilled workers was very general at that time. In the following five years, the 
pattern is again similar for male workers, but for female workers the statistical 
significance drops to very low levels (Appendix 9A). This finding suggests that 
the low-skill work in predominantly female industries was less affected by new 
technology than in industries which traditionally employed significant numbers 
of low-skilled male workers. 
The regressions were also estimated for the effects of hardware purchases and 
software and services purchases separated, each expressed as a proportion of 
industry total expenditure. In the case of software and services purchases, both 
the coefficients and the levels of statistical significance are very similar to those 
for all computing purchases combined. However, for hardware purchases there 
are no statistically significant findings at any educational level, except for 
workers with postgraduate degrees for whom the coefficients are substantial and 
positive. The findings with computing inputs separated are reported in 
Appendix 9B. 
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Graph 7.2A: Relationship between employment change and industry 
computer use at each educational level : 1991 – 1996 
 
 
 
Graph 7.2B: Relationship between employment change and industry 
computer use at each educational level : 1996 – 2001 
 
Note : Y bars indicate 95% confidence intervals 
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The stronger apparent effect for software and services may reflect the fact that 
expenditure on this input is nearly four times as great as expenditure on 
hardware, making it easier to observe statistically significant effects. The 
increasing trend toward outsourcing computer services also raises questions 
about the validity of the hardware figure from the input-output tables, since the 
purchase of computer services necessarily hides a substantial hardware 
component, which then appears as a purchase by the computer services industry 
instead of the end-user industry.  
 
7.C.2  Multivariate relationships 
 
Several additional control variables were added to the model to test whether 
these bivariate relationships between industry use of computers and changes in 
employment patterns are robust. These additional variables included: 
profitability (proxied by operating surplus), wages, and trade effects (proxied by 
exports and imports). Industries vary widely in the extent to which they are 
involved in exporting, or experience import penetration, and also in their 
proportions of labour costs, and it might therefore have been expected that the 
relationship between computing expenditure and labour demand would be 
muted once these control variables were brought into the model. The data for 
these variables were again drawn from the 1996 inter-industry tables and were 
again expressed as proportions of total industry expenditure.  
 
A gender variable was also included, being the ratio of female workers to total 
workers in each industry, as at the start of each five year period. There is a 
marked tendency for male and female workers to cluster in specific industries. 
In 1996, for example, mining and quarrying were more than 90% male, while 
clothing manufacture or health care and care of the elderly were over 70% 
female.  It is therefore also plausible that controlling for the female proportion 
of employment in each industry could have produced different coefficients for 
the computing effect. 
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The coefficients on computing expenditure in the multivariate model are given 
in Table 7.2B. When these controls are included the coefficient for computing 
expenditure changes little from the bivariate model, with the magnitude of each 
coefficient almost invariably increased. Moreover, in the multivariate model the 
statistical significance of the results for the computing variable also remains 
high for the coefficients on workers with only school level qualifications, as was 
the case in the bivariate model. In the multivariate model the statistical 
significance is again low for workers with university degrees, confirming that in 
the industries with high levels of ICT uptake the better-qualified workers were 
less vulnerable to employment decline.  
 
The full results for this augmented model are reported in Appendix 10A for the 
1991-1996 period, and Appendix 10B for 1996-2001. Most of the control 
variables had very little effect, and few of these effects were statistically 
significant. In particular the gender variable had no significant effect in either 
five year period. Evidently the tendency of men and women to cluster in 
different industries has no significance once other factors such as qualifications 
have been allowed for.  
 
In the 1991-1996 period there was a small tendency for openness to trade to 
lower the employment prospects. Import penetration appears to have had a 
negative effect on workers with at least school certificate, and especially on 
those with postgraduate qualifications. This finding suggests that more skilled 
workers were to some extent disadvantaged during the period of rapid 
restructuring after the mid-1980s, when import restrictions were relaxed and it 
would have been easier for firms to substitute imports for local skilled labour.  
 
As might be expected, exactly the opposite pattern applies to industries with 
higher levels of exports, where employment decline was exacerbated for 
workers who lacked post-school qualifications, and there was no significant 
effect on the better qualified workers. Firms which are involved in exporting 
tend to be the more innovative firms (Dosi and Fabiani, 1994), and it is 
therefore plausible that more export-oriented industries will have labour demand 
skewed toward the better qualified. But the import and the export effects 
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evaporated in the period following 1996, suggesting that they were both features 
of the period of rapid restructuring. 
 
In the 1991-1996 period there was also a small negative effect on wages for 
workers at the two ends of the skills spectrum. This probably also relates to the 
widespread changes taking place in that period, as the trend did not continue 
after 1996. Operating surplus had no significant effect in the earlier period, but 
after 1996 it does show a positive correlation with the postgraduates. This 
finding is very similar to the finding on income inequality noted in Chapter 6, 
where again operating surplus had insignificant effects in the earlier period, but 
after 1996 was associated with higher earnings. 
 
A regression specification test (RESET) was run following each regression. The 
regression specification test is designed to find evidence of excluded relevant 
variables and incorrect functional form, by included powers of the fitted values 
in the model. Only in the regression for workers with postgraduate degrees, and 
only in the 1991-1996 period did the RESET test find any significant evidence 
of misspecification. The relationship between industry spending on computing 
and the change in demand for workers of each skill level therefore appears to be 
reasonably robust. 
 
 
7.D  Summary and Implications 
 
In New Zealand, the late 20th century saw a marked decline in demand for less 
skilled workers, a pattern which is common to many of the developed countries 
and especially to the English-speaking countries. This period has also been one 
of rapid technological change, notably with regard to the adoption of 
Information and Communication Technologies and the widespread workplace 
reorganization which new technologies have facilitated.  
 
The results reported here suggest a strong correlation between changing patterns 
of labour demand and the ICT-intensiveness of industries. The industry-level 
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demand for well qualified workers does not appear to be significantly affected 
by industry ICT use. However the findings show a substantial and statistically 
significant decline in demand for workers with no qualifications beyond school 
level, and this decline is strongly correlated with the uptake of ICT. The trend 
was most marked between the Censuses of 1991 and 1996, and continued 
between 1996 and 2001 although at a reduced level. 
 
The reduced demand for less-qualified workers in ICT-intensive industries 
parallels the wage dispersion noted in Chapter 6. It was found there that 
between-group inequality had risen substantially over the 10 years 1991 – 2001, 
and that the rise in inequality was correlated with ICT-uptake. In particular, the 
skills premium in ICT-intensive industries showed a major jump in the first five 
years, which is also the period when the demand for worker numbers was in 
steepest decline for the less-skilled workers. In the five years after 1996 the 
skew in the skills premium toward the ICT-intensive industries was more 
muted, as was the decline in demand for less skilled workers.   
 
This pattern is consistent with the complementarity of computers with skilled 
workers and the substitutability of computers for unskilled workers. The 
international literature suggests that this complementarity is partly a direct 
effect of computers replacing workers in routine tasks, but more importantly the 
indirect effect that automation facilitates workplace reorganization, which in 
turn leads to a changing pattern of labour demand (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; 
Wolff, 2002). The findings from the Census data reported here tend to support 
the returns to adaptability theory. The greatest shift in both between-group wage 
inequality and labour-skills demand occurred during the period of rapid change 
in the early 1990s, suggesting that the process of adjustment had more effect on 
inequality than computerization per se. 
 
The latest New Zealand Census of Population was held in March 2006. No data 
from this Census are available at the time of writing (August 2006), but it will 
be interesting to study the ongoing trends in labour demand when the next batch 
of Census data are released early in 2007. However the relevance of the 1996 
input-output tables becomes increasingly tenuous with time. In the context of 
 124
ICT uptake, any further study of Census data should probably be delayed until a 
more recent indicator of industry inputs becomes available. 
 
The analysis of Census data has therefore been taken as far as is currently 
possible, but since the 1990s Statistics New Zealand have been collecting 
earnings information through the Income Supplement to the Household Labour 
Force Survey. As explained in Chapter 5, unit record data have a number of 
advantages over Census data, both in terms of reliability and especially in terms 
of separating earnings from other forms of income. Too few years are available 
yet for long term trends to be studied, but Chapter 8 following uses the 2002 
Income Supplement data for a more up-to-date view of earnings inequality than 
is possible from the Census, and one which is more earnings specific. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Technological change and the demand for skills in  
New Zealand : Evidence from Unit Record Data 
 
8.A  Introduction 
 
8.A.1  Skill-biased technological change 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s inequality in earnings and incomes increased 
considerably in New Zealand, as in many of the industrialized countries, and 
this rising inequality was coincident with the rapid diffusion of Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICT). This is most unlikely to be mere 
coincidence, since a number of overseas studies have established that the 
industries with the greatest ICT uptake have been leaders in the trend toward 
greater wage inequality (Allen, 2001; Bell, 1996; Machin, 2001), and the earlier 
chapters of this thesis confirm that this is also the pattern in New Zealand.  
 
Many commentators believe that the latest phase of technological developments 
has been biased in favour of more-skilled workers, and that the rise in inequality 
reflects the associated premium for skills (Katz, 2000; Green, Felstead and 
Gallie, 2003). But the exact path of causality is not clear. In particular, the 
number of experts in computing and related fields in New Zealand has been 
estimated at no more than four percent of the workforce (Engelbrecht, 2000b; 
Blumenfeld and Thickett, 2003), and it therefore seems implausible that the 
increasing inequality can be explained by the wages of ICT specialists alone.  
 
For skill-biased technological change to be the cause of rising wage inequality, 
a much more general demand for higher skills throughout industries with rapid 
uptake of new technology would seem to be necessary. Computers have 
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automated many specific tasks, and this has doubtless changed the proportions 
of workers of different skill levels that are needed in firms. But again, the extent 
to which cheaper technology alters the skills demand through direct 
displacement of low-skilled workers appears too small to explain the observed 
shift in labour demand (Acemoglu, 2002; Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego, 
2001). 
 
However various studies around the world have identified an effect with a 
deeper groundswell. New technology only appears to have really far-reaching 
effects when it is combined with rather general workplace reorganisation 
(David, 2000; Wolff, 2002a): 
 
" Much of the previous discussion of IT impact has focused on the 
substitution of IT for labor, yet much of the managerial literature has 
recently stressed the importance of finding complementarities between 
IT and other organizational practices” (Hitt and Snir, 1999) 
 
A large proportion of the New Zealand workforce is employed in industries 
which have experienced substantial reorganisation, in part associated with the 
adoption of new technologies, and it is therefore plausible that widening 
earnings dispersion reflects the increased returns to the knowledge and skills 
required to maximize the potential of the new workplace. This chapter reports 
the findings of an investigation into the extent to which wage inequality is 
related to new technology and the extent to which it is correlated with skills and 
qualifications. Specifically it uses unit record data collected by Statistics New 
Zealand in the June 2002 Income Supplement to the Household Labour Force 
Survey to estimate wage differentials in the New Zealand economy.  
 
To explore the role of technical change I relate data on the industry use of 
computers from the 1996 Input-Output tables to the earnings dispersion. Quantile 
regression was used to estimate how the proportion of industry spending on 
computing affects workers at the 10th and 90th percentiles of the conditional log 
wage distribution, and whether that log wage gap is wider in industries making 
more intensive use of computers.  These regressions include tests for the effects 
of occupations, qualifications and skills, in order to estimate how much any 
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difference in inequality is explained by worker characteristics, and how much 
the difference is ICT-specific. 
 
 
8.B  Data and Methods 
 
8.B.1 The Household Labour Force Survey – Income Supplement 
 
Statistics New Zealand (SNZ) conducts a quarterly Household Labour Force 
Survey (HLFS), to which they add an annual Income Supplement each year in 
June1. This chapter uses the Income Supplement for June 2002, which contains 
extensive detail on the various sources of income, including income from 
wages, for a cross-section of some 29 000 New Zealanders aged 15 and over.  
 
As noted in Chapter 5, unit record data contain large amounts of personal 
information, and for confidentiality reasons access to the IS data is therefore 
limited to approved users working at an office of Statistics New Zealand. The 
empirical work described in this chapter was carried out in the controlled 
environment of the Statistics New Zealand Datalab, and all analyses were 
checked by SNZ staff for conformity with the confidentiality requirements of 
the Statistics Act (1975). 
 
In order to focus on wage effects, those respondents were excluded who 
reported no income from earnings, or unrealistic earnings (less than $4.00 per 
hour), reducing the sample size to 12 919. Not only does the Income 
Supplement distinguish between earnings and other forms of income, it also 
provides information on normal hours of work per week and earnings derived 
from those hours. One of the derived values provided by SNZ is the usual 
hourly wage from the primary job. This figure provides a robust basis for the 
analysis of industry, occupation and skill level effects on wage dispersion, since 
it is hourly wage rates which most accurately reflect the willingness of 
employers to pay for particular skills.  
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 8.B.2  Occupations, qualifications and skill levels of workers 
 
For occupations and skill levels of workers this paper draws on the work of 
Nick Pappas (2001), which itself was based on the classification of occupations 
developed in the U.S. Department of Labor (1991) Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles (DOT). Pappas provides estimates of cognitive skills, interpersonal skills 
and motor skills for each occupation (Pappas, 2001: 213-217).  
 
The occupation classification used by Pappas is the Australian Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ASCO) revision 1. A concordance was created to 
translate the ASCO categories into their equivalents in the New Zealand 
Standard Classification of Occupations (NZSCO),2 and were then grouped up to 
the two digit occupation level. Appendix 12 provides a summary table of the 
skill measures.  
 
The HLFS Income Supplement includes information on the highest qualification 
attained for each of the workers sampled. There are ten levels identified in the 
HLFS, but levels 9 and 10 together represent less than 0.6 percent of the sample, 
and some qualifications levels (eg. 5 and 8) are rather ill-defined, so for the 
purposes of the present study the groupings were compacted into five, as 
detailed in Table 8.1. The very small, totally unspecified level 10 was merged 
with level 6, as that is both the most numerous class and it straddles the 
median3. 
 
Table 8.1: Qualification levels in the HLFS 
HLFS Regrouped 
1 No qualification 1 No qualification 
2 School certificate 2 School certificate 
3 Sixth form certificate 4  
4 Higher school qualification 4 Higher school qualification 
5 Other school qualification 4  
6 Vocational / trade qualification 6 Vocational / trade qualification 
7 Bachelor or higher degree 7 Bachelor or higher degree 
8 Other post-school qualification 6  
9 Post-school not specified 6 Post-school not specified 
10 Not specified 6  
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 8.B.3  Method of analysis 
 
As in Chapter 6, this phase of the investigation studied both within group and 
between group inequality. To study within group inequality, quantile regression 
(QR) was used (Buchinsky, 1998; Koenker and Hallock, 2001), the θ-th 
quantile (0< θ<1) of the log wage (w) distribution for the i-th individual being 
specified as: 
         Quantθ(wi|xi) = α(θ) +xi’β(θ) 
 
While OLS relates the conditional mean of a dependent variable to the 
explanatory variables, QR permits estimation of the conditional median (θ = 
0.5) or any other quantile. By comparing changes in the log wage at the 10th 
percentile with changes in the log wage at the 90th percentile it is possible to see 
whether wage dispersion is increasing or decreasing as an explanatory variable 
such as the computing share of industry inputs changes. Such a comparison may 
reveal whether wage dispersion for otherwise similar workers (according to the 
observable characteristics included as controls in X) is greater for more 
computer intensive industries. 
 
To investigate the extent to which the computing effect differs between groups 
of similar workers, the set of 58 industries was split into two groups. Each 
industry was flagged as ICT-intensive or not ICT-intensive, according to 
whether industry spending on computing exceeded 0.8% of total industry 
expenditure. Appendix 2B shows the 58 industries ranked by computer inputs as 
a proportion of total inputs, and marks the 0.8 percent cutoff line. While only 14 
of the 58 industries lie above this line, these industries include several of the 
largest, including wholesale and retail trade which employs nearly one-sixth of 
the full-time workforce. These 14 industries together employed 45.2 percent of 
the workforce as at the 2001 Census (Table 9.3), so the cutoff chosen divides 
the workforce into two approximately equal groups. 
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OLS regressions of log wages on the interaction of this computing intensity 
dummy with the five qualification level dummies were estimated, to see 
whether computer intensive industries show higher returns to qualifications. 
These OLS regressions were also estimated controlling for characteristics such 
as occupation and cognitive skills. Where Qi is the qualification dummy and 
HiTech is the computer expenditure dummy, the specification is: 
 
        ln wage = ΣdiQi +  Σβi(Qi*HiTech) + Ui 
 
 
8.C  Findings 
 
8.C.1  Quantile regression estimates for New Zealand workers in 2002 
 
Graph 8.1 presents quantile regression estimates for the 10th percentile of the 
workforce (P10) and the 90th percentile (P90), simply regressing log wage on 
age and age squared, without any controls for industry or skill effects. The 
graph shows the characteristic concave curves for log wages over the working 
life cycle. As would be expected, the estimated earnings for those at the 90th 
percentile are rising more steeply than for those at the 10th percentile over most 
of the working age range, and the 90th percentile curve peaks several years later. 
The P10 to P90 gap is widest at age 53, with a log wage gap of 1.02 
representing an hourly wage difference of 2.76 times. In dollar terms, across all 
industries, occupations, qualification groups, and other relevant characteristics, 
a 53 year old worker at the 10th percentile of the wage distribution typically 
earns $9.75 per hour, while a worker of the same age at the 90th percentile earns 
$26.89 per hour. 
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Graph 8.1 : Wage dispersion by worker age 
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8.C.2  Computing effects 
 
The dispersion was then estimated between the 10th percentile and the 90th 
percentile with the proportion of industry expenditure on computing included as 
an additional explanatory variable (Appendix 2A). A number of different 
specifications were tested, but following Winkelman (1998) all included 
controls for experience and experience squared3, this specification being 
preferred to a quadratic in age for the reasons outlined in Section 6.C (P. 95). 
The simplest specification included only experience, experience squared and the 
variable indicating the proportion of computer inputs in the industry where the 
worker has their primary job.  This reveals a marked tendency for wage 
dispersion in New Zealand to be wider in those industries which are significant 
users of new technology, than it is within industries which make little use of 
new technology, and the statistical significance of the computer use coefficient 
is very high (Table 8.2).  
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 Table 8.2: Relationship between wage dispersion and industry use 
of computing, controlling only for experience and experience 
squared. 
 
Variable P10 P90 Difference 
 
Computing/total 
expenditure 
 
Experience 
 
 
Experience squared 
 
 
Constant 
 
4.24 
    (8.78)** 
 
0.03 
(25.9)** 
 
-0.0005 
(24.0)** 
 
1.894 
(150.9)** 
 
8.41 
(8.81)** 
 
0.079 
(19.43)** 
 
-0.001 
(16.06)** 
 
1.484 
(20.54)** 
 
4.17 
 
R2   =  0.11 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%;  ** significant at 1% 
 
 
The difference of 4.17 in the coefficient on computing expenditure means a 
greater log wage dispersion of 0.20 log points between those industries which 
have negligible computing expenditure and those which are the most computer 
intensive (4.8% of total expenditure). This log wage difference of 0.20 
represents a 22 percent difference in P90:P10 dispersion. 
 
However, once the regression was re-estimated incorporating controls for 
occupation, qualifications and cognitive skill, the apparent dispersion due to 
computer spending disappeared. Of these three sets of controls, occupation was 
found to have the strongest explanatory power, with the coefficient on 
computing expenditure becoming almost the same at the 10th percentile as it is 
at the 90th  percentile. This implies that the wage dispersion over industries 
which is correlated with computer expenditure is in fact largely explained by the 
occupations of the workers. When a dummy variable for qualifications is also 
incorporated into the equations the coefficient on computer expenditure actually 
becomes smaller at the 90th percentile than it is at the 10th  percentile. 
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 Graph 8.2 shows the coefficients on the variable measuring the industry 
proportion of computing expenditure in the quantile wage regressions, at the 
10th and 90th percentiles, for five different specifications of the control variables. 
The first pair of bars reports the estimation when no control variables are added 
apart from experience and exprience squared, and shows the large difference 
between the estimated coefficients at the 10th and 90th percentiles. The second 
pair of bars incorporates a dummy variable for occupation, with the P90 
coefficient only fractionally larger than the P10 coefficient. The third pair 
incorporates a further control for qualifications and the fourth pair is the third 
with the addition of controls for cognitive skills. The fifth pair is the fourth with 
the incorporation of variables for marital status, sex, ethnicity, local government 
region of residence, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the 
respondent was a migrant to New Zealand. The error bars indicate one standard 
error plus or minus. 
 
Graph 8.2: P10 and P90 comparisons of the computing effect, controlling 
for experience and experience squared, with and without the inclusion of 
other control variables.  
 
	



				
		
	
		
	
	
		
 !
 
 134
  
Controlling for occupation and qualifications reveals exactly the same pattern 
whether or not the control for cognitive skill is also incorporated (specifications 
3 and 4 in Graph 8.2). Additional controls were brought into the model for 
interpersonal skills and motor skills as calculated by Pappas (2001), but the 
coefficients on computer expenditure remained the same as they were in the 
simpler specification. The coefficients on interpersonal skills and motor skills 
are negligible, while the small positive coefficients on cognitive skills are offset 
by reduced positive coefficients on the dummies for qualifications and 
occupation.  
 
 
Table 8.3: Relationship between wage dispersion and industry use 
of computing, including all control variables. 
 
Variable P10 P90 Difference 
 
Computing/total 
expenditure 
 
Experience 
 
 
Experience squared 
 
 
Constant 
 
3.38 
    (5.79)** 
 
0.020 
  (13.50)** 
 
-0.00034 
 (11.7)** 
 
1.95 
(30.4)** 
 
3.27 
 (3.92)** 
 
0.028 
(14.21)** 
 
-0.0046 
(12.06)** 
 
2.31 
(16.57)** 
 
0.11 
 
R2   =  0.23 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
** significant at 1% level 
 
A number of additional control variables were introduced into the model, for 
worker characteristics which could possibly have significance: sex, ethnicity, 
marital status, migrant status and local government region of residence 
(specification 5 in Graph 8.2). When all these control variables are included the 
coefficients on computing expenditure become almost identical, suggesting that 
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there is no direct technology effect as such. It appears that the characteristics of 
the workers fully explain the rising inequality associated with new technology, 
and in particular it is very largely occupations and qualifications which 
determine the difference. Table 8.3 shows the revised coefficients and t-
statistics for the most complete specification4. 
 
 
8.C.3  Within group inequality 
 
The study of Census data reported in Chapter 6 found a tendency for the 
computer intensity of industries to be associated with higher within-group 
inequality for workers with higher qualifications in the period from 1991 to 
1996, but in the period 1996 to 2001 there was hardly any significant 
relationship between computer use and within-group inequality (Appendix 8). 
In order to double check this finding using the 2002 unit record data, the sample 
was divided into five groups by level of qualification, and quantile regressions 
were estimated at the 10th and 90th percentiles for each qualification level in 
turn. 
 
In the simplest specification, controlling only for age and age squared, QR 
estimates show a substantial increase in wage dispersion associated with 
computer intensity, for those workers with no qualifications or only school 
certificate. However, for those workers who have higher schooling or vocational 
or university qualifications computer intensity is associated with compression of 
the wage differential.  The same pattern is apparent when cognitive skill is also 
controlled for, but the coefficients on computing are somewhat muted (Graph 
8.3. Error bars show one standard error plus or minus).  
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Graph 8.3: The effect of computing intensity on within-group inequality, by 
highest qualification achieved, controlling for cognitive skill. 
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8.C.4  Between group inequality 
 
Finally, in order to examine changes in between-group inequality, industries 
were divided into two groups according to whether their expenditure on new 
technology exceeds 0.8% of total industry expenditure (Appendix 2B). OLS 
wage regressions on the interaction of qualifications and technology were 
estimated, to see whether the return to qualifications was greater in the more 
computer intensive industries. 
 
These regressions were run separately for male and female workers. For male 
workers the higher technology industries were associated with greater returns to 
qualifications at all qualification levels, with the effect most marked at the 
middle levels. For example, a male worker with School Certificate gains a 
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premium of 6.78% over a male worker with no qualifications, but if they also 
work in a high technology industry that premium is enhanced by a further 
8.34%. This difference is statistically significant (t=2.42).  
 
Table 8.4 reports the coefficients on the interaction effects between the indicator 
that an industry is higher-technology and the independent variables age and age 
squared. For female workers the pattern was similar to the male pattern up to the 
middle levels, but for university graduates the relationship was reversed, with 
high technology industries associated with a lower return to qualifications. The 
regressions were re-estimated including a control for the interaction of high-
technology with cognitive skills, and the patterns were found to be similar to the 
base case specification. However for male degree holders the wage premium 
was greater, and for female degree holders the reduction in wage premium was 
halved. 
 
 
 
Table 8.3: Effect of higher technology uptake on returns to 
education at different qualification levels. 
 
 
Controlling only for high-
technology dummy 
Further controlling for 
cognitive skill 
     
 Male Female Male Female 
     
School Cert 0.0834 0.0917 0.0827 0.0905 
 
(2.42)* 
 
(2.69)** 
 
(2.42)* 
 
(2.72)** 
 
Higher school 0.1822 0.0886 0.1575 0.0669 
 
(5.02)** 
 
(2.78)** 
 
(4.58)** 
 
(2.08)* 
 
Vocational 0.0929 0.0052 0.0861 0.0514 
 
(3.37)** 
 
(0.19) 
 
(3.25)** 
 
(1.84) 
 
Degree 0.0754 -0.1053 0.1144 -0.0582 
 (1.77) (2.56)* (2.55)* (1.37) 
 
Heteroscedastically robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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 8.D  Summary and Conclusions 
 
In New Zealand, the more computer intensive industries show significantly 
greater wage dispersion than industries which make little use of new 
technology, a pattern which has also been found in other countries (Allen, 2001; 
Katz, 2000).  The most technology-intensive industries in New Zealand are 
associated with an increase of 0.20 in the log wage gap between the 10th 
percentile and the 90th percentile, representing an hourly wage premium of 22%. 
 
However the relationship between wage dispersion and industry use of new 
technology is fully explained when controls for educational qualifications and 
occupation are introduced into the equations. Evidently it is not so much the 
industry use of technology as such that is driving the wage dispersion, as the 
industry need for a better educated and more appropriately qualified workforce. 
This finding tends to support the hypothesis that new technology is just one 
manifestation of the new industrial workplace, and that rising inequality reflects 
returns to the skills which are most in demand as the workplace evolves. 
 
There appears to be within group wage compression associated with industry 
computer use for workers at the higher educational levels, suggesting that rapid 
change and new technology have little effect on those who have higher skills. 
But for those workers with no qualifications beyond School Certificate the use 
of technology is associated with a marked widening of the P10:P90 wage gap, 
tending to confirm the intuitively plausible idea that workers with few 
qualifications enjoy only weak demand in technology intensive industries. 
 
Testing whether computer intensive industries show higher returns to 
qualifications also revealed a softening of the technology effect at the top of the 
qualification range. For male workers there was a higher return to education at 
all levels, but for female workers this was only true in the mid range, and for 
women university graduates high technology industries are associated with 
wage compression. 
 139
 In line with the conclusions of Chapter 7, this finding tends to support the idea 
of the complementarity of computers with skilled workers and the 
substitutability of computers for unskilled workers. The returns to skill are 
correlated with those industries which are major users of new technology, 
implying that the general level of education in New Zealand is likely to be a 
constraint on the speed at which new technology can be further expanded. 
 
The trends in the Population Census data, described in Chapter 6, revealed a 
widespread rise in between group inequality, especially in the later 1990s. The 
present chapter provides a more detailed view of this between-group inequality, 
and suggests that the gaps between the bottom and the middle of the 
qualification range are now more significant than between the middle and the 
top, with the workers who have no qualifications beyond School Certificate 
being the most disadvantaged. It therefore seems likely that an increased 
commitment to public education could be expected to have beneficial outcomes, 
if it were aimed at raising the standards of the least educated.  
 
In this context it is particularly troubling that the numbers of young adults 
entering the workforce with no formal qualifications continue to make up nearly 
30 percent of the New Zealand workforce, and are only trending downwards 
very slowly (Graph 7.1) While greater numbers of women are completing at 
least some qualifications, and the general level of women’s education is 
trending upwards, the proportion of men with no qualifications beyond School 
Certificate rose to 45 percent in the 1990s.  
 
If inequality is exacerbated by changing labour demand rewarding the well-
positioned, there is a serious risk of self perpetuating polarisation. Moreover it 
has been argued that within-group inequality tends to be temporary while 
between-group inequality is more permanent (Aghion and Howitt, 2002). If this 
is correct, and the Census findings in Chapter 6 strongly suggest that this has 
been the case in New Zealand, there would seem to be a strong argument for an 
increased public commitment to lifting the workers at the bottom of the 
qualification range.  
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Footnotes: 
 
1. In recent years the HLFS Income Supplement has been restyled the New  
      Zealand Income Survey (NZIS). 
 
2. The ASCO : NZSCO occupation concordance is available from the author on 
request, with two-digit level detail. 
 
3. Because only five qualification levels were usable from this data it was necessary 
to modify the Winkelmann (1998) experience measure described in Chapter 6 (P. 
108). The values used in this chapter are: No qualification (8 years), school 
certificate (11 years), higher school qualification (13 years), vocational/trade 
qualification (14 years), university degree (16 years), 
 
4. The complete results showing coefficients on every qualification level, every 
occupation etc. are available from the author on request. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Inequality decomposition using unit record files 
 
 
9.A  Introduction 
 
The pattern of rising inequality at the same time as rising demand for skills and 
increased use of technology is now widely recognized, both in New Zealand and 
rather generally around the English speaking world. But the path of causality is 
by no means clear.  
 
The existence of these parallel trends of rising demand for skills and uptake of 
new technology has prompted many commentators to speculate that the new 
technologies are driving the demand for skills, which in turn is lifting wage 
inequality, and this is a plausible explanation which accords with the basic facts. 
But it could also be that the industries which are undertaking automation are the 
ones in which change is generally most rapid, for example through workplace 
reorganization, and that these industries reward certain worker characteristics. 
In this case the highly technologized industries would tend to be the ones which 
paid a skills premium, without necessarily paying a return to computerization 
per se. 
As noted in Chapter 6, some industries have been affected much more by the 
ICT revolution than others, and so it is natural to compare wage inequality in 
the more ICT-intensive industries with inequality in the less ICT-intensive 
industries. A finding of higher inequality in the ICT-intensive industries may 
indicate an unpalatable tradeoff between faster productivity growth from 
spurring ICT-uptake, and widening inequality. However, inequality may differ 
between these two groups of industries for reasons that are not directly related 
to the industry’s investment in new technology, especially if there are 
systematic differences in the characteristics of workers in each industry which 
account for any inequality differences.  
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In this chapter I address this issue by dividing the industries into two groups, 
high-tech and low-tech, according to their expenditure on ICT inputs as a 
proportion of total industry purchases. Using wage data from the Statistics NZ 
Confidentialized Unit Record Files for 2002 and 2004 the comparative wage 
distributions in the two groups of industries are examined, controlling for 
gender, highest qualification and other attributes.  Using the reweighting 
technique pioneered by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), counterfactual 
wage distributions are constructed to estimate the extent to which the different 
wage distributions reflect industry differences, and the extent to which different 
industries are rewarding worker characteristics. 
 
9.B  Data 
  
9.B.1  The Income Survey CURF data 
 
 
Since 1997 Statistics New Zealand has conducted an annual Income 
Supplement to the Household Labour Force Survey, now known as the New 
Zealand Income Survey (NZIS). The NZIS provides an extensive range of 
earnings information such as hourly and annual wage rates, in addition to 
information about incomes from other sources. 
 
The Income Supplement (IS) data are a very rich source, but because they 
contain extensive detail about private individuals use of the full data set is 
understandably very strictly controlled, and access to it is only possible for 
approved projects conducted at the Statistics New Zealand Datalab. However 
since 2002 the IS data have been put through a confidentialising process. This 
involves some top coding of numbers to exclude outliers, and some rounding to 
make identification of individuals more difficult. It also involves some 
regrouping into broader categories, such as grouping location of residence from 
the local government districts into 10 larger regions.  
 
With the risks to confidentiality much reduced, Statistics New Zealand are 
willing to make these Confidentialised Unit Record Files (CURFs) available for 
use outside Statistics New Zealand offices, and while the loss of some detail is 
 143
regrettable they are beginning to prove a very useful research tool. Full details 
of CURFs available and the confidentialising process are available on the 
Statistics New Zealand website (Statistics New Zealand, 2004).  
 
Some 30 000 individuals aged 15 or over are surveyed, establishing information 
on the industries and occupations those individuals are employed in, their 
highest level of qualification, and many other details such as marital status and 
ethnicity. However, for the purpose of this study approximately half of these 
observations are dropped, almost always because earnings are zero or trivial, but 
in a few cases because industries or occupations were not identified in the data.  
 
As at mid-2006 three years of Income Supplement CURFs had been released. 
The present chapter uses the 2002 and 2004 CURFs, the earliest and latest years 
currently available, to examine wage inequality between workers in each of 
those years, and also the inequality trend over this two year period. Table 9.1 
shows the total numbers of observations in each of these two CURF data sets, 
and the numbers which were usable for the present study. 
 
 
Table 9.1 : Income Supplement CURF Data  
 
Descriptive statistics 2002 2004 
   
Total CURF sample 29356 27847 
No earnings 14923 13975 
Industry or occupation not 
identified 50 61 
Usable sample 14383 13811 
   
Female workers 7233 6912 
Male workers 7150 6899 
   
 
 
The CURF data provide many different income and earnings variables, but 
because this is a study of the technology and industry effects on wages it focuses 
on the usual hourly wage from first job. This variable should be the indicator 
most responsive to the earnings effects of industry and worker characteristics.   
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9.B.2  Industry Use of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) 
This chapter again makes use of the industry expenditure on computers and 
computer services drawn from the 1996 inter-industry tables compiled by 
Statistics New Zealand.  
Industry expenditure on computers and computer services ranges from virtually 
zero in the primary industries such as farming, fishing and forestry, up to 4.8 
percent of total industry expenditure in banking and finance, and over 3 percent 
in public administration. As in Chapter 8, industries were divided into two 
groups, according to whether expenditure on computers and computing services 
was greater or less than 0.8 percent of total industry expenditure. This threshold 
divides the labour force approximately in half.  (Description in 8.B.3  Page 126) 
The overall proportion of workers in the technology-intensive industries has 
remained close to 45.5 percent over the two years, but there is a marked 
tendency for the proportion of female workers in the technology-intensive 
industries to be rising while the proportion of male workers in the technology-
intensive industries is declining. Table 9.2 gives the split between the two 
groups (labeled hi_comp and low_comp) for male and female workers 
separately and together.  
Unfortunately the CURF data only provide single-digit industry indicators, 
whereas the NZIS data contain industry information to the two-digit level. 
However the proportions of workers in each group are very similar, whether 
single-digit or two-digit data are used. For comparison, Table 9.2 includes the 
data from the 2001 Population Census, which provide industry data to the two-
digit level.  
While the proportions are very similar, the single-digit industry groupings do 
not correspond exactly to the two-digit industries. In some groups one or two 
technology-intensive industries are swamped by a generally low-technology 
group, and vice versa. However, while a finer division of industries would be 
desirable in the CURF data, it is probable that the single-digit industry grouping 
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will tend to diminish the differences between groups rather than distorting the 
direction of findings. 
 
 
Table 9.2  
 
Census CURF CURF 
 
Hi_comp/Low_comp split 2001 2002 2004 
   
Usable sample 1 005 825 14 383 13 811 
    
Female workers 431 589 7 233 6 912 
Male workers 574 236 7 150 6 899 
    
Low-comp group    
Low_comp group (male) 317 343 4 077 4 017 
Proportion in low_comp group 
(male) 
55.3% 57.0% 58.2% 
 
Low_comp group (female) 233 955 3 774 3 500 
Proportion in low_comp group 
(female) 
54.2% 52.2% 50.6% 
 
Low_comp group (all 
workers) 551 298 7 851 7 517 
Proportion in low_comp group 
(all) 
54.8% 54.6% 54.4% 
 
    
High-comp group    
High_comp group (male) 256 893 3 073 2 882 
Proportion in high_comp 
group (male) 
44.7% 43.0% 41.8% 
 
High_comp group (female) 197 634 3 459 3 412 
Proportion in high_comp 
group (female) 
45.8% 47.8% 49.4% 
 
High_comp group (all 
workers) 454 527 6 532 6 294 
Proportion in high_comp 
group (all) 
45.2% 45.4% 45.6% 
 
    
 
9.B.3  Occupations and skills
For skill levels of workers this chapter again uses the skills factors estimated by 
Nick Pappas (2001) for each occupational group, as described in Chapter 8 
(Section 8.B.2  Page 125) and Appendix 12. As with the industry information, 
the CURF data only provide single digit occupation indicators, so for the 
present study the cognitive skill estimate has been grouped up to that level.   
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9.C  Method of Analysis 
9.C.1  The base line case 
The base line case for the analysis examined the wage inequality patterns for 
male workers only, since male workers are less prone to sample bias. Both full-
time and part-time male workers were included. 
Three inequality measures were used in the analysis: 
 
1.  The Theil inequality measure (which is a member of the Generalized 
Entropy family with an income difference sensitivity parameter equal to two), 
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 where xi  is the income of the ith person, μ is the mean 
income and N is the total number of persons. The Theil index is sensitive to 
income differences towards the top of the distribution. 
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G μ22 , which is most sensitive to income 
differences around the mode of the distribution. 
3.  The Atkinson inequality measure, ( )
( )εε
μ
−−
= ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡−= ∑
111
1
1
N
i
ixA with the 
coefficient of relative inequality aversion, ε=2 making the index sensitive to 
income differences at the bottom of the distribution.   
The CURF data for 2002 and 2004 were combined, and inequality measures 
were compared both between the workers in the two groups of industries and 
also between the two years.   
Every observation in the CURF data has a weight attached, since: 
“Each record represents a number of people in the population. The 
number of people represented is indicated by the weight held on the 
record” (Statistics NZ, 2004).  
Thus the weights need to be taken into account when using these samples, in 
order to obtain reliable estimates for the total working population.  
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 The inequality analysis was initially performed using the replication weights 
provided by Statistics New Zealand, to show the difference in inequality 
between the workers in the two groups of industries. Using the technique 
pioneered by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), hereafter DFL, the data 
were then reweighted. A reweighting factor was estimated from a logit which 
captures the characteristics of workers, including age, age squared, sex, 
ethnicity, marital status, local government region, whether or not a migrant, 
highest qualification achieved, whether working fulltime, occupation and 
cognitive skill level.  
The weights for workers in the high-comp industries are multiplied by the 
reweighting factor, and the inequality decomposition is recalculated. This 
technique achieves the separation of industry effects from the effects of worker 
characteristics. Lorenz curves display the differences in overall inequality 
between the two groups of workers and the two years, and when redrawn to 
reflect the reweighted workers in the high_comp industries they show the extent 
to which the inequality reflects the value of the worker characteristics. Kernel 
density graphs show the shape of the wage distribution under each specification.  
The inequality decomposition program provides Gini coefficients, Atkinson 
indices and Theil indices. As noted above, these different measures of inequality 
are sensitive to changes in different parts of the distribution, and reporting all 
three measures provides some understanding of which part of the distribution is 
most affected.  
 
9.C.2  Sensitivity analysis 
Two sets of sensitivity analyses were also performed, in order to test the 
robustness of the base line specification. Firstly, sensitivity to sample selection 
was checked by re-estimation four ways: all workers (male and female) full-
time only or full-time and part-time, and male workers only, full-time only or 
fulltime and part-time.  
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Secondly, in an attempt to understand which worker characteristics are most 
significant, the estimates were also tested for sensitivity to the respecification of 
the logit which determines the reweighting factor. Using only the male workers 
the inequality decompositions were reestimated without the measure of 
cognitive skill or the indicators of occupation or highest qualification, or 
combinations of these.  
 
The two sets of sensitivity analyses were only run on the 2002 data, as the 
inequality differences were substantially more pronounced in that year 
compared to 2004. 
 
9.D  Results 
 
9.D.1  Results using original weights 
Table 9.3 gives the mean and median hourly wages for the two different 
categories of workers in both years, using the original Statistics New Zealand 
weights. It is significant that the median wage in 2002 is exactly the same across 
the two groups of workers, and in 2004 it is fractionally lower in the 
technology-intensive industries, despite the means being substantially higher. 
Thus the difference between the two groups of industries is entirely one of 
levels of inequality, and there is no difference in the general level of wages paid 
in each group.  
Table 9.3 also reports the Atkinson A(2) indices, Gini coefficients and Theil 
GE(2) indices. These three inequality indicators are more sensitive to 
movements at the bottom, the middle and the top of the distribution 
respectively, and a comparison of them therefore reveals which part of the 
distribution is most affected.  
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 Table 9.3 : Hourly wages and inequality 
                   measures Original weights 
  
2002 Mean wage Median Atkinson Gini Theil 
(hourly) wage A(2) GE(2) 
  
Overall 0.2681 0.3194 0.90071 
Low-comp 18.26 15.30 0.2245 0.2788 0.59578 
High_comp 20.13 15.30 0.3162 0.3632 1.20094 
Difference 1.87 0.00 40.89% 30.25% 101.57% 
  
  
  
2004 Mean Median Atkinson Gini Theil 
wage wage A(2) GE(2) 
 
Overall 0.2136 0.2833 0.2186 
Low-comp 19.30 16.70 0.1901 0.2599 0.1855 
High_comp 20.15 16.40 0.2413 0.3096 0.2555 
Difference 0.85 -0.30 26.90% 19.11% 37.75% 
  
Inequality is markedly greater in the technology-intensive group, with the Gini 
coefficient on wages in the hi-comp group being some 30 percent higher in 
2002, and more than 19 percent higher in 2004. However, in both 2002 and 
2004 the Gini coefficients show less difference in wage inequality between the 
two groups of industries than is found at either end of the distribution, 
suggesting that the difference in inequality is largely a feature of the two tails 
rather than workers near the median.  
Of the three inequality indicators, it is the Theil index which shows the greatest 
difference in both years. Indeed, in 2002, the Theil index for wage inequality in 
the technology-intensive industries was fully double the value for the less 
technologized industries. Graph 9.1A is a kernel density graph showing the 
density of worker numbers against wage rates for workers in the low-comp and 
high-comp groups in 2002. The curve for the workers in the low-tech industries 
is taller and narrower, illustrating the greater concentration of worker numbers 
near the mode of the distribution. The substantially greater inequality in the 
right hand tail of the high-tech curve is also clearly visible, echoing the higher 
value of the Theil index noted above.  
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9.D.2  Effect of reweighting 
The DFL reweighting technique adjusts the weight attached to the workers in 
the high-technology industries to allow for worker characteristics. Thus, the 
more closely the reweighted figures approach the figures for the workers in the 
low-tech industries, the more we can see the difference as being explained by 
worker characteristics and the less it relates to anything intrinsic to the 
industries themselves.  
When the workers in the high-comp group are reweighted to reflect the 
attributes of the workers, the difference largely disappears. Table 9.4 shows the 
comparable figures after reweighting, and Graph 9.1B presents the 2002 kernel 
density graphs with the reweighted hi-comp group showing a distribution much 
closer to the low-comp group than it is to the unadjusted hi-comp group. 
In 2002 both the Atkinson index and the Gini coefficient drop to about a quarter 
of their original values. The Theil index, sensitive to income differences at the 
top of the distribution where the wage difference between the two groups is 
most marked, drops by more than 40 percent. Graph 9.2 displays the Lorenz 
curves for the 2002 workers, with the low-comp group dominant and the hi-
comp group with the original weights much the most unequal. 
9.D.3  Trend over time: 2002 - 2004 
By 2004 there was apparently less inequality overall in New Zealand wages, 
with all the three measures showing considerably lower figures than two years 
earlier. Graph 9.3 shows the Lorenz curves for the hi-comp workers in each 
year, with and without reweighting. Within each year the reweighted curve is 
dominant, while the pair for 2004 is markedly less unequal than the 2002 pair. 
 It could be suggested that this merely reflects an ongoing adjustment of the 
labour market to new industrial labour demand patterns. But the reweighted 
figures in 2004 show an even larger proportion of the difference explained by 
adjustment for worker characteristics. This suggests that the worker 
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characteristics are particularly important in explaining the industry wage 
differentials, and it is not merely an adjustment issue.  
Both the mean wage and the Atkinson index in the reweighted high-comp group 
actually fall below their counterparts in the low-comp group, suggesting that the 
lower end of the distribution is totally explained by worker characteristics. And 
at the top of the distribution, more than six sevenths of the difference in the 
Theil index is also explained by the worker characteristics.  
Table  
9.4    
    
Inequality in high-comp and low-comp 
Industries : Male workers only 
 
Adjusted 
weights 
2002 
Mean 
wage Atkinson Gini Theil 
 (hourly) A(2)  GE(2) 
     
Overall  0.233 0.2886 0.7013 
Low-comp 18.263 0.224 0.2788 0.5958 
   (0.0117)  
High-
comp 18.473 0.244 0.3001 0.8264 
   (0.0153)  
Difference 0.210 8.54% 7.63% 38.71% 
     
Original 
difference 1.870 40.89% 30.25% 101.57% 
Explained 88.79% 79.11% 74.79% 61.89% 
proportion     
     
     
2004 Mean Atkinson Gini Theil 
 Wage A(2)  GE(2) 
     
Overall  0.1899 0.2632 0.1899 
Low-comp 19.303 0.1901 0.2599 0.1855 
   (0.0117)  
High-
comp 18.570 0.1889 0.2666 0.1952 
   (0.0153)  
Difference -0.733 -0.66% 2.57% 5.22% 
     
Original 
difference 0.85 26.90% 19.11% 
      
37.75% 
Explained     
proportion 186.24% 102.44% 86.57% 86.16% 
     
Standard errors in brackets   
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Graph 9.2     2002 Lorenz curves
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Graph 9.3          Hi_comp 2002 and 2004
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9.E  Sensitivity analysis 
 
9.E.1  Sensitivity to sample selection 
The base line case above considers only male workers, but includes both full-
time and part-time workers. In order to check the sensitivity to sample selection 
the 2002 CURF data were also analyzed including both male and female 
workers. They were further checked using only the fulltime workers, both 
including and excluding the female workers. The comparative findings are 
reported in Table 9.5.  
Inclusion of the female workers makes very little difference to the overall 
pattern. As we would expect, mean wages are somewhat lower when women are 
included in the sample. But whereas the difference in the mean wage is less than 
5 percent in the low-tech group it is over 14 percent in the high-tech group with 
the original weights. Reweighting for worker characteristics produces very 
similar results whether or not female workers are included, with the worker 
characteristics explaining the overwhelming proportion of the difference.  
Not only do mean wages drop when women are included. Compared to the male 
only samples the inequality is also lower, by any of the three inequality 
measures, and especially in the Theil index. In the most extreme case, 
considering full-time workers only in the technology-intensive industry group, 
the Theil index drops by 20 percent when female workers are added to the 
sample. This finding, combined with the significantly lower mean wages when 
women are included, implies that women are much more bunched toward the 
low end of the wage spectrum than are men.  
Inclusion of part-time workers also makes very little difference to the general 
pattern. When part-time workers are included the mean wage drops, but only by 
some 6 percent in the high-comp group and one-third of that in the low-comp 
group. Part-time workers tend to be concentrated toward the low end of the 
wage distribution, as would be expected.  
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Sensitivity analysis 
Table 9.5  
 
Various samples 
     
Low-comp 
group     
 Mean Atkinson Gini Theil 
  A(2)  GE(2) 
Full-time and 
part-time     
Male only 18.26 0.224 0.279 0.596 
Male and 
female 17.45 0.217 0.275 0.582 
     
Full-time only     
Male only  18.45 0.199 0.263 0.489 
Male and 
female 17.80 0.188 0.253 0.418 
     
High-comp 
group     
Original 
weights Mean Atkinson Gini Theil 
  A(2)  GE(2) 
Full-time and 
part-time     
Male only 20.13 0.316 0.363 1.201 
Male and 
female 17.58 0.269 0.326 1.005 
     
Full-time only     
Male only  21.31 0.272 0.332 0.976 
Male and 
female 19.12 0.234 0.298 0.775 
     
High-comp 
group     
Reweighted Mean Atkinson Gini Theil 
  A(2)  GE(2) 
Full-time and 
part-time     
Male only 18.47 0.244 0.300 0.826 
Male and 
female 17.53 0.230 0.290 0.755 
     
Full-time only     
Male only  18.67 0.214 0.283 0.706 
Male and 
female 17.91 0.198 0.268 0.573 
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Rather more surprising, inclusion of part-time workers increases the dispersion, 
and this is reflected in all three inequality measures. While part-time workers 
are lower paid on average, the spread of their wages is evidently higher. Thus 
the base case, considering only male workers but including those working part-
time and full-time, is the case which shows the most marked inequality patterns. 
 
9.E.2  Sensitivity to the weighting factor specification 
As outlined in Section 9.C above, the DFL technique for estimating the extent to 
which inequality reflects worker characteristics uses a reweighting factor based 
on a logit estimate designed to capture the characteristics which are likely to be 
relevant. Respecifying this logit with certain characteristics included or 
excluded provides a test of the sensitivity of the reweighting to those particular 
characteristics.  
The base line specification of male workers from the 2002 CURF, including 
both full-time and part-time workers, was re-estimated excluding the occupation 
and highest qualification variables and the cognitive skill measure, singly and in 
combination, in order to check the sensitivity of the analysis to these 
characteristics. The results are reported in Table 9.6.  
 
Dropping the cognitive skill indicator on its own from the logit results in no 
change to any of the estimates, suggesting that the effects of this measure are 
fully captured by the other variables already included. Dropping the occupation 
variable reduces the reweighting effect significantly, but simultaneously 
dropping occupation and cognitive skill reduces the reweighting effect on the 
Gini by some 38 percent. 
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Table 9.6 
 
Sensitivity analysis :  
Various logit specifications 
  
2002 
    
Adjusted weights 
 
  
Mean 
wage Atkinson Gini Theil 
  (hourly) A(2)  GE(2) 
      
Low-comp  18.263 0.224 0.279 0.596 
High_comp Original weights 20.130 0.316 0.363 1.201 
      
 Reweighted     
      
High_comp All variables 18.473 0.244 0.300 0.826 
      
High_comp 
Without 
occupation 18.583 0.259 0.315 0.913 
High_comp Without cog_skill 18.473 0.244 0.300 0.826 
High_comp Without either 19.224 0.271 0.324 0.959 
     
    
High_comp 
Without 
qualifications 18.622 0.242 0.300 0.816 
High_comp No quals or occ 18.790 0.256 0.314 0.887 
High_comp 
No quals, no 
cog_skill 18.622 0.242 0.300 0.816 
    
High_comp 
None of these 
three attributes 19.972 0.277 0.331 0.977 
   
 
 
Evidently occupation and cognitive skill are worker qualifications of particular 
value in the more ICT-intensive industries, though workers in the desired 
occupations appear to have the required skills, and the cognitive skill dummy 
contributes nothing extra if occupation has already been included. Dropping the 
highest qualification variable by itself produces results very similar to dropping 
the occupation variable, while dropping both these simultaneously makes hardly 
any difference. It would therefore appear that qualifications and occupations are 
very closely correlated, and, as would be expected, that these two variables 
largely proxy for each other and for an important set of worker characteristics. 
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 If all these three worker characteristics are dropped from the logit two thirds of 
the reweighting effect disappears from all the inequality indices, and the mean 
hourly wage returns to within $0.16 of the figure in the high-comp industries 
without reweighting. Evidently, the worker characteristics captured in the 
occupation and highest qualifications variables and in the cognitive skill 
measure are the characteristics of particular importance in determining which 
workers will be of greatest value in the industries which are undertaking new 
technologies. 
 
 
9.F  Conclusions   
  
Two conclusions can be drawn from this examination of wage data by industry. 
Firstly, especially in the 2002 data, wage inequality is substantially higher in the 
industries which are more technology-intensive than it is in the less technology-
intensive industries. But this difference in inequality reflects differences in 
worker characteristics much more than differences which are intrinsic to the 
industries themselves.   
The implication of this finding is that increasing use of ICT should not be a 
direct cause of wider inequality. Once we adjust for worker attributes there is 
almost no difference in inequality between ICT-intensive and other industries. 
However workers lacking the relevant characteristics are little valued in the 
technology-intensive industries. Not only are they not pulled forward by 
generally higher industry wages, they tend to be rewarded even less well than 
they would be in the less technology-intensive industries.  This finding is 
strongly supportive of the theory that new technology is complementary to skills 
and a substitute for the less-skilled (Goldin and Katz, 1998; Krueger, 1993).  
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A second significant finding is that wage inequality fell very generally between 
2002 and 2004. This was not specifically an inter-industry decline, but was 
spread across all groups of workers in both technology-intensive and less 
technologized industries, with the gap between industries continuing to be 
explained overwhelmingly by worker characteristics.  
A two year period is too short to be taken as signifying a major trend. But 
following the rapid rise in inequality that was recorded in the 1990s it suggests a 
distinct break with the previous decade. This lends support to the theories of 
Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Schultz (1975), that firms pay a premium for 
adaptability which is highest during periods of rapid change. As Acemoglu 
(2001) suggested, it may now be that the period of most rapid change is past, 
and with much of the adjustment accomplished the worst phase of rising 
inequality may be over.  
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Chapter 10 
 
Conclusions, Policy Implications and  
Possible Future Research 
 
 
 
10.A  Summary of existing knowledge 
 
10.A.1  Inequality and its recent trends 
 
Inequality matters. It has long been appreciated that, for a given level of 
production, greater inequality means a lower standard of living for most people. 
Moreover, in the last 20 years it has also come to be widely accepted that 
inequality has a marked tendency to impede growth (Osberg, 1995).  
 
Prior to the 1970s it was widely accepted that the rich would save and invest 
more, and that inequality was therefore a necessary precursor to growth. But the 
availability of extensive new data has brought this theory seriously into question 
(Aghion, Garcia-Penalosa and Caroli, 1998). It now seems reasonably certain 
that the problems of polarization, distorted incentives and misdirection of 
government spending which result from inequality (Easterly, 2001b; Snower, 
1998) far outweigh the very doubtful extent to which the rich are growth-
promoting. And high levels of inequality are also strongly associated with social 
exclusion and crime (Borjas, Grogger and Hanson, 2006; Thorbecke, and 
Charumilind, 2002). 
 
 162
 Over a long period from the late 19th century to the late 20th century, inequality 
of incomes was stable or trending downwards. Growth was shared, and the 
majority of citizens in the more developed countries benefited from growth. 
This trend showed an abrupt reversal in the mid-1970s, or a few years later in 
New Zealand. Not only did growth slow down, but it came to be largely 
captured by the few (Rosenthal, 2004). The average income grew faster than the 
median, which was static in the United States (Freeman, 1999; Wolff, 2001), 
and in New Zealand actually declined by some 3 percent between 1988 and 
1998 (Gregory, 1999; Hyslop and Maré, 2005). 
 
 
10.A.2  Possible explanations for recent trends in inequality 
 
A number of possible explanations have been advanced for the recent trends in 
inequality, falling into four broad categories. The first of these is based on 
labour supply considerations: Increased numbers of unskilled migrants or the 
higher proportions of women entering the workforce, presumably flooding the 
market for less-skilled jobs. However the case for this is weak worldwide, and 
fits the New Zealand data particularly badly. Women in New Zealand are better 
educated than men, and most migrants are required to be well-qualified before 
they are allowed entry. 
 
The second theory is centred on labour market institutions. The late 20th century 
was a period when many governments moved to deregulate labour markets and 
reduce union power. But since the pioneering work of Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1990, 1994) it has become increasingly appreciated that low wages and 
unemployment are not alternatives, but tend to go hand in hand (Conceição, 
Ferreira and Galbraith, 2001; Glyn and Salverda, 2000b). The idea that propping 
up minimum wages raised unemployment therefore looks relatively weak 
(Simonazzi and Villa, 1999) and this undermines the plausibility of labour 
market institutions being at the heart of rising inequality. 
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The third theory is based on rising inequality being coincident with the 
relaxation of trade restrictions in many countries. It is assumed that cheap goods 
from low-wage countries have displaced low-skill workers from routine jobs in 
the developed countries, but have had less impact on high-skill workers. This 
explanation found strong support in the past (Wood, 1995). In recent years it has 
largely fallen out of favour because rich countries mostly trade with other rich 
countries, and the quantities of trade with the third world do not appear large 
enough to have the effects which have been detected (Blanchflower and 
Slaughter, 1999; Burtless, 1998; Freeman, 1995b, 1999). Also this theory fits 
particularly poorly with the New Zealand experience, where the greatest rises in 
inequality tend to be in industries such as banking, financial services and public 
administration, which are not traded at all (Chapter 6, this thesis). 
 
The final theory, and currently the most widely accepted, is that inequality is 
driven by some form of skill-biased technological change (Berman, Bound and 
Machin, 1998). Technology is constantly evolving (Gregory and Machin, 2000), 
and every development is likely to affect inequality, though at any particular 
time the direction of that effect can only be determined empirically. If 
technological change replaces human skills, then less-skilled workers become 
more useful and demand for them would be expected to rise. On the other hand, 
if new technology is a substitute for less-skilled workers and a complement to 
the better-skilled, then demand for the less-skilled is likely to decline, with poor 
job prospects for the less-skilled and rising wage inequality as the low-paid 
workers get left behind (Krueger, 1993). In the international literature the skill-
biased technological change theory has been consistently the most favoured in 
recent years (Chennells and van Reenen, 1997, Galor and Moav, 2000), and the 
findings of the present study strongly support this in the New Zealand context. I 
review the evidence in Section 10.B. 
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10.A.3  Inequality and productive systems 
 
Methods of production are constantly changing. New methods may promote or 
inhibit inequality, depending on whether new technology is more of a 
complement or a substitute for worker skills, and it is easy to think of examples 
of each (Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994). For over 100 years it appears that 
evolving methods of production have been somewhat skill-biased (Acemoglu, 
2002). However, the 20th century witnessed extensive skills upgrading, as 
universal primary education was followed up with comprehensive secondary 
schooling and steadily expanding tertiary programmes (Goldin and Katz, 1996). 
So long as the demand for skills was not rising very fast, and the supply was 
rising faster, the wage gap between the skilled and the less-skilled workers was 
stable or narrowing. 
 
After the mid-1970s the demand for skills began to outstrip supply. In many of 
the developed countries, but especially in the English-speaking world, the skills 
premium began to widen. Not only did the wage dispersion increase, but the 
employment situation became increasingly precarious, and it was precisely 
those workers with the fewest qualifications, those who were falling behind in 
the wages race, who were also most vulnerable to job insecurity, casualisation 
and unemployment (Nickell, 1998).  
 
The increasing skills premium and declining work opportunities for the less-
skilled were also highly correlated with the uptake of new technologies, lending 
strong support to the idea that skill-biased technological change is the primary 
source of rising wage inequality in the late 20th century. But the exact path of 
causality is less clear, and this effect could have come about through a variety of 
different mechanisms. 
 
One possible explanation is that new machines require skilled staff to develop, 
maintain and upgrade them, and that these new skills forced up the wage 
premium. This theory might be plausible in countries with substantial new 
technology industries, but it is hard to believe in the New Zealand context. 
While many industries have adopted new technology extensively, only a very 
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small proportion of their staff are high technology experts. Blumenfeld and 
Thickett (2003) and Engelbrecht (2000b) have both estimated the number of 
ICT experts at no more than 4 percent of the total workforce, and it is 
inconceivable that such a small number of workers could have the effects that 
are observed. 
 
The second possibility is that new technology has taken over tasks that were 
previously performed by less-skilled workers, while the better-skilled have been 
less vulnerable to displacement (Bauer and Bender, 2002). To some extent this 
has doubtless happened, but again it does not seem likely to have had the far-
reaching effects that are seen in the real world. The marked tendency for 
enhanced returns to ability suggests an effect running right through the 
workplace, rather than simply declining demand for workers at the low end of 
the skills range (Bartel and Sicherman, 1999).  
 
Overseas literature has found a strong correlation between new technology and 
workplace reorganization (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002; Green, 
Felstead and Gallie, 2003), and this appears to underlie the most plausible 
explanation for the correlation between the rising skills premium and the 
industries which are most affected by new technology (Bresnahan, 1999). 
Ultimate and proximate causes are hard to disentangle, but many authors have 
noted that new technology and workplace organization are closely intertwined, 
and the full potential of the one can only be realized in the presence of the other 
(Askenazy, 2000; Wolff, 2002). 
 
New technology affects every aspect of the modern firm (David, 2000; 
Freeman, 2001) and the effective adoption of new ICTs therefore depends on 
new ways of structuring and managing the work of an organisation (Pilat, 2002; 
Piva, Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2003). As such it requires staff at every level who 
are adaptable and quick to learn, and: 
 
“it is not enough for the ‘elite’ to be competent and innovative” 
(Lundgren, 2000: 161).  
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This changing nature of the workplace undermines the traditional Fordist 
structure and encourages the involvement of all workers, implying the need for 
a generally better skilled workforce and a reduced role for middle management 
(Black and Lynch, 2003; Caroli and van Reenen, 2001). In line with the ideas of 
Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Schultz (1975), the observed rise in the returns to 
skills strongly supports the idea of increasing returns to adaptability during 
periods of rapid change.  
 
 
10.B  Findings of the present study 
 
10.B.1  Inequality patterns in New Zealand
 
The last 15 years of the 20th century saw a widespread rise in inequality in New 
Zealand, which has already been extensively documented (Chatterjee, Podder 
and Mukhopadhaya, 2003; Hyslop and Maré, 2005). The principal aim of the 
present study was to investigate the underlying patterns of inequality in terms of 
skills demand and the uptake of new technology, in the hope of revealing some 
of the forces behind the rise. In particular, if inequality has mostly risen between 
groups of workers with different characteristics it can be seen as driven by a 
general skill-bias in the way productive systems are evolving. On the other 
hand, if inequality is rising within groups of workers who have similar 
characteristics, it would give stronger support for the theory that changing 
patterns of industrialization were responsible, possibly affected by increased 
trade touching some industries more than others.  
 
It was the hypothesis of this study that new Information and Communications 
Technology is a General Purpose Technology, and moreover that it is skill 
biased. That is to say it is a pervasive technology affecting patterns of industrial 
organization in a wide range of industries, and one which rewards skilled 
workers out of proportion to the unskilled, thereby driving up earnings 
inequality.  
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Whether ICT should be considered a GPT is not a matter to be determined 
within New Zealand or any particular economy. The defining characteristic 
which most authors use as their guideline for a GPT is that it is an enabling 
technology (Bertschek, 2003). As such it is pervasive and has many applications 
beyond those first imagined. Moreover it spawns a wide range of 
complementary products (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995) so that there will 
be a marked time lag before major benefits begin to accrue (David, 2000), and 
its ultimate effects are very slow to be realised (Helpman, 1998; Jovanovic and 
Rousseau, 2005). A few authors consider the computer revolution to have been 
relatively brief and already largely complete (Gordon, 2000). But many believe 
that new ICT developments still stretch far into the future, as applications 
become increasingly diverse and computing and complementary products 
continue to evolve in ways which are still largely unforeseeable (Lipsey, Bekar 
and Carlaw, 2005). In view of this ever increasing diversity of ICT use it seems 
entirely valid to consider it as a GPT. 
 
The second part of the hypothesis was to assess whether ICT has been skill-
biased. In common with findings from other developed countries, the data 
studied in this thesis strongly support the skill-biased technological change 
(SBTC) theory. Neither the labour supply theory nor the labour market 
institutions theory fits the facts of inequality in New Zealand. The trade theory 
does find some support, especially in conjunction with deindustrialization 
following the removal of protection. But the evidence for this effect suggests 
that it was relatively temporary. By contrast, the SBTC theory fits the facts well, 
and in particular it looks to be the most plausible with regard to the longer term 
effects. This trend was especially evident from the Census findings discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
10.B.2 New Zealand Census findings, 1991 to 1996 
 
The data from the five-yearly Population Census show marked differences 
between the inequality trends in the period 1991 – 1996 and those in the period 
1996 – 2001. In the earlier period there was an increase of 6 percent in between-
group wage inequality, as measured by the ratio of the margin for holding a 
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bachelor’s degree compared to the margin for holding only school certificate. 
This increase was unevenly distributed across industries, with workers in some 
industries being much more affected than others, and there was a marked 
tendency for the industries most affected to be those with high ICT-uptake.  
There was also an increase of 8 percent overall in within-group inequality as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, but with the increases concentrated at each 
end of the distribution. The implication of these findings is that inequality was 
changing both because of changed industrial patterns and also because of a 
general skill-bias in labour demand.  
 
Rising within-group inequality in the early 1990s is not surprising, since in the 
decade from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s New Zealand was subjected to a 
particularly abrupt transition from relatively high protection to an almost 
completely open regime. In particular, the relaxation of import controls and the 
abandonment of tariff barriers dramatically changed the operating conditions for 
industries which had previously been protected, while making little difference to 
many others. It was therefore fully to be expected that there would be a period 
of extensive readjustment between industries at that time, and that there would 
be rather high income inequality between industries (and therefore within 
groups of similar workers) as the labour force adjusted to the new 
circumstances. 
 
But while changing industrial patterns doubtless played a role in the early 
1990s, it is unlikely that this was the whole story, as the rising inequality was 
also strongly associated with the industries which are heavy users of new 
technology. It is a feature of the New Zealand economy that the most 
technology-intensive industries, such as banking, business services and public 
administration, are among the least traded, so to the extent that technology was 
correlated with rising inequality it seems necessary that it was driven by skill 
bias in the demand for labour within those industries.  
 
Moreover, unemployment is now widely seen as an important manifestation of 
inequality (Galbraith, 2000). Traditionally, high wages were assumed to reduce 
employment opportunities, and unions and collective bargaining were blamed 
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for penalising the unemployed (Hutton, 1995). Many commentators continue to 
hold this position, but opposition to it has grown steadily since 1990, as data 
from many countries provide convincing evidence that unemployment is higher 
where wages are lower, rather than low wages being a tradeoff for 
unemployment (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005; Glyn and Salverda, 2000a; 
Papps, 2001). 
 
As Chapter 7 of this thesis shows, in New Zealand the early 1990s saw a 
significant decline in job opportunities for workers with few qualifications, but 
no significant change in opportunities for the well-qualified. Since the ease of 
getting a job is itself something of value, a decline in employment opportunities 
at the bottom of the qualifications scale can be seen as a form of increasing 
between-groups inequality, analogous to a rise in the skills premium. And like 
the rise in the skills premium, the declining employment opportunities for the 
less skilled workers were strongly correlated with the technology-intensive 
industries. Thus, when viewed over both the wage and the employment 
dimensions, the rise in between-group inequality was more substantial than 
might be assumed from income trends alone. 
 
 
10.B.3  New Zealand Census findings, 1996 to 2001 
 
In contrast to the early 1990s, the period following 1996 shows a less complex 
pattern. Between-group inequality increased by 13 percent and almost all 
industries were affected. This finding is strongly supportive of the original 
hypothesis of this study, that there has been a skill bias in the latest 
technological phase, and this bias in favour of more skilled workers has been 
pervasive through a wide range of industries. Within-group inequality, which 
had been a distinct feature of the earlier period, was more muted, and mostly 
affected workers with few qualifications. In particular, the sudden rise before 
1996 in within-group inequality for the well-qualified workers was reversed, 
and at the top of the qualifications scale the within-group inequality returned to 
more modest levels. This strongly suggests that the earlier findings were 
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episodic rather than permanent, and were at least partly driven by the abrupt 
policy changes of that particular period. 
 
Looking at the whole decade from 1991 to 2001, the overall trend has been one 
of substantial and ongoing increases in between group inequality, both in terms 
of incomes and in terms of employment opportunities. The rise in income 
inequality was particularly marked in the later part of the period while the 
declining job opportunities for the less-skilled workers were most marked in the 
earlier period. But overall the trends have been persistent and seriously 
damaging to workers with few qualifications. 
 
Within-group inequality only rose persistently for the workers at the low end of 
the qualifications scale. It has been suggested that within-group inequality is 
likely to be transitory, while between-group inequality is likely to be more 
permanent (Aghion and Howitt, 2002), and this theory accords closely with the 
observed facts in New Zealand in the 1990s. For most workers the rising within-
group inequality was a passing phase, very probably a by-product of the sudden 
shocks to the industrial pattern. It was only the least-skilled workers who 
experienced a significant increase which continued through the whole ten years. 
 
10.B.4  The causes of rising inequality 
 
Skill biased technological change can therefore be isolated with reasonable 
confidence as the explanation for the more persistent changes in New Zealand 
earnings inequality. But this finding leaves open the question of what particular 
skills have become more desirable in the latest phase of technological progress, 
and therefore what public policies are likely to be most cost-effective in 
minimizing higher inequality and its undesirable effects. 
 
As described in Chapter 8, quantile regression was used to estimate the changes 
in wage inequality which accompany changes in other variables, such as the 
level of ICT-uptake or the skills of the labour force. In common with the 
findings from other developed countries (Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998; 
Chennells and van Reenen, 1997), New Zealand shows a pattern of higher wage 
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inequality strongly associated with ICT-uptake. However this increased wage 
dispersion is fully explained by worker occupations and qualifications. 
Moreover, the demand for workers with few qualifications is especially 
depressed in the more ICT-intensive industries, whereas the technology effect is 
rather weak for workers near the top of the skills range. This finding strongly 
suggests that it is not so much the technology which is driving the wage 
dispersion as the qualifications and skills which are useful in the industries 
which happen to be more ICT-intensive. 
 
Using the Income Supplement CURF data for 2002 and 2004, workers were 
divided into two groups according to whether or not they were employed in 
industries making significant use of new technologies. Kernel density graphs 
(Chapter 9) clearly indicate the wider wage dispersion in the technology-
intensive industries. However the DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (DFL) 
technique was used to investigate further how much the higher inequality was 
intrinsic to the technology, and how much it related to the characteristics of the 
workers. When the workers in the high-technology group are reweighted to 
allow for worker characteristics the distribution graph is very to similar to that 
for the workers in the low-technology group. This finding strongly supports the 
controlled quantile regression estimates of Chapter 8, in isolating the worker 
characteristics as being the important factor, rather than anything intrinsic to the 
new technology. Evidently, in the recent phase of technological change, firms 
reward workers who have certain qualifications and occupational skills. This 
can be seen as confirmation of the Nelson and Phelps (1966) theory of returns to 
ability, and the Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) theory that changing 
workplaces create new patterns of skills demand rather than technologies per se 
requiring technological specialists. 
 
10.B.5  Recent trends in inequality 
 
A number of previous studies found that income inequality was rising in New 
Zealand in the 1990s (Chatterjee, Podder and Mukhopadhaya, 2003; O’Dea, 
2000). The Population Census data strongly suggested that income inequality in 
New Zealand had been rising steadily throughout the 1990s. However the 
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Income Supplement data, which focuses specifically on wage inequality, 
suggests that between 2002 and 2004 inequality has been declining again, 
confirming the finding of Hyslop and Yahanpath, 2006). A two-year period is 
too short to establish a trend with any certainty, but when CURF data are 
released for the next year or two it should be possible to trace the trend in the 
present decade with greater confidence. Also customized data from the 2006 
Population Census are due for release by early 2007, and their availability will 
facilitate a cross check between trends in wages reported in the Income 
Supplement and the overall income trends revealed by the Census. 
 
 
10.C  Policy implications 
 
10.C.1  Technology and inequality 
 
Technological change is crucial to any rise in productive efficiency, and 
therefore any real rise in living standards. But earnings inequality can be 
seriously affected by changing technology, including the labour force skill 
levels which are a part of the productive system. In New Zealand, as in other 
countries in the developed world, there is strong evidence to suggest that the 
technological changes of the late 20th century have been complementary to 
skilled workers while reducing the opportunities for the less skilled, and this 
trend raises important public policy issues. 
 
In particular, a higher rate of adoption of new technology requires a higher 
general level of skills in the workforce. The changes of the last 15 years 
strongly support the Nelson-Phelps theory of returns to adaptability, since 
workers with a good level of general education have generally done well, while 
the workers with little education have been penalized. Evidently, at least during 
the 1990s the supply of skills in the New Zealand labour force was not keeping 
up with demand, and this phase has opened up a gap between the workers who 
were well-placed to take advantage of the new opportunities and those who 
were ill-prepared and have found themselves left behind. 
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In terms of skill acquisition women have been making steady progress, and by 
the early 1990s women had overtaken men. But it is a concern that the numbers 
of men not going beyond basic schooling are on the increase. Greater numbers 
of both men and women are completing university qualifications, but the 
numbers taking tertiary vocational courses are dropping faster and the pool of 
low-skilled workers is actually on the increase. Thus recent years have seen 
little overall upskilling in New Zealand.   
 
The recent Income Supplement data suggest that the latest period of rising wage 
inequality may be over. But the greater polarization of the community is likely 
to leave a legacy of problems. Firstly, as noted at the start of this chapter, it now 
seems clear that inequality is growth impeding. Polarization distorts investment 
patterns as well as being anti-democratic and socially disruptive (Easterly, 
2001b; Galbraith, 2000). The resulting social problems, ranging from 
unemployment through to alienation and crime, are likely to mean continuing 
costs to government, which could therefore be constrained in its ability to pay 
for improved education which might help the less well-placed workers to 
achieve in the new environment. Secondly, there is a high level of 
intergenerational transmission in education (Cameron and Heckman, 2001; 
Shea, 2000), and the children of the workers who were worst hit by the recent 
changes are themselves likely to be ill-prepared for the workplace of the future.  
 
 
10.C.2  The future of work and workforce skills 
 
It is therefore important to make whatever efforts are cost-effective in terms of 
giving the next generation an equal start. Even if the pace of change eases 
somewhat, it is most unlikely that there will be any return to the large, 
hierarchical firms of yesteryear. The real costs of ICT will almost certainly 
continue to decline, facilitating new combinations of workers and equipment, as 
well as reorganized and possibly dispersed workplaces. 
 
In many workplaces, adaptation to new technology has meant an end to the days 
when large numbers of process workers with minimal skill levels could be given 
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useful employment. It therefore seems probable that the workplace of the future 
will only reward workers who are sufficiently skilled and flexible to be effective 
in a world with flat structures, high levels of delegation and minimal 
supervision. Unless a greater proportion of the workforce is given suitable 
preparation for the new working environment, New Zealand faces the 
probability that substantial numbers of workers will enjoy only minimal rewards 
and low job security, with all the damaging economic and social consequences 
that this would entail. 
 
Internationally, many commentators have noted that the countries which raised 
the supply of skills have lower inequality (Katz, 1994). In this respect, the 
Continental European countries have generally done better than Britain or the 
United States, with education reaching the children of less well-off households 
to much greater effect (Jencks, 2005; Nickell, 1998). The rise in inequality in 
New Zealand is one unfortunate manifestation of a general move toward a more 
user pays approach to the provision of education. Without strong government 
commitment to improving the opportunities of all the next generation of 
workers, New Zealand is likely to find itself trapped in a low-growth, high-
inequality path, lacking the workforce skills which will be needed to make the 
most of whatever opportunities present themselves in the future. 
 
The New Zealand Government has stated its wish to encourage ICT upgrading 
as a growth promoting strategy (Clark, 2002). But given the now well-
established link between new technology and workforce skills it seems unlikely 
that such a strategy would realize its full potential unless there is an increased 
commitment to raising skill levels. Moreover, since adaptability appears to be 
particularly valuable during times of change, the rate of change itself is likely to 
be constrained by the general level of labour force skills 
 
Some 40 percent of young New Zealanders are entering the workforce with 
minimal education. In view of the general purpose nature of new technology, 
and the high proportion of the workforce which has now been touched by 
changing workplace structures, it seems almost certain that this is seriously out 
of balance with the likely future needs. An increased commitment to raising 
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skill levels of the less qualified members of the workforce is almost certainly 
necessary if the New Zealand economy is to take advantage of the opportunities 
which arise in the future, and if undesirable divisions in society are to be kept to 
a minimum. 
 
 
10.D  Directions for future research 
 
10.D.1  Extensions to the present study 
 
The provision of New Zealand Income Survey Confidentialised Unit Record 
Files (CURFs) has greatly facilitated research into income trends in New 
Zealand, with data on both wages and other forms of income. Income Survey 
CURFs only became available from 2002, but over the next few years this 
resource will provide a powerful tool for the analysis of trends in all forms of 
income, including inequality trends.  
 
The 2006 Census was held in March, and when customized data are released 
this will also allow a useful extension of the present study beyond 2001. In 
particular, it should help to clarify whether the recent reversal of the rising 
inequality trend was only a minor dip, or whether it represents a more 
significant change of trend. Moreover, once the Income Survey CURFs are 
available up to 2006 it will be possible to compare much of the latest inter-
censal period between the two sets of data. The Population Census information 
is limited, both by having only a single variable for income and through the 
reliability issues surrounding a self-reported survey. An overlap of several years 
between the CURF and the Census should reveal how much trust can be placed 
in Census income figures as a proxy for earnings. 
 
Any further investigation into the relationships between economic outcomes and 
industry use of technology will need a more up to date source of information on 
technology uptake. The inter-industry tables from Statistics New Zealand were a 
one-off project in 1996, and as at September 2006 no update is planned. It is 
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unlikely that patterns of industry use of technology would change very rapidly, 
as some industries naturally lend themselves to new technology more than 
others. Nonetheless, using a source which is now 10 years old will become 
increasingly questionable. 
 
10.D.2  Wider research questions 
 
The present thesis has concentrated on wage inequality within and between 
groups of workers of different skills and qualifications. However inequality has 
many dimensions, and unequal outcomes along gender or ethnic lines are two 
which merit more attention than was possible in this study. 
 
Over the last 50 years the proportion of women in the workforce has risen 
steadily (Statistics New Zealand, 2000), partly through choice, but partly also 
because the two-earner household has become increasingly necessary to 
maintain satisfactory household incomes (Martin, 1998). In parallel with rising 
participation, women workers have also overtaken men in their formal 
qualifications (Graph 7.1, page 110). That women are investing more in 
education is not surprising, since Sholeh Maani notes that women enjoy higher 
returns to education (Maani, 1997). This implies that women are well aware that 
their workplace opportunities are even more dependent on qualifications than 
are the opportunities for men.  
 
Male and female workers continue to cluster strongly in different industries 
(Section 7.C.2, p. 118), but the ICT-intensive industries are one area where 
women’s participation has increased very markedly, and Engelbrecht notes that: 
 
“By 1996 about 55% of the female work force was employed in 
information occupations, compared to 40% of the male work force”  
(Engelbrecht, 2001: 135). 
 
 
The other important fault line of inequality in New Zealand is the ethnic divide. 
It is widely recognized that Maori are generally less well qualified than non-
Maori, and are disproportionately unemployed or found in low paid jobs 
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(Stevenson, 2004). Just as male and female workers tend to cluster into distinct 
areas of employment, so do Maori workers often seek employment in certain 
industries (Chapple, 1999).  
 
It was noted in Chapter 7 that the restructuring era of the early 1990s saw a 
sharp rise in unemployment, as some workers were well placed to take 
advantage of the new opportunities while others were seriously disadvantaged.  
The concentration of Maori (especially Maori men) in the secondary sector and 
manual work meant they were particularly hard hit (Engelbrecht and Mahon, 
2003), and their employment rates “remained depressed in the late 1990s” 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2000).  
 
The world will continue to change, and new ways of working and workplace 
arrangements are likely to continue rewarding the well-educated, as the workers 
who are best placed to cope with and benefit from change. It seems probable 
that New Zealand already has too many young adults entering the work force 
inadequately prepared for the working world of the future, and that an increased 
public commitment to raising educational standards of school leavers is 
desirable. If young Maori are particularly concentrated in this group there is a 
serious risk of rising alienation and social problems. Moreover, given the strong 
intergenerational transmission effect noted in Section 3.D, unequal opportunities 
are likely to persist for a long time unless their sources are understood and 
addressed. There are many dimensions of inequality to be studied, but we ignore 
them at the risk of ever widening social divisions, impaired economic 
performance, and a poorer country for the majority of citizens. 
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 Appendix 1A : Summary Details from New Zealand Population Census   
           
   Full-time worker numbers by highest qualification   
       
 Highest  1991   1996   2001  
Qualificaton Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total
           
 No qualification 158142 100308 258450 167130 101283 268416 181296 103347 284643
 School Cert 54690 50007 104697 60831 55485 116316 78966 66483 145449
 UE/6th Form 38949 33909 72858 52590 46677 99267 61278 54438 115719
 Bursary 16812 9705 26517 26160 17652 43815 31470 22443 53913
 Diploma 211926 129612 341541 174363 116157 290523 135684 101727 237411
 Bachelor 33939 21204 55140 44988 34416 79404 53841 53538 107382
 Postgraduate 21081 10926 32007 25656 15774 41430 29706 23106 52815
 Total 535539 355674 891210 551718 387447 939162 572244 425088 997332
           
   Proportions by highest qualification    
           
 Highest  1991   1996   2001  
Qualificaton Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total
           
 No qualification 29.53% 28.20% 29.00% 30.29% 26.14% 28.58% 31.68% 24.31% 28.54%
 School Cert 10.21% 14.06% 11.75% 11.03% 14.32% 12.39% 13.80% 15.64% 14.58%
 UE/6th Form 7.27% 9.53% 8.18% 9.53% 12.05% 10.57% 10.71% 12.81% 11.60%
 Bursary 3.14% 2.73% 2.98% 4.74% 4.56% 4.67% 5.50% 5.28% 5.41%
 Diploma 39.57% 36.44% 38.32% 31.60% 29.98% 30.93% 23.71% 23.93% 23.80%
 Bachelor 6.34% 5.96% 6.19% 8.15% 8.88% 8.45% 9.41% 12.59% 10.77%
 Postgraduate 3.94% 3.07% 3.59% 4.65% 4.07% 4.41% 5.19% 5.44% 5.30%
  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
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Appendix 1B : Worker numbers by income bracket 
  1991   1996   2001  
 Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
          
Nil Income or Loss 0 0 0 330 186 513 1458 864 2325 
$1 - $5,000 6,525 9,726 16,251 11916 13881 25794 11196 10926 22122 
$5,001 - $10,000 19,206 24,375 43,578 19014 21612 40623 16221 17322 33546 
$10,001 - $15,000 40,023 49,095 89,121 30423 35226 65649 24573 28320 52890 
$15,001 - $20,000 70,821 65,892 136,713 45351 51069 96420 36972 43032 80004 
$20,001 - $25,000 84,387 67,755 152,142 68061 62901 130959 54486 54366 108852 
$25,001 - $30,000 81,204 58,749 139,950 81816 66906 148719 73491 61992 135483 
$30,001 - $40,000 109,335 54,429 163,764 119037 79404 198441 122850 98058 220911 
$40,001 - $50,000 63,318 15,249 78,567 74955 28581 103536 82539 51393 133932 
$50,001 - $70,000 38,052 5,157 43,212 54450 12039 66492 77997 35256 113256 
$70,001 and Over 17,163 1,557 18,720 32109 4605 36714 55251 12762 68013 
Not Specified 5,502 3,687 9,192 14259 11040 25299 15204 10794 25998 
Total 535,539 355,674 891,210 551718 387447 939162 572244 425088 997332 
          
 Proportion Proportion Proportion 
Nil Income or Loss 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 
$1 - $5,000 1.2% 2.7% 1.8% 2.2% 3.6% 2.7% 2.0% 2.6% 2.2% 
$5,001 - $10,000 3.6% 6.9% 4.9% 3.4% 5.6% 4.3% 2.8% 4.1% 3.4% 
$10,001 - $15,000 7.5% 13.8% 10.0% 5.5% 9.1% 7.0% 4.3% 6.7% 5.3% 
$15,001 - $20,000 13.2% 18.5% 15.3% 8.2% 13.2% 10.3% 6.5% 10.1% 8.0% 
$20,001 - $25,000 15.8% 19.0% 17.1% 12.3% 16.2% 13.9% 9.5% 12.8% 10.9% 
$25,001 - $30,000 15.2% 16.5% 15.7% 14.8% 17.3% 15.8% 12.8% 14.6% 13.6% 
$30,001 - $40,000 20.4% 15.3% 18.4% 21.6% 20.5% 21.1% 21.5% 23.1% 22.2% 
$40,001 - $50,000 11.8% 4.3% 8.8% 13.6% 7.4% 11.0% 14.4% 12.1% 13.4% 
$50,001 - $70,000 7.1% 1.4% 4.8% 9.9% 3.1% 7.1% 13.6% 8.3% 11.4% 
$70,001 and Over 3.2% 0.4% 2.1% 5.8% 1.2% 3.9% 9.7% 3.0% 6.8% 
Not Specified 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 2.6% 2.8% 2.7% 2.7% 2.5% 2.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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 Appendix 1C Worker numbers by industry 1991 1996 2001 
Code Industry Worker   numbers 
Worker   
numbers 
 Worker   
numbers 
     
1 Dairy Farming 6,552 8,181 9,765 
2 Sheep and Beef Farming 9,333 8,799 8,223 
3 Other Farming 19,458 19,755 18,027 
4 Agricultural Services 6,021 8,196 8,085 
5 Hunting and Trapping 156 210 147 
6 Forestry and Logging 3,909 6,408 6,453 
7 Fishing 1,602 2,139 1,803 
8 Coal Mining 789 642 522 
9 Exploration and Extraction of Oil and Gas 786 555 264 
10 Other Mining and Quarrying 2,325 2,355 2,028 
11 Slaughtering and Preserving Meat 23,100 18,591 19,416 
12 Dairy Products 6,807 6,039 5,370 
13 Other Food Preparation 17,391 17,898 16,497 
14 Beverages and Tobacco 3,105 2,910 3,381 
15 Textiles 7,737 7,557 6,513 
16 Wearing Apparel and Footwear 14,376 11,589 8,328 
17 Wood and Wood Products 16,314 18,060 20,226 
18 Paper and Paper Products 8,226 6,753 5,415 
19 Printing and Publishing 14,478 13,377 15,033 
20 Industrial Chemicals 3,678 3,423 3,411 
21 Other Chemicals 4,335 4,488 2,667 
22 Petroleum Refineries 870 609 174 
23 Petroleum and Coal Products 252 378 216 
24 Rubber Products 1,848 1,377 1,209 
25 Plastic Products 5,565 5,934 6,285 
26 Non Metallic Industries 4,890 4,593 4,545 
27 Iron and Steel Products 3,177 2,715 2,280 
28 Non-Ferrous Metals 2,847 2,571 2,517 
29 Fabricated Metal Products 14,901 16,179 14,952 
30 Machinery nec. 11,790 13,059 12,591 
31 Electrical Machinery 7,974 8,859 8,853 
32 Transport Equipment 9,504 9,147 8,244 
33 Professional Equipment 486 570 1,983 
34 Other Manufacturing 3,000 2,664 2,808 
 
 
                  Continued… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 216
  Appendix 1C - Continued Worker numbers by industry 1991 1996 2001 
Code Industry Worker   numbers 
Worker   
numbers 
 Worker   
numbers 
     
35 Electricity 9,141 5,943 3,636 
36 Gas Manufacture and Distribution 840 567 465 
37 Water Works and Supply 762 1,074 741 
38 Building and Ancillary Services 32,943 37,623 43,833 
39 Other Construction 11,904 11,658 12,405 
40 Wholesale and Retail Trade 129,210 138,483 162,477 
41 Restaurants and Hotels 25,896 33,759 36,585 
42 Rail Transport 3,300 2,331 2,070 
43 Road Passenger Transport 4,854 4,305 4,296 
44 Road Freight Transport 10,341 12,240 13,776 
45 Water Transport 5,871 3,960 1,155 
46 Air Transport 7,986 7,893 7,098 
47 Services to Transport 11,376 13,905 20,184 
48 Communication 22,587 15,909 14,541 
49 Banking 24,687 19,767 15,705 
50 Other Financial Institutions and Services 9,897 11,025 16,368 
51 Insurance 10,608 9,837 9,897 
52 Owning and Leasing Real Estate 9,162 12,597 12,738 
53 Owning Owner-Occupied Dwellings 0 0 0 
54 Business Services 56,574 69,417 85,110 
55 Public Administration and Defence 77,409 69,207 64,899 
56 Sanitary and Cleaning Services 4,383 5,259 26,139 
57 Education 65,652 71,604 83,115 
58 Social and Community Services 24,477 31,293 40,119 
59 Health Services 52,692 46,290 56,664 
60 Recreational and Cultural Services 14,553 18,147 21,006 
61 Domestic Services 810 516 222 
62 Personal Services 25,125 26,502 22,359 
63 Internat'l And Extra-Territorial Body Operation 588 384 0 
64 Unidentifiable/ Not Specified 0 21,093 16,197 
65 Total 891,210 939,162 997,332 
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Appendix 2A : Computing Proportion of Industry Inputs  
     
  Inputs  $M  
Industry Industry Total Computing
code Computing Inputs proportion
  
1 Dairy Farming 0 3590 0.00%
2 Sheep and Beef Farming 0 2909 0.00%
3 Other Farming 0 2885 0.00%
4 Agricultural Services 4 949 0.42%
6 Forrestry and Logging 5 2633 0.19%
7 Fishing 0 807 0.00%
8 Coal Mining 0 241 0.00%
9 
 
Exploration and Extraction of Oil 
and Gas 1 944 0.11%
10 Other Mining and Quarrying 0 696 0.00%
11 Slaughtering and Preserving Meat 26 5363 0.48%
12 Dairy Products 9 4925 0.18%
13 Other Food Preparation 47 4887 0.96%
14 Beverages and Tobacco 4 1636 0.24%
15 Textiles 10 1385 0.72%
16 Wearing Apparel and Footwear 5 1443 0.35%
17 Wood and Wood Products 8 2835 0.28%
18 Paper and Paper Products 13 2886 0.45%
19 Printing and Publishing 27 3086 0.87%
20 Industrial Chemicals 23 1759 1.31%
21 Other Chemicals 6 1659 0.36%
23 Petroleum and Coal Products 0 79 0.00%
24 Rubber Products 1 336 0.30%
25 Plastic Products 10 1497 0.67%
26 Non Metallic Industries 5 1436 0.35%
27 Iron and Steel Products 5 1691 0.30%
28 Non-Ferrous Metals 5 1691 0.30%
29 Fabricated Metal Products 8 2883 0.28%
30 Machinery nec. 13 1929 0.67%
31 Electrical Machinery 48 1993 2.41%
32 Transport Equipment 8 2325 0.34%
33 Professional Equipment 2 197 1.02%
34 Other Manufacturing 8 1352 0.59%
 
 
 
 
  Continued …. 
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Appendix 2A : Computing Proportion of Industry Inputs - Continued 
     
  Inputs  $M  
Industry Industry Total Computing
code Computing Inputs proportion
  
35 Electricity 21 4611 0.46%
36 Gas Manufacture and Distribution 0 469 0.00%
37 Water Works and Supply 0 374 0.00%
38 Building and Ancillary Services 20 10147 0.20%
39 Other Construction 4 2835 0.14%
40 Wholesale and Retail Trade 367 27475 1.34%
41 Restaurants and Hotels 6 3534 0.17%
42 Rail Transport 2 1507 0.13%
43 Road Passenger Transport 1 580 0.17%
44 Road Freight Transport 3 2581 0.12%
45 Water Transport 2 1507 0.13%
46 Air Transport 21 4960 0.42%
47 Services to Transport 21 4960 0.42%
48 Communication 52 4761 1.09%
49 Banking 255 5236 4.87%
50 
 
Other Financial Institutions and 
Services 273 6488 4.21%
51 Insurance 41 1948 2.10%
52 Owning and Leasing Real Estate 7 6484 0.11%
54 Business Services 266 11881 2.24%
55 Public Administration and Defence 176 4605 3.82%
56 Sanitary and Cleaning Services 0 720 0.00%
57 Education 14 4823 0.29%
58 Social and Community Services 41 3700 1.11%
59 Health Services 34 6345 0.54%
60 Recreational and Cultural Services 66 3506 1.88%
62 Personal Services 1 1510 0.07%
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Appendix 2B : Industries Ranked by Computing Inputs   
    
  Inputs  $M   
Industry Industry Total Computing
code Computing Inputs proportion
  
49 Banking 255 5236 4.87%
50 Other Financial Institutions and Services 273 6488 4.21%
55 Public Administration and Defence 176 4605 3.82%
31 Electrical Machinery 48 1993 2.41%
54 Business Services 266 11881 2.24%
51 Insurance 41 1948 2.10%
60 Recreational and Cultural Services 66 3506 1.88%
40 Wholesale and Retail Trade 367 27475 1.34%
20 Industrial Chemicals 23 1759 1.31%
58 Social and Community Services 41 3700 1.11%
48 Communication 52 4761 1.09%
33 Professional Equipment 2 197 1.02%
13 Other Food Preparation 47 4887 0.96%
19 Printing and Publishing 27 3086 0.87%
15 Textiles 10 1385 0.72%
30 Machinery nec. 13 1929 0.67%
25 Plastic Products 10 1497 0.67%
34 Other Manufacturing 8 1352 0.59%
59 Health Services 34 6345 0.54%
11 Slaughtering and Preserving Meat 26 5363 0.48%
35 Electricity 21 4611 0.46%
18 Paper and Paper Products 13 2886 0.45%
46 Air Transport 21 4960 0.42%
47 Services to Transport 21 4960 0.42%
4 Agricultural Services 4 949 0.42%
21 Other Chemicals 6 1659 0.36%
26 Non Metallic Industries 5 1436 0.35%
16 Wearing Apparel and Footwear 5 1443 0.35%
32 Transport Equipment 8 2325 0.34%
24 Rubber Products 1 336 0.30%
27 Iron and Steel Products 5 1691 0.30%
28 Non-Ferrous Metals 5 1691 0.30%
57 Education 14 4823 0.29%
17 Wood and Wood Products 8 2835 0.28%
29 Fabricated Metal Products 8 2883 0.28%
14 Beverages and Tobacco 4 1636 0.24%
 
 
 
  Continued …. 
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Appendix 2B : Industries Ranked by Computing Inputs - Continued 
    
  Inputs  $M   
Industry Industry Total Computing
code Computing Inputs proportion
  
38 Building and Ancillary Services 20 10147 0.20%
6 Forestry and Logging 5 2633 0.19%
12 Dairy Products 9 4925 0.18%
43 Road Passenger Transport 1 580 0.17%
41 Restaurants and Hotels 6 3534 0.17%
39 Other Construction 4 2835 0.14%
42 Rail Transport 2 1507 0.13%
45 Water Transport 2 1507 0.13%
44 Road Freight Transport 3 2581 0.12%
52 Owning and Leasing Real Estate 7 6484 0.11%
9 
Exploration and Extraction of Oil and 
Gas 1 944 0.11%
62 Personal Services 1 1510 0.07%
1 Dairy Farming 0 3590 0.00%
2 Sheep and Beef Farming 0 2909 0.00%
3 Other Farming 0 2885 0.00%
7 Fishing 0 807 0.00%
8 Coal Mining 0 241 0.00%
10 Other Mining and Quarrying 0 696 0.00%
23 Petroleum and Coal Products 0 79 0.00%
36 Gas Manufacture and Distribution 0 469 0.00%
37 Water Works and Supply 0 374 0.00%
56 Sanitary and Cleaning Services 0 720 0.00%
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Appendix 3 : Industry mapping in the Inter-industry Study 1996 - Concordance P.1 
      
49 industry tables     126 industry tables   62 industry 
tables
Industry grouping   Reference 
Number 
Industry grouping Reference 
Number Reference Number 
Horticulture and fruit growing  1 Other horticulture 1 3 
    Apple and pear growing 2 3 
    Kiwifruit growing 3 3 
      Other fruit growing 4 3 
Livestock and cropping farming   2 Mixed livestock and cropping 5 3 
    Sheep and beef cattle farming 6 2 
Dairy cattle farming  3 Dairy cattle farming 7 1 
Other farming  4 Other farming 8 3 
Services to agriculture, hunting and 
trapping 
  5 Services to agriculture, hunting and 
trapping 
9 
4 
Forestry and logging   6 Forestry 10 6 
    Services to forestry 11 6 
      Logging 12 6 
Fishing   7 Fishing 13 7 
Mining and quarrying   8 Coal mining 14 8 
    Services to mining 15 10 
    Other mining and quarrying 16 10 
Oil & gas exploration & extraction  9 Oil & gas extraction 17 9 
      Oil & gas exploration 18 9 
Meat and meat product manufacturing   10 Meat processing 19 11 
    Poultry processing 20 11 
      Bacon, ham and smallgood manufacturing 21 11 
Dairy product manufacturing   11 Dairy product manufacturing 22 12 
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Appendix 3 : Industry mapping in the Inter-industry Study 1996 - Concordance P.2 
      
49 industry tables     126 industry tables   62 industry 
tables
Industry grouping   Reference 
Number 
Industry grouping Reference 
Number Reference Number 
Other food manufacturing   12 Fruit and vegetable, oil and fat, cereal and 
flour manufacturing 
23 
13 
    Bakery, sugar and confectionery 
manufacturing 
24 
13 
    Seafood processing 25 13 
      Other food manufacturing 26 13 
        
Beverage, malt and tobacco manufacturing   13 Soft drink, cordial and syrup manufacturing 27 14 
    Beer, wine, spirit and tobacco 
manufacturing 
28 
14 
Textile and apparel manufacturing   14 Textile manufacturing 29 15 
    Clothing manufacturing 30 16 
    Footwear manufacturing 31 16 
      Other leather product manufacturing 32 16 
Wood product manufacturing   15 Log sawmilling and timber dressing 33 17 
    Other wood product manufacturing 34 17 
Paper and paper product manufacturing   16 Paper and paper product manufacturing 35 18 
Printing , publishing & recorded media  17 Printing and services to printing 36 19 
      Publishing and recorded media 
manufacturing 
37 
19 
Petroleum and industrial chemical 
manufacturing 
  18 Petroleum refining 38 
22 
    Petroleum & coal product manufacturing 
nec 
39 
23 
    Fertiliser manufacturing 40 20 
      Other industrial chemical manufacturing 41 20 
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Appendix 3 : Industry mapping in the Inter-industry Study 1996 - Concordance P.3 
      
49 industry tables     126 industry tables   62 industry 
tables
Industry grouping   Reference 
Number 
Industry grouping Reference 
Number Reference Number 
Rubber, plastic and other chemical product 
manufacturing 
  19 Medicinal, detergent and cosmetic 
manufacturing 
42 
21 
    Other chemical product manufacturing  43 21 
    Rubber manufacturing 44 24 
      Plastic product manufacturing 45 25 
Non-metallic mineral product 
manufacturing 
  20 Glass and glass product and ceramic 
manufacturing 
46 
26 
      Other non-metallic mineral product 
manufacturing 
47 
26 
Basic metal manufacturing   21 Basic metal manufacturing 48 27, 28 
Structural, sheet, and fabricated metal 
product manufacturing 
  22 Structural, sheet and fabricated metal 
product manufacturing 
49 
29 
Transport equipment manufacturing   23 Motor vehicle and part manufacturing 50 32 
    Ship and Boat Building 51 32 
      Other transport equipment manufacturing 52 32 
Machinery & equipment manufacturing   24 Photographic and scientific equipment 
manufacturing 
53 
33 
    Electronic equipment and appliance 
manufacturing 
54 
31 
    Agricultural machinery manufacturing 55 30 
      Other industrial machinery and equipment 
manufacturing 
56 
30 
Furniture and other manufacturing   25 Prefabricated building manufacturing 57 38 
    Furniture manufacturing 58 34 
      Other manufacturing 59 34 
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Appendix 3 : Industry mapping in the Inter-industry Study 1996 - Concordance P.4 
      
49 industry tables     126 industry tables   62 industry 
tables
Industry grouping   Reference 
Number 
Industry grouping Reference 
Number Reference Number 
Electricity generation and supply   26 Electricity Generation 60 35 
    Electricity Transmission 61 35 
    Electricity Supply 62 35 
Gas supply  27 Gas supply 63 36 
Water supply   28 Water supply 64 37 
Construction   29 Residential building construction 65 38 
    Owner builders 66 38 
    Non-residential building construction 67 38 
    Non-building construction 68 39 
    Site preparation services 69 38 
    Building structure services 70 38 
    Plumbing services 71 38 
    Installation trade services 72 38 
    Building completion services 73 38 
      Other construction services 74 39 
Wholesale trade   30 Wholesale trade 75 40 
Retail trade  31 Retail trade 76 40 
Accommodation, restaurants and bars   32 Accommodation 77 41 
    Bars, clubs, cafes and restaurants 78 41 
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Appendix 3 : Industry mapping in the Inter-industry Study 1996 - Concordance P.5 
      
49 industry tables     126 industry tables   62 industry 
tables
Industry grouping   Reference 
Number 
Industry grouping Reference 
Number Reference Number 
Road transport   33 Road Freight transport 79 44 
    Road passenger transport 80 43 
Water and rail transport  34 Water and rail transport 81 42,45 
Air transport, services to transport and 
storage 
 35 Air transport, services to transport and 
storage 
82 
46,47 
Communication services   36 Communication services 83 48 
Finance   37 Finance 84 49,50 
Insurance   38 Life insurance 85 51 
    Superannuation fund operation 86 51 
    Health insurance 87 51 
    General insurance 88 51 
Services to finance and investment   39 Services to finance and insurance 89 50 
Real estate   40 Residential property operators 90 52 
    Commercial property operators 91 52 
    Real estate agents 92 52 
Ownership of owner-occupied dwellings   41 Ownership of owner-occupied dwellings 93 53 
Equipment hire and investors in other 
property 
  42 Investors in other property 94 
52 
      Vehicle and equipment hire 95 54 
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Appendix 3 : Industry mapping in the Inter-industry Study 1996 - Concordance P.6 
      
49 industry tables     126 industry tables   62 industry 
tables
Industry grouping   Reference 
Number 
Industry grouping Reference 
Number Reference Number 
Business services   43 Scientific research 96 54 
    Technical services 97 54 
    Computer services 98 54 
    Legal services 99 54 
    Accounting services 100 54 
    Advertising and marketing services 101 54 
    Business administrative and management 
services 
102 
54 
    Employment, security and investigative 
services 
103 
54 
    Pest control and cleaning services 104 56 
      Other business services 105 54 
Central government administration, 
defence, public order and safety services  
  44 Central government administration 106 
55 
    Defence 107 55 
    Public order and safety services 108 58 
Local government administration services 
and civil defence 
  45 Local government administration services 
and civil defence 
109 
58 
Education   46 Pre-school education 110 57 
    Primary and secondary education 111 57 
    Post school education 112 57 
      Other education 113 57 
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Appendix 3 : Industry mapping in the Inter-industry Study 1996 - Concordance P.7 
      
49 industry tables     126 industry tables   62 industry 
tables
Industry grouping   Reference 
Number 
Industry grouping Reference 
Number Reference Number 
Health and community services   47 Hospitals and nursing homes 114 59 
    Medical, dental and other health services 115 59 
    Veterinary services 116 59 
    Child care services 117 59 
    Accommodation for the aged 118 59 
      Other community care services 119 59 
Cultural and recreational services   48 Motion picture, radio and TV services 120 60 
    Libraries, museums and the arts 121 60 
    Horse and dog racing 122 60 
    Lotteries, casinos and other gambling 123 60 
      Other sport and recreational services 124 60 
Personal and other community services   49 Personal and other community services 125 62 
    
  
Waste disposal, sewerage and drainage 
services 
126 
56 
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Appendix 4A (1991) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
1991 Industry  
1 
Industry  
2 
Industry  
3 
Industry  
4 
Industry  
6 
Industry  
7 
School cert 0.805 1.401 1.502 1.388 0.758 0.941 
 (61.47) (89.49) (128.90) (68.19) (47.20) (25.66) 
UE 1.160 1.950 2.369 1.936 1.165 1.165 
 (64.91) (93.20) (142.20) (68.43) (50.45) (23.39) 
Bursary 1.117 1.720 2.175 1.768 1.187 0.692 
 (38.01) (60.28) (107.11) (44.20) (30.45) (9.62) 
Diploma 1.125 1.597 1.792 1.578 0.944 1.051 
 (94.63) (102.90) (158.08) (82.42) (76.65) (42.32) 
Bachelor 1.597 2.131 2.623 2.283 1.713 1.561 
 (52.02) (71.99) (122.54) (58.59) (63.18) (22.60) 
Postgrad 1.733 1.772 1.989 2.143 1.579 1.209 
 (27.62) (31.49) (57.92) (36.37) (33.07) (12.48) 
Experience 0.163 0.113 0.239 0.115 0.203 0.184 
 (51.22) (32.58) (80.69) (20.25) (48.83) (17.67) 
Expersq -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (14.24) (8.30) (26.23) (7.56) (21.78) (4.03) 
Chi2 8442.3 10085 20768.8 6271.1 6030.7 1995.4 
Observations 6429 9165 18948 5892 3837 1572 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 Industry  
8 
Industry  
9 
Industry 
10 
Industry 
11 
Industry 
12 
Industry 
13 
School Cert 0.578 0.626 1.231 1.336 1.307 1.080 
 (12.38) (9.04) (34.12) (268.77) (113.99) (134.53) 
UE 1.400 1.434 1.655 1.995 1.961 1.706 
 (16.25) (15.19) (34.83) (265.18) (124.90) (138.85) 
Bursary  1.065 1.348 1.645 1.848 1.288 
  (9.93) (19.28) (168.26) (93.83) (82.07) 
Diploma 0.559 1.117 1.231 1.310 1.338 1.259 
 (16.96) (20.84) (42.36) (317.77) (144.22) (188.87) 
Bachelor 1.604 1.966 2.364 2.289 2.307 2.183 
 (21.87) (24.31) (43.11) (192.06) (127.87) (148.04) 
Postgrad 1.047 1.848 2.132 1.990 2.212 1.897 
 (7.42) (20.91) (34.39) (102.88) (104.74) (76.75) 
Experience 0.169 0.151 0.078 0.142 0.143 0.140 
 (20.22) (12.91) (9.43) (92.09) (57.23) (66.92) 
Expersq -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (15.53) (3.14) (6.05) (2.31) (4.19) (6.16) 
Chi2 507.2 800.2 2104.3 48597 12861 26088 
Observations 759 777 2307 22830 6759 17070 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (1991) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
1991 Industry  
14 
Industry  
15 
Industry  
16 
Industry  
17 
Industry  
18 
Industry  
19 
School cert 1.179 1.438 1.532 0.914 1.369 1.304 
 (50.20) (104.59) (170.56) (161.94) (138.78) (135.05) 
UE 1.826 1.991 2.277 1.168 1.806 1.801 
 (59.94) (100.22) (155.28) (148.70) (139.17) (162.60) 
Bursary 1.775 1.610 1.342 0.845 1.401 1.661 
 (43.70) (69.96) (84.75) (69.47) (84.23) (122.59) 
Diploma 1.305 1.551 1.541 0.877 1.409 1.578 
 (64.52) (126.87) (197.47) (205.80) (186.19) (177.84) 
Bachelor 2.449 2.385 2.676 1.488 2.263 2.061 
 (74.67) (85.82) (130.62) (108.68) (140.18) (145.69) 
Postgrad 2.363 2.083 2.036 1.343 2.050 2.220 
 (56.65) (39.49) (54.56) (54.78) (83.93) (128.11) 
Experience 0.082 0.090 0.159 0.114 0.062 0.067 
 (16.44) (24.83) (58.96) (101.04) (28.79) (35.86) 
Expersq 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 
 (8.03) (14.71) (4.44) (15.25) (33.43) (27.41) 
Chi2 3917 10560.5 22250 32402 17697 24070 
Observations 3099 7629 14133 16107 8139 14367 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 Industry  
20 
Industry  
21 
Industry 
23 
Industry 
24 
Industry 
25 
Industry 
26 
School Cert 0.887 1.014 1.039 0.660 1.127 0.827 
 (60.40) (60.70) (17.73) (30.06) (99.25) (74.97) 
UE 1.380 1.640 1.336 1.110 1.566 1.130 
 (70.50) (76.64) (19.75) (32.05) (103.83) (70.59) 
Bursary 1.109 1.562 1.959 0.690 1.200 0.778 
 (45.40) (56.71) (12.04) (14.57) (65.18) (34.74) 
Diploma 1.100 1.357 0.782 0.863 1.221 0.892 
 (96.36) (88.84) (19.50) (46.08) (138.49) (106.96) 
Bachelor 1.985 2.195 2.752 1.428 2.144 1.575 
 (98.11) (99.56) (23.05) (34.84) (105.55) (72.83) 
Postgrad 1.584 2.133 2.415 1.479 2.109 1.496 
 (64.33) (83.60) (17.51) (24.76) (63.42) (39.84) 
Experience 0.054 0.079 0.171 0.045 0.111 0.106 
 (14.09) (23.20) (14.99) (7.83) (46.48) (37.85) 
Expersq 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (13.26) (8.82) (4.80) (6.26) (4.18) (3.51) 
Chi2 6290 6471.4 473.6 2245 10931.4 8763 
Observations 3633 4281 249 1830 5484 4860 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (1991) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
1991 Industry  
27 
Industry  
28 
Industry  
29 
Industry  
30 
Industry  
31 
Industry  
32 
School cert 1.398 1.149 0.879 0.917 1.172 0.929 
 (62.87) (49.88) (147.33) (111.10) (108.23) (100.93) 
UE 2.030 1.410 1.312 1.309 1.678 1.247 
 (75.04) (45.79) (152.30) (119.73) (115.72) (99.03) 
Bursary 1.373 1.105 0.871 1.095 1.186 1.086 
 (40.64) (26.24) (71.44) (72.70) (70.90) (60.85) 
Diploma 1.625 1.311 0.913 1.121 1.236 1.052 
 (87.53) (68.76) (205.82) (167.31) (152.88) (159.52) 
Bachelor 2.508 2.074 1.556 1.756 2.169 1.702 
 (84.23) (59.33) (122.29) (126.99) (144.90) (98.64) 
Postgrad 2.244 1.612 1.591 1.606 2.044 1.504 
 (54.02) (33.23) (65.72) (69.13) (91.87) (57.71) 
Experience 0.106 0.049 0.123 0.099 0.114 0.066 
 (22.33) (10.83) (91.41) (81.93) (50.41) (39.52) 
Expersq 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (8.95) (14.52) (18.54) (4.56) (1.36) (17.30) 
Chi2 5170 3770 29657 22511 14566 16953 
Observations 3144 2826 14700 11685 7851 9408 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 Industry  
33 
Industry  
34 
Industry 
35 
Industry 
36 
Industry 
37 
Industry 
38 
School Cert 0.537 0.919 0.877 0.544 0.649 0.871 
 (12.03) (50.75) (76.46) (11.62) (11.41) (161.77) 
UE 1.183 1.302 1.437 1.042 0.819 1.203 
 (19.90) (50.11) (101.43) (19.64) (10.72) (168.93) 
Bursary 1.129 1.245 1.069 1.135 0.145 0.934 
 (12.49) (34.12) (52.97) (12.53) (0.73) (85.28) 
Diploma 0.773 1.044 1.199 0.763 0.580 0.954 
 (21.42) (68.21) (123.89) (20.81) (18.19) (240.65) 
Bachelor 1.419 1.772 1.857 1.252 1.358 1.442 
 (20.67) (48.77) (130.59) (22.67) (19.56) (127.23) 
Postgrad 1.160 1.526 1.953 1.250 1.326 1.384 
 (11.73) (29.47) (94.24) (15.63) (9.60) (61.93) 
Experience 0.078 0.106 0.064 0.086 0.103 0.123 
 (10.32) (26.28) (36.74) (11.06) (11.32) (141.65) 
Expersq 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.08) (3.17) (11.19) (1.99) (5.99) (34.31) 
Chi2 547.1 4258 14658 831.3 509 56307 
Observations 486 2964 9072 825 762 32517 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (1991) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
1991 Industry  
39 
Industry  
40 
Industry  
41 
Industry  
42 
Industry  
43 
Industry  
44 
School cert 1.582 1.230 1.650 1.275 1.731 1.439 
 (172.13) (553.89) (187.97) (48.64) (46.95) (144.96) 
(UE) 2.130 1.819 2.533 1.933 2.636 1.907 
 (171.31) (663.64) (230.44) (54.25) (51.59) (138.47) 
Bursary 1.619 1.674 2.595 1.598 1.682 1.679 
 (109.19) (469.80) (204.21) (40.10) (37.52) (94.04) 
Diploma 1.575 1.435 2.327 1.417 1.958 1.563 
 (210.04) (700.23) (257.82) (58.07) (53.28) (160.22) 
Bachelor 2.416 2.309 2.827 2.466 3.404 1.995 
 (165.27) (627.45) (192.78) (53.22) (49.26) (71.61) 
Postgrad 2.423 2.182 2.498 2.465 3.172 2.478 
 (93.63) (389.13) (127.24) (28.97) (35.56) (46.81) 
Experience 0.062 0.123 0.158 0.085 0.124 0.066 
 (28.78) (309.18) (100.38) (15.52) (9.94) (21.28) 
Expersq 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 
 (38.52) (6.16) (2.78) (6.85) (3.91) (31.18) 
Chi2 23093 286433 38882 3090 2884.6 16026 
Observations 11724 128004 25446 3261 4788 10212 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 Industry  
45 
Industry  
46 
Industry 
47 
Industry 
48 
Industry 
49 
Industry 
50 
School Cert 1.221 0.984 1.003 1.246 0.797 1.222 
 (82.87) (81.74) (97.83) (141.35) (111.88) (93.41) 
UE 1.702 1.610 1.522 1.902 1.263 1.873 
 (91.49) (114.63) (132.04) (175.14) (163.21) (137.84) 
Bursary 1.562 1.583 1.383 1.653 1.311 1.915 
 (70.53) (96.53) (97.74) (129.15) (144.78) (123.99) 
Diploma 1.380 1.488 1.297 1.684 1.084 1.531 
 (105.72) (121.38) (134.42) (195.11) (139.24) (123.80) 
Bachelor 2.297 2.100 1.682 2.394 1.725 2.375 
 (94.92) (119.57) (107.82) (194.25) (166.15) (164.57) 
Postgrad 2.149 1.908 1.800 2.415 1.811 2.397 
 (68.33) (78.61) (68.19) (140.00) (127.22) (137.05) 
Experience -0.011 0.068 0.074 0.128 0.091 0.088 
 (3.35) (30.74) (44.12) (74.59) (89.04) (48.22) 
Expersq 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (35.63) (16.54) (14.36) (6.20) (11.23) (10.14) 
Chi2 9061 14401 17317 29957 34062 18659 
Observations 5793 7941 11262 22458 24582 9831 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (1991) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
1991 Industry  
51 
Industry  
52 
Industry  
54 
Industry  
55 
Industry  
56 
School cert 1.104 1.426 1.175 1.099 1.480 
 (79.96) (82.21) (202.65) (229.27) (67.91) 
UE 1.690 2.241 1.921 1.718 2.132 
 (113.72) (106.40) (296.20) (325.79) (69.20) 
Bursary 1.696 2.095 1.874 1.727 1.622 
 (100.31) (80.29) (250.89) (275.63) (46.47) 
Diploma 1.368 1.506 1.590 1.264 1.535 
 (102.14) (99.36) (281.94) (289.98) (87.84) 
Bachelor 2.121 2.949 2.474 1.861 2.386 
 (126.62) (128.81) (384.24) (332.90) (52.34) 
Postgrad 2.103 2.584 2.300 1.813 2.284 
 (95.59) (88.49) (301.90) (310.50) (38.01) 
Experience 0.076 0.121 0.120 0.073 0.093 
 (38.92) (30.75) (147.21) (92.23) (14.58) 
Expersq 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 (7.53) (5.90) (0.85) (33.05) (9.94) 
Chi2 15527 11600 102512 110418 5272 
Observations 10566 9075 56223 76896 4329 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 Industry  
57 
Industry  
58 
Industry 
59 
Industry 
60 
Industry 
62 
School Cert 0.825 1.318 1.322 0.961 0.801 
 (96.77) (103.29) (181.48) (106.74) (135.76) 
UE 1.561 1.966 2.491 1.750 1.084 
 (147.24) (117.89) (257.23) (176.60) (144.43) 
Bursary 1.702 1.912 2.383 1.868 1.008 
 (123.64) (96.68) (202.04) (159.15) (83.95) 
Diploma 1.449 1.437 1.889 1.371 1.031 
 (247.73) (144.58) (281.86) (175.03) (217.91) 
Bachelor 2.189 2.289 3.273 2.054 1.235 
 (329.90) (163.63) (354.49) (191.08) (69.40) 
Postgrad 2.159 2.266 2.757 1.900 1.320 
 (320.38) (178.46) (326.41) (169.09) (53.36) 
Experience 0.092 0.079 0.181 0.180 0.105 
 (69.48) (22.34) (130.00) (103.31) (123.43) 
Expersq 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (11.05) (16.12) (24.88) (29.70) (14.66) 
Chi2 95669 25037 87416 28779 42798 
Observations 65238 24243 52233 14406 24789 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (1996) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
1996 Industry  
1 
Industry  
2 
Industry  
3 
Industry  
4 
Industry  
6 
Industry  
7 
School cert 0.927 1.336 1.920 1.399 0.865 1.232 
 (117.12) (117.12) (190.63) (112.04) (93.19) (42.76) 
UE 1.284 1.958 2.837 2.182 1.243 1.710 
 (126.89) (143.13) (219.54) (130.44) (104.87) (49.28) 
Bursary 1.382 2.104 3.192 2.377 1.216 1.817 
 (97.04) (119.37) (192.62) (106.09) (67.52) (35.66) 
Diploma 1.269 1.678 2.369 1.575 1.040 1.419 
 (165.16) (146.62) (223.19) (129.64) (131.06) (56.94) 
Bachelor 1.693 2.381 3.226 2.401 1.609 1.963 
 (102.54) (129.77) (199.19) (120.34) (118.05) (45.87) 
Postgrad 1.344 2.138 2.998 2.683 1.799 1.791 
 (43.43) (85.98) (136.61) (86.58) (78.20) (31.65) 
Experience 0.185 0.121 0.190 0.162 0.182 0.147 
 (110.85) (56.63) (76.11) (46.91) (77.47) (16.10) 
Expersq -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.001 
 (41.49) (7.79) (6.57) (2.46) (26.39) (2.57) 
Chi2 16670.8 16231 33451 13986.7 12832.4 3288 
Observations 7965 8604 18969 7884 6120 2082 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 Industry  
8 
Industry  
9 
Industry 
10 
Industry 
11 
Industry 
12 
Industry 
13 
School Cert 0.681 0.920 1.489 1.067 1.417 1.295 
 (8.09) (13.11) (39.86) (242.41) (104.20) (236.64) 
UE 0.868 0.979 1.923 1.660 2.054 1.996 
 (8.55) (11.50) (39.42) (271.47) (122.49) (281.12) 
Bursary 0.494 1.171 2.020 1.735 2.382 2.226 
 (4.68) (9.62) (32.58) (206.16) (114.73) (231.00) 
Diploma 0.673 1.034 1.413 1.055 1.681 1.491 
 (9.39) (16.47) (45.12) (268.75) (130.00) (295.47) 
Bachelor 1.565 1.641 2.657 2.077 2.646 2.554 
 (13.26) (20.41) (46.40) (213.93) (138.40) (294.98) 
Postgrad 1.707 1.970 2.700 1.847 2.675 2.524 
 (10.10) (21.27) (43.09) (106.66) (119.72) (187.64) 
Experience 0.127 0.059 0.084 0.137 0.099 0.149 
 (11.07) (6.33) (11.89) (121.63) (37.29) (105.96) 
Expersq -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (4.45) (2.24) (7.25) (13.28) (18.93) (4.48) 
Chi2 404.5 574.8 2184.7 45746.4 11020.4 41938.3 
Observations 618 549 2304 18015 5919 17244 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (1996) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
1996 Industry  
14 
Industry  
15 
Industry  
16 
Industry  
17 
Industry  
18 
Industry  
19 
School cert 1.070 1.566 1.751 1.041 1.266 1.364 
 (43.56) (141.04) (165.59) (228.33) (119.20) (146.58) 
UE 1.651 2.291 2.592 1.491 1.753 1.930 
 (57.43) (151.25) (175.62) (258.18) (138.24) (184.72) 
Bursary 2.045 2.262 2.683 1.586 1.735 2.099 
 (54.40) (120.32) (133.15) (187.80) (104.51) (175.74) 
Diploma 1.412 1.638 1.972 1.050 1.384 1.734 
 (61.22) (155.92) (186.08) (269.25) (164.39) (189.20) 
Bachelor 2.455 2.476 2.791 1.545 2.214 2.334 
 (78.23) (130.85) (155.44) (171.86) (146.38) (187.43) 
Postgrad 2.420 2.614 2.791 1.558 2.355 2.266 
 (60.61) (80.02) (82.01) (94.72) (109.90) (140.38) 
Experience 0.104 0.059 0.081 0.131 0.079 0.084 
 (24.55) (20.32) (29.92) (137.11) (40.97) (56.70) 
Expersq 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (3.92) (31.39) (31.79) (17.38) (22.33) (24.58) 
Chi2 3893.1 14191.6 19648.7 42965.5 14791 26085.6 
Observations 2841 7320 11133 17493 6594 13104 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 Industry  
20 
Industry  
21 
Industry 
23 
Industry 
24 
Industry 
25 
Industry 
26 
School Cert 1.014 0.960 0.668 0.755 1.214 0.960 
 (66.48) (66.97) (13.73) (29.29) (106.24) (82.98) 
UE 1.460 1.512 1.152 1.139 1.753 1.431 
 (77.44) (88.09) (16.94) (32.58) (126.34) (93.59) 
Bursary 1.845 1.684 1.215 1.018 2.030 1.243 
 (68.62) (75.05) (15.08) (22.72) (105.43) (60.41) 
Diploma 1.204 1.283 0.760 0.849 1.382 0.957 
 (95.47) (95.73) (17.18) (37.60) (140.20) (98.67) 
Bachelor 1.964 2.086 1.832 1.380 2.017 1.780 
 (97.21) (116.44) (23.76) (31.07) (119.22) (89.22) 
Postgrad 1.823 2.159 1.904 1.410 2.191 1.934 
 (66.59) (100.86) (20.37) (21.30) (69.95) (58.10) 
Experience 0.071 0.077 0.117 0.127 0.106 0.100 
 (19.97) (24.81) (12.12) (25.52) (40.54) (39.24) 
Expersq 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (12.06) (12.10) (3.65) (8.99) (10.07) (1.97) 
Chi2 6320.6 7455.7 525.2 2039.6 11579.1 8726 
Observations 3333 4383 372 1329 5730 4443 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (1996) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
1996 Industry  
27 
Industry  
28 
Industry  
29 
Industry  
30 
Industry  
31 
Industry  
32 
School cert 1.391 0.903 1.057 1.040 1.214 1.044 
 (58.95) (49.07) (176.70) (145.85) (122.94) (141.86) 
UE 1.788 1.252 1.532 1.595 1.730 1.444 
 (62.97) (56.67) (199.34) (189.08) (150.45) (157.73) 
Bursary 1.870 1.367 1.533 1.746 1.882 1.603 
 (52.04) (40.21) (138.13) (152.81) (125.53) (122.45) 
Diploma 1.549 1.070 1.076 1.284 1.324 1.149 
 (76.28) (71.74) (219.55) (205.79) (165.36) (188.46) 
Bachelor 2.520 1.863 1.778 1.863 2.162 1.780 
 (76.81) (61.60) (171.46) (178.94) (180.98) (142.94) 
Postgrad 2.207 1.790 1.718 1.978 2.186 1.987 
 (48.43) (48.09) (100.29) (120.03) (131.94) (83.73) 
Experience 0.072 0.056 0.126 0.121 0.127 0.101 
 (15.11) (14.25) (95.99) (107.47) (68.56) (71.85) 
Expersq 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (13.31) (13.45) (11.03) (11.31) (5.87) (1.87) 
Chi2 4334 4215.3 32660 28869.4 17092 20912.7 
Observations 2643 2514 15633 12702 8601 8916 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 Industry  
33 
Industry  
34 
Industry 
35 
Industry 
36 
Industry 
37 
Industry 
38 
School Cert 0.723 1.154 1.358 0.662 1.029 0.992 
 (12.72) (72.01) (68.47) (14.89) (25.17) (256.29) 
UE 1.323 1.578 2.141 1.253 1.346 1.466 
 (18.04) (78.73) (89.84) (21.54) (30.92) (310.69) 
Bursary 1.420 1.718 2.281 1.380 1.181 1.547 
 (10.48) (64.36) (87.53) (18.58) (23.34) (240.90) 
Diploma 0.983 1.240 1.749 1.070 1.148 1.058 
 (19.51) (86.18) (91.14) (23.42) (35.16) (339.10) 
Bachelor 1.572 1.463 2.684 1.777 1.779 1.465 
 (20.64) (49.41) (112.90) (31.42) (42.76) (181.56) 
Postgrad 1.871 1.914 2.873 1.308 1.965 1.364 
 (18.32) (32.30) (108.58) (20.17) (38.04) (97.23) 
Experience 0.117 0.136 0.049 0.116 0.010 0.162 
 (10.18) (39.15) (16.66) (19.62) (1.63) (217.10) 
Expersq -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (2.78) (6.21) (23.28) (5.97) (11.76) (65.54) 
Chi2 499.1 4925.1 10122.9 873.1 1444.4 83132 
Observations 555 2589 5826 546 1059 36441 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (1996) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
1996 Industry  
39 
Industry  
40 
Industry  
41 
Industry  
42 
Industry  
43 
Industry  
44 
School cert 1.388 1.254 1.231 1.278 1.961 1.542 
 (177.10) (593.77) (217.08) (64.40) (51.59) (186.50) 
UE 1.901 1.978 2.087 1.789 3.001 2.144 
 (196.29) (805.99) (317.21) (70.32) (59.04) (205.02) 
Bursary 2.049 2.298 2.548 1.710 2.983 2.244 
 (156.73) (782.99) (331.43) (55.38) (51.48) (174.56) 
Diploma 1.379 1.618 1.990 1.444 2.272 1.702 
 (207.04) (755.53) (346.44) (76.65) (56.43) (200.06) 
Bachelor 2.214 2.490 2.280 2.207 3.576 2.580 
 (185.87) (834.92) (293.93) (63.44) (55.91) (152.12) 
Postgrad 2.047 2.487 1.943 2.652 3.226 2.848 
 (112.23) (567.95) (246.92) (57.96) (40.20) (106.27) 
Experience 0.099 0.135 0.175 0.045 0.049 0.063 
 (55.83) (376.22) (192.47) (12.49) (5.05) (30.42) 
Expersq 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (22.64) (2.15) (35.30) (19.47) (14.38) (49.77) 
Chi2 24956.6 356493 72791 3736.3 3026.8 24183 
Observations 11319 135003 32490 2280 4185 11862 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 Industry  
45 
Industry  
46 
Industry 
47 
Industry 
48 
Industry 
49 
Industry 
50 
School Cert 0.935 0.917 1.016 1.476 1.121 1.279 
 (52.82) (79.39) (106.42) (152.58) (103.58) (105.75) 
UE 1.630 1.597 1.623 2.250 1.971 1.993 
 (71.97) (121.41) (151.93) (192.47) (150.30) (150.98) 
Bursary 1.640 1.891 1.762 2.822 2.317 2.194 
 (53.82) (126.21) (136.89) (202.68) (169.66) (150.51) 
Diploma 1.182 1.543 1.500 2.154 1.950 1.812 
 (77.82) (133.29) (158.21) (203.47) (148.40) (141.70) 
Bachelor 2.164 2.191 1.899 3.279 2.751 2.642 
 (81.44) (139.83) (148.24) (238.32) (197.00) (194.24) 
Postgrad 1.874 2.359 1.880 3.307 2.881 2.847 
 (49.86) (100.22) (97.97) (202.90) (178.60) (181.31) 
Experience 0.080 0.104 0.088 0.162 0.123 0.096 
 (27.18) (58.02) (55.80) (92.58) (78.73) (53.20) 
Expersq 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (8.00) (2.77) (13.10) (3.75) (0.80) (14.98) 
Chi2 6203 15965.7 21710.8 29457.7 31661.7 22605 
Observations 3870 7782 13605 15612 19488 10815 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (1996) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
1996 Industry  
51 
Industry  
52 
Industry  
54 
Industry  
55 
Industry  
56 
School cert 0.975 1.178 1.150 1.273 1.794 
 (79.72) (124.06) (229.44) (221.14) (92.11) 
UE 1.685 1.936 1.981 1.961 2.486 
 (122.91) (175.27) (341.23) (302.13) (99.11) 
Bursary 1.941 2.123 2.266 2.186 2.639 
 (130.20) (157.16) (357.74) (303.80) (85.63) 
Diploma 1.446 1.501 1.771 1.580 1.967 
 (114.90) (168.23) (330.20) (272.57) (104.68) 
Bachelor 2.247 2.554 2.658 2.273 3.049 
 (151.51) (217.99) (454.34) (338.16) (97.35) 
Postgrad 2.271 2.345 2.740 2.330 3.016 
 (122.66) (158.76) (423.99) (335.64) (65.72) 
Experience 0.089 0.106 0.119 0.073 0.034 
 (53.73) (56.76) (173.27) (72.93) (6.73) 
Expersq 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.004 
 (5.82) (11.83) (13.69) (42.41) (27.78) 
Chi2 17316.5 24555.3 140887 99984 8194.9 
Observations 9693 12318 68271 68208 5079 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 Industry  
57 
Industry  
58 
Industry 
59 
Industry 
60 
Industry 
62 
School Cert 0.728 1.190 1.511 1.064 1.099 
 (114.65) (161.57) (199.89) (129.78) (232.92) 
UE 1.284 2.049 2.721 1.757 1.582 
 (178.05) (228.37) (269.68) (198.35) (286.77) 
Bursary 1.531 2.377 3.191 2.146 1.780 
 (170.75) (206.80) (279.28) (218.76) (257.30) 
Diploma 1.281 1.629 2.413 1.613 1.335 
 (258.27) (240.73) (282.54) (200.37) (315.43) 
Bachelor 1.974 2.438 3.699 2.221 1.577 
 (357.66) (292.30) (358.84) (237.70) (167.37) 
Postgrad 1.953 2.722 4.036 2.186 1.548 
 (343.75) (334.68) (385.09) (209.84) (96.64) 
Experience 0.078 0.082 0.137 0.136 0.146 
 (83.69) (42.23) (104.92) (104.61) (185.12) 
Expersq 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (17.75) (31.69) (23.50) (3.88) (30.88) 
Chi2 118522 55287.3 94121 39652 61095 
Observations 70557 30582 45321 17745 25554 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (2001) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
2001 Industry  
1 
Industry  
2 
Industry  
3 
Industry  
4 
Industry  
6 
Industry  
7 
School cert 0.892 1.327 1.795 1.780 0.737 1.111 
 (103.37) (80.45) (166.09) (129.33) (105.29) (24.48) 
UE 1.280 1.967 2.705 2.453 1.139 1.616 
 (114.62) (97.17) (195.72) (146.83) (125.19) (28.47) 
Bursary 1.597 2.370 3.209 2.804 1.392 1.891 
 (98.04) (94.38) (192.73) (126.63) (97.08) (23.29) 
Diploma 1.387 2.024 2.646 2.280 1.030 1.758 
 (145.5) (103.6) (199.24) (147.29) (150.49) (36.2) 
Bachelor 1.674 2.477 3.359 2.989 1.614 2.195 
 (98.45) (92.01) (201.51) (135.39) (126.27) (24.33) 
Postgrad 1.348 2.346 3.103 3.201 2.085 2.352 
 (56.47) (70.32) (163.2) (99.91) (95.81) (20.88) 
Experience 0.182 0.110 0.108 0.117 0.207 0.142 
 (86.65) (32.98) (45.71) (32.22) (91.55) (11.19) 
Expersq -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (28.82) (9.02) (36.36) (21.93) (36.02) (1.22) 
Chi2 16022 11421 35838 17668 16531 1524 
Observations 9492 7977 17367 7743 6183 1707 
 
 
 
2001 Industry  
8 
Industry  
9 
Industry 
10 
Industry 
11 
Industry 
12 
Industry 
13 
School Cert 1.277 0.603 1.437 1.130 1.187 1.315 
 (15.82) (3.90) (30.23) (310.09) (104.54) (281.65) 
UE 1.684 0.647 1.831 1.588 1.793 2.044 
 (16.57) (3.46) (31.06) (338.18) (126.67) (338.23) 
Bursary 1.457 0.697 1.834 1.874 2.289 2.588 
 (11.53) (2.58) (25.93) (290.98) (126.59) (301.18) 
Diploma 1.466 0.850 1.596 1.295 1.667 1.802 
 919.24) (4.74) (35.78) (336.67) (136.41) (345.92) 
Bachelor 2.354 1.704 2.759 2.203 2.652 2.826 
 (19.74) (8.11) (39.34) (290.63) (152.60) (357.30) 
Postgrad 2.626 1.926 2.675 2.443 2.681 2.994 
 (19.97) (8.26) (32.91) (202.01) (127.42) (269.41) 
Experience 0.029 0.073 0.031 0.109 0.113 0.150 
 (2.14) (4.22) (3.29) (124.72) (49.59) (118.31) 
Expersq 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (5.58) (0.07) (10.19) (17.13) (10.32) (13.24) 
Chi2 414.9 191.9 1549.8 56530 11354 48273 
Observations 504 270 1977 18705 5229 15798 
 
Interval regression of Census income brackets, by industry.  
Independent variables are highest qualification achieved, experience and experience 
squared.  t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (2001) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
2001 Industry  
14 
Industry  
15 
Industry  
16 
Industry  
17 
Industry  
18 
Industry  
19 
School cert 1.255 1.738 1.729 1.091 1.053 1.492 
 (62.96) (119.42) (95.21) (232.01) (108.77) (145.12) 
UE 2.098 2.538 2.778 1.512 1.646 2.253 
 (84.66) (137.09) (110.66) (252.63) (131.05) (181.81) 
Bursary 2.556 2.771 3.093 1.773 1.712 2.582 
 (85.35) (121.67) (95.95) (202.13) (108.45) (185.71) 
Diploma 1.988 2.164 2.635 1.267 1.370 2.301 
 (89.97) (134.83) (113.75) (268.59) (153.94) (190.48) 
Bachelor 3.116 2.996 3.217 1.868 2.339 3.062 
 (110.52) (130.95) (108.46) (213.79) (148.38) (220.13) 
Postgrad 3.227 3.174 3.621 1.931 2.476 2.956 
 (94.79) (87.40) (73.04) (131.05) (108.33) (193.63) 
Experience 0.131 0.039 0.025 0.121 0.096 0.062 
 (33.97) (11.80) (5.09) (106.45) (37.28) (33.91) 
Expersq 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 (6.31) (35.67) (30.48) (4.27) (11.10) (42.81) 
Chi2 6404.3 11586.2 10377.1 44117.6 12138.6 29685.4 
Observations 3255 6285 8004 19482 5256 14724 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 Industry  
20 
Industry  
21 
Industry 
23 
Industry 
24 
Industry 
25 
Industry 
26 
School Cert 1.069 0.988 0.337 1.004 1.218 1.060 
 (77.92) (54.60) (3.69) (32.40) (131.67) (90.31) 
UE 1.583 1.616 0.927 1.400 1.805 1.443 
 (93.17) (70.11) (7.45) (35.37) (158.17) (96.46) 
Bursary 1.780 2.095 1.177 1.092 1.902 1.612 
 (76.67) (62.20) (7.20) (20.05) (124.96) (74.94) 
Diploma 1.502 1.599 0.495 1.113 1.590 1.207 
 (112.12) (76.71) (5.44) (37.22) (172.98) (103.59) 
Bachelor 2.302 2.174 1.427 1.438 2.215 1.959 
 (118.12) (85.38) (9.15) (25.04) (161.83) (101.45) 
Postgrad 2.378 2.478 1.134 0.938 2.164 2.001 
 (94.54) (70.55) (6.80) (10.79) (95.59) (77.68) 
Experience 0.051 0.067 0.073 0.045 0.095 0.098 
 (15.88) (13.98) (4.82) (6.20) (38.75) (31.30) 
Expersq 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (22.05) (12.11) (1.58) (6.99) (16.89) (4.35) 
Chi2 7201 4171 91.4 1430 13720.2 8693 
Observations 3318 2598 198 1179 6066 4386 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (2001) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
2001 Industry  
27 
Industry  
28 
Industry  
29 
Industry  
30 
Industry  
31 
Industry  
32 
School cert 1.115 1.002 1.066 1.258 1.254 0.912 
 (48.73) (63.16) (202.08) (138.01) (114.43) (99.34) 
UE 1.574 1.499 1.571 1.796 1.873 1.341 
 (54.40) (72.12) (235.15) (165.54) (144.24) (120.59) 
Bursary 1.958 1.670 1.721 1.865 2.286 1.521 
 (47.06) (57.94) (177.38) (133.42) (141.42) (95.33) 
Diploma 1.571 1.331 1.282 1.592 1.708 1.215 
 (69.31) (86.92) (254.28) (177.43) (161.66) (138.01) 
Bachelor 2.082 2.108 1.892 2.144 2.507 1.634 
 (56.99) (79.99) (199.04) (167.47) (180.27) (93.01) 
Postgrad 2.090 2.457 1.785 2.300 2.654 1.726 
 (43.55) (64.12) (114.60) (127.97) (156.70) (54.04) 
Experience 0.073 0.067 0.131 0.085 0.120 0.084 
 (17.54) (18.38) (103.38) (53.44) (51.38) (44.65) 
Expersq 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (11.43) (14.05) (12.84) (18.75) (6.70) (7.10) 
Chi2 3539.3 4744 33754.8 23171 16515.9 14950.6 
Observations 2199 2439 14436 12210 8637 7998 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 Industry  
33 
Industry  
34 
Industry 
35 
Industry 
36 
Industry 
37 
Industry 
38 
School Cert 0.865 1.192 0.905 0.670 0.557 0.943 
 (29.74) (66.03) (34.49) (7.88) (11.40) (275.27) 
UE 1.377 1.855 1.541 1.101 0.891 1.431 
 (39.22) (81.02) (48.80) (10.62) (14.03) (338.85) 
Bursary 1.720 2.089 1.956 1.981 1.196 1.629 
 (36.06) (66.30) (54.46) (15.49) (15.82) (275.05) 
Diploma 1.502 1.564 1.416 1.254 0.858 1.174 
 (48.82) (80.18) (55.93) (12.63) (18.39) (372.26) 
Bachelor 2.212 1.887 2.426 2.195 1.520 1.515 
 (59.56) (62.73) (74.40) (18.74) (26.02) (217.55) 
Postgrad 2.282 2.047 2.549 2.687 1.724 1.578 
 (56.83) (33.09) (70.83) (20.76) (25.09) (128.37) 
Experience 0.091 0.093 0.107 0.151 0.093 0.137 
 (16.87) (23.21) (27.16) (15.35) (12.60) (194.99) 
Expersq 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (3.22) (8.61) (0.94) (4.22) (3.03) (42.15) 
Chi2 2543 4855.6 5372.3 611.9 798.6 92336 
Observations 1944 2658 3591 444 708 42366 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (2001) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
2001 Industry  
39 
Industry  
40 
Industry  
41 
Industry  
42 
Industry  
43 
Industry  
44 
School cert 1.289 1.257 1.245 1.215 2.229 1.653 
 (142.71) (617.99) (254.40) (36.63) (52.85) (232.26) 
UE 1.831 2.101 2.160 1.824 3.259 2.313 
 (162.00) (829.36) (362.45) (41.03) (57.29) (252.56) 
Bursary 2.173 2.609 2.668 1.812 2.927 2.455 
 (140.47) (867.71) (393.78) (35.58) (50.89) (210.24) 
Diploma 1.654 1.921 2.242 1.535 2.868 1.955 
 (181.90) (815.67) (393.94) (41.55) (56.72) (242.09) 
Bachelor 2.390 2.736 2.532 2.392 4.031 3.037 
 (169.64) (912.29) (354.48) (44.17) (58.19) (207.58) 
Postgrad 2.551 2.733 2.424 2.638 3.705 3.062 
 (116.28) (682.04) (275.98) (37.86) (44.05) (117.14) 
Experience 0.086 0.133 0.158 0.041 -0.124 0.093 
 (38.25) (372.97) (212.24) (7.26) (12.15) (42.65) 
Expersq 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.002 
 (19.90) (26.65) (13.14) (11.08) (28.74) (40.19) 
Chi2 21262.6 428051 89323 2129 2862.3 28893.7 
Observations 12018 158010 35133 2016 4143 13284 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 Industry  
45 
Industry  
46 
Industry 
47 
Industry 
48 
Industry 
49 
Industry 
50 
School Cert 0.683 0.747 0.958 1.537 1.103 1.188 
 (16.61) (74.70) (142.60) (100.09) (83.19) (117.70) 
UE 1.420 1.359 1.647 2.533 2.162 2.212 
 (27.81) (116.47) (210.12) (130.00) (117.05) (171.07) 
Bursary 1.691 1.779 2.041 3.434 3.012 2.892 
 (27.01) (128.96) (211.97) (156.14) (145.91) (199.17) 
Diploma 1.159 1.653 1.702 2.662 2.629 2.291 
 (27.86) (144.90) (233.42) (139.20) (132.48) (176.78) 
Bachelor 1.773 2.079 2.239 3.878 3.478 3.224 
 (30.77) (147.86) (230.22) (176.95) (166.24) (229.71) 
Postgrad 1.869 2.210 2.258 3.923 3.471 3.368 
 (21.59) (116.27) (158.47) (165.09) (155.18) (219.20) 
Experience 0.076 0.098 0.097 0.167 0.143 0.095 
 (11.09) (61.72) (69.37) (63.04) (67.07) (52.69) 
Expersq 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (1.02) (1.50) (15.63) (5.60) (4.09) (27.16) 
Chi2 1340.8 15929.9 35856.4 25372.3 24852.2 34198 
Observations 1107 6978 19704 14271 15579 16119 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4A (2001) : Wage Effects of Qualifications, by Industry  
 
 
2001 Industry  
51 
Industry  
52 
Industry  
54 
Industry  
55 
Industry  
56 
School cert 0.973 1.289 1.140 1.337 1.689 
 (77.06) (141.67) (247.59) (172.49) (227.13) 
UE 1.836 2.220 2.136 2.093 2.762 
 (115.90) (194.08) (364.54) (223.06) (293.29) 
Bursary 2.323 2.849 2.807 2.468 3.525 
 (133.28) (202.60) (427.24) (249.23) (322.36) 
Diploma 1.911 1.929 2.184 1.978 2.490 
 (122.54) (191.39) (381.07) (220.52) (286.85) 
Bachelor 2.653 3.251 3.169 2.601 3.775 
 (154.21) (252.71) (507.43) (267.95) (358.71) 
Postgrad 2.734 2.987 3.337 2.732 3.765 
 (138.54) (196.65) (500.90) (272.53) (326.91) 
Experience 0.082 0.132 0.136 0.033 0.129 
 (42.04) (66.28) (177.54) (25.45) (79.73) 
Expersq 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 
 (14.75) (13.33) (19.68) (59.78) (35.70) 
Chi2 17405.5 27844.2 178617 78474 59885.7 
Observations 9786 12444 83709 64164 25356 
t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 Industry  
57 
Industry  
58 
Industry 
59 
Industry 
60 
Industry 
62 
School Cert 0.851 1.471 1.402 1.053 1.063 
 (143.90) (229.20) (155.28) (133.05) (208.62) 
UE 1.491 2.425 2.600 1.759 1.615 
 (217.85) (294.77) (201.91) (190.84) (264.08) 
Bursary 1.935 3.098 3.325 2.448 1.893 
 (237.46) (319.94) (220.83) (233.63) (244.67) 
Diploma 1.672 2.266 2.403 1.853 1.471 
 (307.40) (312.79) (212.12) (205.13) (283.74) 
Bachelor 2.464 3.306 4.187 2.603 1.792 
 (407.16) (386.34) (287.18) (254.49) (194.69) 
Postgrad 2.368 3.533 4.318 2.510 1.545 
 (391.94) (415.26) (290.31) (225.50) (103.11) 
Experience 0.029 0.078 0.141 0.143 0.146 
 (31.04) (46.65) (76.37) (111.47) (154.61) 
Expersq 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (76.34) (55.37) (22.53) (4.27) (25.45) 
Chi2 132799 83030 81766 45235.5 52036.8 
Observations 82149 39192 55635 20553 21507 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 4B : Skills premium in each industry and Census year,  
                          and change in premia between Census years 
 
1991 1996 2001 ratio ratio ratio
Code Industry bach/sc bach/sc bach/sc 1996:1991 2001:1996 2001:1991
   
1 Dairy Farming 1.983 1.827 1.877 0.921 1.027 0.946
2 Sheep and Beef Farming 1.521 1.781 1.866 1.171 1.047 1.227
3 Other Farming 1.606 1.680 1.872 1.046 1.114 1.165
4 Agricultural Services 1.645 1.717 1.679 1.043 0.978 1.020
6 Forestry and Logging 2.261 1.861 2.189 0.823 1.176 0.968
7 Fishing 1.659 1.593 1.977 0.960 1.241 1.192
8 Coal Mining 2.777 2.298 1.844 0.828 0.802 0.664
9 Oil & Gas Exploration  3.139 1.783 2.825 0.568 1.584 0.900
10 Other Mining and Quarrying 1.920 1.784 1.920 0.929 1.077 1.000
11 Slaughtering and Preserving Meat 1.713 1.946 1.949 1.136 1.002 1.138
12 Dairy Products 1.766 1.868 2.234 1.058 1.196 1.265
13 Other Food Preparation 2.021 1.973 2.149 0.976 1.090 1.064
14 Beverages and Tobacco 2.076 2.296 2.483 1.106 1.082 1.196
15 Textiles 1.658 1.581 1.724 0.953 1.090 1.040
16 Wearing Apparel and Footwear 1.747 1.594 1.861 0.912 1.168 1.065
17 Wood and Wood Products 1.627 1.485 1.712 0.912 1.153 1.052
18 Paper and Paper Products 1.653 1.749 2.222 1.058 1.271 1.344
19 Printing and Publishing 1.581 1.712 2.053 1.083 1.199 1.298
20 Industrial Chemicals 2.239 1.936 2.154 0.865 1.112 0.962
21 Other Chemicals 2.164 2.174 2.201 1.005 1.012 1.017
23 Petroleum and Coal Products 2.650 2.743 4.234 1.035 1.544 1.598
24 Rubber Products 2.164 1.828 1.432 0.845 0.783 0.662
25 Plastic Products 1.903 1.661 1.818 0.873 1.095 0.955
26 Non Metallic Industries 1.904 1.855 1.848 0.975 0.996 0.971
27 Iron and Steel Products 1.794 1.812 1.867 1.010 1.031 1.041
28 Non-Ferrous Metals 1.805 2.064 2.103 1.143 1.019 1.165
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29 Fabricated Metal Products 1.770 1.683 1.776 0.951 1.055 1.003
30 Machinery nec. 1.916 1.791 1.704 0.935 0.952 0.889
31 Electrical Machinery 1.852 1.781 1.999 0.962 1.123 1.080
32 Transport Equipment 1.832 1.706 1.791 0.931 1.050 0.977
33 Professional Equipment 2.640 2.173 2.557 0.823 1.177 0.969
34 Other Manufacturing 1.929 1.268 1.582 0.657 1.248 0.820
35 Electricity 2.118 1.977 2.681 0.933 1.356 1.266
36 Gas Manufacture and Distribution 2.303 2.686 3.278 1.166 1.220 1.423
37 Water Works and Supply 2.093 1.728 2.727 0.826 1.578 1.303
38 Building and Ancillary Services 1.656 1.477 1.606 0.892 1.088 0.970
39 Other Construction 1.527 1.595 1.854 1.045 1.163 1.215
40 Wholesale and Retail Trade 1.878 1.986 2.177 1.057 1.096 1.159
41 Restaurants and Hotels 1.713 1.853 2.035 1.082 1.098 1.188
42 Rail Transport 1.934 1.727 1.968 0.893 1.140 1.018
43 Road Passenger Transport 1.967 1.824 1.809 0.927 0.992 0.920
44 Road Freight Transport 1.386 1.674 1.837 1.207 1.098 1.325
45 Water Transport 1.881 2.313 2.595 1.230 1.122 1.380
46 Air Transport 2.135 2.390 2.784 1.119 1.165 1.304
47 Services to Transport 1.677 1.870 2.337 1.115 1.250 1.394
48 Communication 1.921 2.221 2.523 1.156 1.136 1.313
49 Banking 2.163 2.453 3.153 1.134 1.285 1.458
50 Other Financial Services 1.942 2.066 2.714 1.063 1.314 1.397
51 Insurance 1.922 2.306 2.727 1.200 1.183 1.419
52 Owning and Leasing Real Estate 2.068 2.167 2.521 1.048 1.163 1.219
54 Owning Owner-Occupied Dwellings 2.106 2.311 2.781 1.097 1.203 1.320
55 Business Services 1.694 1.785 1.946 1.054 1.090 1.149
56 Public Administration and Defence 1.612 1.700 2.235 1.054 1.315 1.386
57 Sanitary and Cleaning Services 2.655 2.710 2.896 1.021 1.069 1.091
58 Education 1.736 2.048 2.247 1.179 1.097 1.294
59 Social and Community Services 2.475 2.449 2.987 0.989 1.220 1.207
60 Health Services 2.137 2.088 2.472 0.977 1.184 1.157
62 Recreational and Cultural Services 1.542 1.435 1.686 0.931 1.175 1.094
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Appendix 5 :       Changes in within-group income inequality by highest education level  
    Full-time workers, 1991-1996 and 1996-2001     
          
    1991-1996  1996-2001  
          
Education Gini Gini Gini d_Gini Mean Mean d_Gini Mean Mean
level 1991 1996 2001 1991-1996 absolute %-age 1996-2001 absolute %-age 
 (1) (2) (3) (2) - (1) change change (3) - (2) change change
 in Gini in Gini in Gini in Gini
          
No qualificat’s 0.231 0.255 0.267 0.024 0.021 9.3% 0.013 0.010 4.0%
School Cert 0.243 0.256 0.264 0.013 0.011 4.6% 0.008 0.006 2.6%
UE/6th form 0.261 0.274 0.289 0.013 0.006 2.7% 0.015 0.011 4.3%
Bursary 0.309 0.330 0.345 0.022 0.015 5.8% 0.015 0.012 3.5%
Diploma 0.242 0.255 0.263 0.013 0.011 4.6% 0.008 0.006 2.4%
Bachelor  0.274 0.308 0.299 0.033 0.030 10.9% -0.008 -0.008 -2.9%
Postgraduate 0.258 0.292 0.276 0.033 0.028 11.2% -0.015 -0.016 -5.1%
Total 0.267 0.289 0.298 0.022 0.019 7.4% 0.009 0.006 2.2%
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Appendix 6: Bivariate relationships between industry computer use and the change in   
                      between-groups inequality for all full time workers, 1991-1996 
 Independent variables 
Missing values set to: OutlayTotal
Hardware  
OutlayTotal
Software  
OutlayTotal
ComputingAll  
   
(i) Zero 3.174 2.243 2.061 
  (0.90) (2.90)** (2.67)** 
     
(ii) ($0.5m/total outlay) 3.060 2.242 2.060 
  (0.85) (2.90)** (2.66)** 
     
(iii) Lowest non-missing ratio 3.229 2.248 2.072 
  (0.89) (2.90)** (2.67)** 
     
(iv) Mean of non-missing ratios 3.159 2.307 2.162 
  (0.75) (2.89)** (2.67)** 
     
 
 Bivariate relationships between industry computer use and the change in 
between-groups inequality for all full-time workers, 1996-2001 
 
  Independent variables 
 
 
 
Missing values set to: 
 
OutlayTotal
Hardware  
OutlayTotal
Software  
OutlayTotal
ComputingAll  
     
(i) Zero 0.868 1.865 1.568 
  (0.21) (1.27) (1.14) 
     
(ii) ($0.5m/total outlay) 1.029 1.887 1.585 
  (0.25) (1.28) (1.15) 
     
(iii) Lowest non-missing ratio 1.189 1.909 1.602 
  (0.29) (1.29) (1.16) 
     
(iv) Mean of non-missing ratios 1.672 1.617 1.291 
  (0.85) (1.98)* (1.85) 
 
Note: The values in the table are coefficients from bivariate regressions. The dependent variable for each 
regression is the ratio of the marginal effect of a Bachelor’s degree relative to the marginal effect of School 
Certificate in Census year t, relative to the value of the same ratio in Census year (t-5). The independent variables 
are, alternately, the ratio of industry spending on computer hardware to total industry outlay, the ratio of software 
spending, and the ratio of all computer expenditures to total industry outlay. Each regression is estimated on the 
sample of 58 industries, and is weighted by industry size in the first year of each interval   
Heteroscedastically-robust t-statistics in parenthesis;   
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. 
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Appendix 7 : Multivariate relationships between change in the skills premium  
                       and industry proportion of expenditure on computing, with   
                       controls for profitability, wages and trade effects 
Appendix 7A 
  
General  
employment change 
  
Targeted  
employment change 
      
1991-1996  ICT purchases ICT purchases ICT purchases ICT purchases 
  separated grouped separated grouped 
       
Hardware/Total 2.954   2.823   
  (0.91)   (1.01)   
Software/Total 2.208   2.019   
  (2.22)*   (2.35)*   
All computing/Total  2.312  2.123 
   (2.94)**  (2.78)** 
Op. surplus/Total 0.149 0.151 0.174 0.176 
  (0.62) (0.62) (0.7) (0.71) 
Wages/Total 0.047 0.048 0.039 0.04 
  (0.35) (0.36) (0.28) (0.28) 
Exports/Total 0.135 0.137 0.139 0.14 
  (1.1) (1.14) (1.18) (1.21) 
Imports/Total -0.349 -0.339 -0.371 -0.361 
  (1.92) (1.83) (2.05)* (1.95) 
Change in employment 0.005 0.007 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.05) (0.08) (1.2) (1.23) 
Constant 0.989 0.988 0.997 0.996 
  (10.55)** (10.56)** (10.16)** (10.19)** 
R-squared 0.1745 0.1739 0.2015 0.2008 
F-test 0.0041 0.0023 0.0009 0.0005 
  F(7,50) F(6,51) F(7,48) F(6,49) 
 
Note: The values in the table are coefficients from multivariate regressions. The dependent variable for 
each regression is the ratio of the marginal effect of a Bachelor’s degree relative to the marginal effect of 
School Certificate in 1996, relative to the value of the same ratio in 1991. The independent variables are 
the ratio of industry spending on all computer inputs, plus control variables for operating surplus, wages, 
imports, exports, and the extent of employment change. Each regression is estimated on the sample of 58 
industries, and is weighted by industry size in 1991.   
 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
 
 
 
 
 248
 
 
Appendix 7 : Multivariate relationships between change in the skills premium  
                       and industry proportion of expenditure on computing, with  
                       controls for profitability, wages and trade effects 
 
 
 
General  
employment change 
  
Targeted  
employment change 
Appendix 7B  
      
1996-2001  ICT purchases ICT purchases ICT purchases ICT purchases 
  separated grouped separated grouped 
       
Hardware/Total -0.948   -1.137   
  (0.32)   (0.38)   
Software/Total 1.848   1.841   
  (2.09)*  (2.31)*  
All computing/Total  1.419  1.417 
    (1.73)  (1.80) 
Op. surplus/Total 0.523 0.514 0.535 0.525 
  (3.40)** (3.32)** (3.42)** (3.35)** 
Wages/Total 0.120 0.113 0.122 0.117 
  (1.25) (1.18) (1.26) (1.18) 
Exports/Total 0.032 0.026 0.040 0.036 
  (0.39) (0.31) (0.49) (0.43) 
Imports/Total 0.005 -0.035 0.013 -0.025 
  (0.03) (0.19) (0.07) (0.14) 
Change in employment -0.012 -0.021 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.17) (0.31) (0.91) (0.92) 
Constant 1.011 1.017 1.011 1.015 
  (20.02)** (20.19)** (21.88)** (21.47)** 
R-squared 0.260 0.253 0.2769 0.2655 
F-test 0.00 0.0036 0.0004 0.0018 
  F(7,50) F(6,51) F(7,48) F(6,49) 
 
Note: The values in the table are coefficients from multivariate regressions. The dependent variable for 
each regression is the ratio of the marginal effect of a Bachelor’s degree relative to the marginal effect of 
School Certificate in 1996, relative to the value of the same ratio in 1991. The independent variables are 
the ratio of industry spending on all computer inputs, plus control variables for operating surplus, wages, 
imports, exports, and the extent of employment change. Each regression is estimated on the sample of 58 
industries, and is weighted by industry size in 1996.   
 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Appendix 8 : Relationship between industry computer use and the  
                       change in within-group inequality for full-time workers 
 
 1991 - 1996 1996 - 2001 
     
 Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate Multivariate 
     
No qualifications -0.285 -0.284 0.316 0.217 
 (2.93)** (3.14)** (1.08) (1.05) 
School Certificate -0.281 -0.280 0.006 0.095 
 (3.44)** (1.86) (0.02) (0.8) 
UE / 6th Form -0.156 0.027 0.190 0.247 
 (1.06) (0.11) (0.54) (1.31) 
Bursary / 7th Form 0.008 -0.072 -0.449 -0.542 
 (0.04) (0.20) (1.58) (2.27)* 
Other post-school -0.028 0.128 -0.004 0.085 
 (0.15) (1.05) (0.02) (0.79) 
Bachelor’s degree 0.342 0.332 0.189 0.106 
 (1.83) (2.35)* (1.11) (0.78) 
Postgraduate 0.759 0.833 0.035 -0.058 
 (5.24)** (3.99)** (0.1) (0.26) 
ALL SKILL GROUPS -0.030 0.045 0.053 0.096 
 (0.26) (0.54) (0.39) (1.03) 
Dependent variable is the change in the Gini coefficient within each qualifications level. 
Independent variable is proportion of computer expenditure by industry. Multivariate model 
includes control variables for profitability, wages, and trade effects. 
Each regression is estimated on the sample of 58 industries and is weighted by industry size. 
Heteroscedastically robust t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix 9A: Bivariate relationships between employment change and  
                         industry computer use, by educational level 
         
 All workers  Male workers  Female workers 
         
 
1991 
-1996 
1996
-2001  
1991
-1996
1996
-2001  
1991 
-1996 
1996
-2001
        
        
All levels -2.31 -2.01  -2.70 -0.06  -2.82 5.12 
 (1.23) (0.72)  (1.12) (0.50)  (1.21) (0.48) 
         
         
No  -4.18 -3.44  -5.34 -0.11  -2.98 4.06 
qualification *(2.03) (0.89)  (1.67) (0.34)  (1.49) (0.45) 
         
School  -6.26 -7.83  -7.97 -0.95  -5.46 8.31 
Certificate **(3.42) **(3.07)  **(3.85) **(4.43)  *(2.26) (0.55) 
         
U.E./6th  -15.26 -9.71  -14.85 -0.82  -17.00 5.07 
Form **(6.58) **(3.72)  **(5.45) **(6.05)  **(7.60) (0.32) 
         
Bursary -18.05 -4.66  -18.30 -0.52  -18.23 9.04 
 **(5.93) (1.44)  **(6.47) **(4.10)  **(3.80) (0.60) 
         
Diploma -2.26 1.14  -2.46 0.49  -2.68 1.58 
 (1.89) (0.41)  (1.25) **(2.94)  (1.70) (0.22) 
         
Bachelor's  -0.71 -6.66  0.18 -0.11  -0.06 -4.86 
degree (0.17) (1.28)  (0.04) (0.74)  **(5.00) (0.39) 
         
         
Postgraduate 1.67 -0.94  1.34 0.21  3.40 -1.29 
degree (0.32) (0.26)  (0.21) (1.38)  (0.70) (0.18) 
         
         
Coefficients from labour-skills demand equation. 
Dependent variable is proportional change in employment at each skill level. 
Independent variable is industry outlay on all computer inputs grouped together. 
 
Heteroscedastically robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Appendix 9B:  Bivariate relationships between employment change and industry 
                          computer use, by educational level, with hardware expenditure  
                          separated from software and services  
  
 
 1991-1996 1996-2001 
     
 
Hardware 
Total 
Software/Serv’s
Total 
Hardware 
Total 
Software/Serv’s
Total 
     
All levels 2.40 -2.94 -3.32 -1.81 
 (0.22) (1.57) (0.34) (0.71) 
     
     
No  -4.33 -4.16 -10.73 -2.02 
Qualification (0.49) (1.96) (1.06) (0.50) 
     
School  -2.51 -6.61 -13.06 -7.15 
Certificate (0.26) **(3.44) (1.48) **(2.99) 
     
U.E./6th  -0.38 -16.06 -8.51 -9.84 
Form (0.05) **(8.50) (1.02) **(4.36) 
     
Bursary -11.64 -18.53 4.19 -5.73 
 (0.95) **(6.66) (0.41) *(2.09) 
     
Diploma -4.32 -1.91 -3.65 2.05 
 (0.44) (1.14) (0.40) (0.72) 
     
Bachelor's  -2.80 -0.37 -20.58 -4.43 
degree (0.28) (0.08) (1.28) (1.16) 
     
Postgraduate 37.97 -4.25 21.30 -4.80 
degree (1.78) (0.75) *(2.06) (1.18) 
     
Coefficients from labour-skills demand equation. 
Dependent variable is proportional change in employment at each skill level. 
Independent variables are industry outlays on computer hardware and computer software and services 
 
Heteroscedastically robust t-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Appendix 10A: Relationship between employment change and industry computer use 
by educational level. Multivariate results including controls for profitability, wages, 
trade effects and gender.  1991-1996. 
 
 All  No School U.E./ Bursary Diploma Bach’s Postgrad 
1991-1996 Levels Qualificat’s Certificate 6th form   Degree Degree 
        
         
Computing -3.79 -5.84 -9.52 -19.47 -21.94 -3.38 -1.08 0.98 
expenditure (1.78)+ (2.32)* (4.33)** (6.65)** (4.81)** (2.25)* (0.51) (0.38) 
         
Imports -0.46 -0.30 -0.68 -0.46 -1.44 -0.34 -0.82 -2.31 
 (1.14) (0.96) (1.83)+ (0.81) (1.7)+ (0.87) (1.07) (1.97)* 
         
Exports -0.34 -0.48 -0.50 -0.64 -0.92 -0.20 0.64 1.18 
 (1.74)+ (2.74)** (2.33)* (1.96)+ (1.66)+ (1.11) (1.5) (0.98) 
         
Wages -0.55 -0.52 0.08 0.05 -0.81 -0.43 -0.81 -0.72 
 (1.92)+ (1.48) (0.18) (0.07) (0.91) (1.72)+ (2.45)* (1.93)+
         
Operating -0.50 -0.38 -0.42 -0.75 -0.39 -0.70 0.04 0.85 
surplus (1.01) (0.79) (0.79) (1.15) (0.44) (1.42) (0.09) (1.1) 
         
Proportion 0.24 0.13 0.010 0.18 0.09 0.24 0.42 -0.01 
of female (1.2) (0.81) (0.03) ( 0.65) (0.17) (1.48) (1.2) (0.01) 
workers         
         
F-test 1.39 2.26+ 4.18** 13.08** 9.06** 1.15 4.45** 3.35** 
R2 0.15 0.23 0.38 0.62 0.44 0.17 0.30 0.28 
RESET (F)  1.42 0.99 1.48 1.07 0.52 1.43 0.90 3.28* 
Number of observations = 58      
Degrees of freedom for F test are usually 6, 51    
The Regression Specification Test (RESET) is distributed as F with 3 and 48 degrees of freedom 
  
Coefficients from multivariate labour-skills demand equation. 
Dependent variable is proportional change in employment at each skill level. 
Independent variables are industry outlays on computer hardware and computer software and services, 
imports, exports, wages and operating surplus, all expressed as proportions of total industry inputs; and 
proportion of female workers in each industry in 1991. 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Appendix 10B                                                                          1996 – 2001 
 
Relationship between employment change and industry computer use by  
educational level.   Multivariate results including controls for profitability,  
wages, trade effects and gender.   
 
 All  No School U.E./ Bursary Diploma Bach’s Postgrad 
1996-2001 Levels Qualificat’s Certificate 6th form   Degree Degree 
         
         
Computing -4.05 -6.54 -11.46 -14.96 -10.50 -0.32 -7.98 -3.55 
expenditure (1.47) (1.66)+ (2.71)** (2.87)** (1.78)+ (0.12) (1.25) (0.64) 
         
Imports -0.44 -0.71 -0.62 -0.24 -0.04 -0.21 1.02 0.62 
 (0.98) (1.38) (1.26) (0.52) (0.06) (0.56) (0.94) (0.53) 
         
Exports -0.26 -0.31 -0.35 -0.21 -0.23 -0.32 -0.86 -0.89 
 (1.12) (1.09) (1.24) (0.76) (0.76) (1.63)+ (1.42) (1.05) 
         
Wages 0.16 0.07 0.53 1.34 1.56 -0.03 0.40 0.99 
 (0.29) (0.1) (0.58) (1.13) (1.22) (0.08) (0.44) (2.04)* 
         
Operating 0.60 0.39 0.37 1.05 1.48 0.13 1.79 2.24 
Surplus (0.73) (0.48) (0.39) (0.9) (1.1) (0.19) (1.39) (2.27)* 
         
Proportion 0.21 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.23 0.96 -0.86 
of female (0.92) (0.99) (0.01) (0.03) (0.39) (1.08) (1.01) (1.28) 
Workers         
         
F-test 2.46* 1.27 2.84* 6.12** 2.87* 2.10+ 0.96 1.23 
R2 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.04 
RESET (F) 0.11 0.13 0.38 1.02 1.36 0.44 1.00 0.14 
Number of observations = 57       
Degrees of freedom for F test are usually 6, 50      
The Regression Specification Test (RESET) is distributed as F with 3 and 47 degrees of freedom. 
   
Coefficients from multivariate labour-skills demand equation. 
Dependent variable is proportional change in employment at each skill level. 
Independent variables are industry outlays on computer hardware and computer software and services, 
imports, exports, wages and operating surplus, all expressed as proportions of total industry inputs; and 
proportion of female workers in each industry in 1996.. 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
+ significant at 10% level; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Appendix 11 : Extention of the Tobit Model (intreg in Stata) 
 
Each of the j observations comes from one of four possible subsets of the data:  
For  the actual earnings (i.e., yCj∈ j) are observed, giving standard point data.  
For  the data are left-censored, where the unobserved yLj ∈ j is only known to be less than or equal to the threshold yLj  e.g. 
≤$4,999).   
For  the data are right-censored, with the unobserved yRj∈ j only known to be greater than or equal to the threshold yRj (e.g.  
≥$70,000).  
The other Ij∈  observations are intervals, where all that is known is that the unobserved yj is in the interval  The 
log likelihood function is: 
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Appendix 12: Skill levels from Pappas (2001) regrouped to the           
                        N Z Standard Classification of Occupations                  
Occupation Cognitive 
Skill 
Interactive 
Skill 
Motor 
Skill 
     
1 Legislators, Administrators & 
Managers 8.52 6.41 5.44 
2 Professionals 8.52 6.41 5.44 
3 Technicians and associate 
professionals 7.39 4.44 4.38 
4 Clerks 4.76 2.12 5.17 
5 Service and sales workers 4.21 3.00 3.37 
6 Agricultural and fisheries 
workers 3.85 2.44 5.25 
7 Trades workers 5.45 1.61 8.34 
8 Plant and machine operators 
and assemblers 3.72 1.94 5.64 
9 Elementary occupations (incl 
residuals) 2.57 1.22 1.94 
Skill levels from Pappas (2001) translated from ASCO to NZSCO. 
The Pappas list of occupations has no equivalent to NZSCO occupation 1, so 
figures for occupation 2 were assumed to be comparable.  
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